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Abstract
The ubiquitous reliance on software systems increases the need for ensuring that
systems behave correctly and are well protected against security risks. Runtime
enforcement is a dynamic analysis technique that utilizes software monitors to
check the runtime behaviour of a software system with respect to a correctness
specification. Whenever the runtime behaviour of the monitored system is about
to deviate from the specification (either due to a programming bug or a security
hijack attack), the monitors apply enforcement techniques to prevent this deviation.
Current Runtime Enforcement techniques require that the correctness specifi-
cation defines the behaviour of the enforcement monitor itself. This burdens the
specifier with not only having to define property that needs to be enforced, but
also with having to specify how this should be enforced at runtime; we thus relieve
the specifier from this burden by resorting to a highly expressive logic. Using a
logic we allow the specifier to define the correctness specification as a logic formula
from which we can automatically synthesise the appropriate enforcement monitor.
Highly expressive logics can, however, permit for defining a wide variety of
formulae, some of which cannot actually be enforced correctly at runtime. We
thus study the enforceability of Hennessy Milner Logic with Recursion (µHML)
for which we identify a subset that allows for defining enforceable formulae. This
allows us to define a synthesis function that translates enforceable formulae into
enforcement monitors. As our monitors are meant to ensure the correct behaviour
of the monitored system, it is imperative that they work correctly themselves. We
thus study formal definitions that allow us to ensure that our enforcement monitors
behave correctly.
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1. Introduction
Modern society is becoming more dependent on software solutions, thus increasing
the need for software systems to behave correctly. In an ideal world, the correctness
of software systems should be entirely verified pre-deployment using static verifi-
cation techniques (e.g., Theorem Proving or Model Checking). These techniques
can statically determine whether a system is well-behaved, or not, as specified by a
correctness property, which is often expressed in terms of an abstract logic.
However, as software systems become increasingly larger and more complex,
pre-deployment verification becomes exponentially harder due to the state explo-
sion problems inherent to static verification techniques [34, 5]. As a compromise,
correctness properties can be decomposed [67, 60, 7] into smaller parts and verified
using a combination of static (pre-deployment) and dynamic (post-deployment)
verification techniques. Runtime Monitoring is a lightweight, dynamic verification
technique in which the correctness of a program is assessed by only analysing the
current execution wrt. some correctness property.
In most monitoring settings [15, 48, 25, 49], the correctness property is gen-
erally specified as a formula in a logic with precise formal semantics, from which
a monitor is then automatically synthesised. This monitor is essentially the exe-
cutable software which observes and analyses the runtime execution of a program
in relation to the given property, and reacts accordingly. Monitoring is currently
gaining interest in verification [54, 81] since it provides a mechanism for verifying
1
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and (in certain cases) ensuring correct system behaviour after a system is deployed.
Runtime Enforcement (RE) [45, 54, 64] is a monitoring technique which ensures
that the system behaviour is always in agreement with the correctness specifica-
tion. The monitor (a.k.a. the enforcer) should therefore be capable of anticipating
incorrect behaviour and countering it before it actually happens. Hence, enforcers
are typically designed to act as an intermediary which wraps around the system
and scrutinises its interactions. During analysis, the enforcers are thus able to
transform incorrect executions into correct ones by either suppressing incorrect
events (interactions) exhibited by the system, or by inserting events by executing
actions on behalf of the system [54, 64].
The execution transformation capabilities of action suppression and insertion
were first introduced in [54] in terms of special finite state automata called Edit-
Automata. However, specifying correctness properties directly in terms of Edit-
Automata, burdens the specifier with having to manually identify the points in
which the enforcer must suppress or insert a specific system action. As identified
in earlier work by Bielova et. al [21, 18], in most RE approaches there does not
exist a distinction between the specification and the enforcer, which means that the
specifiers must not only reason about what property they want to enforce, but also
about how they should enforce it. Hence, an algorithmic enforcer should ideally be
automatically derived from a declarative correctness property that is expressed as
a logic formula.
Being able to derive enforcers from logic formulae allows for integrating Runtime
Enforcement within a multi-pronged verification approach that combines static and
dynamic verification. Such an approach can therefore benefit from the dynamic
nature of runtime enforcement to completely ensure correct system behaviour,
while minimizing the possibilities of incurring state explosion when applying pre-
deployment verification in cases where enforcement might not be possible. This,
however, requires understanding the boundaries of enforceability, i.e., determining
which types of properties can actually be enforced at runtime or not.
2
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When used in conjunction to other verification techniques, Runtime Enforce-
ment raises a number of issues related to:
(i) the expressiveness of the logic used for defining correctness specifications,
(ii) the correctness of the enforcers themselves, and
(iii) the implementability and feasibility of enforcing a property at runtime.
In the case of (i), making use of a highly expressive logic is important since
the more expressive the logic is, the more types of correctness properties one can
express. Although some parts of the logic might not be enforceable, when used in
combination with other verification techniques, one can employ standard techniques
[67, 7, 60] to decompose a large (possibly non-enforceable) property into a collection
of smaller properties, such that the enforceable ones can be enforced at runtime,
while the others are statically verified. Identifying which parts of the logic are
enforceable is therefore crucial.
The second issue, i.e., (ii), stipulates that ensuring a degree of correctness
about the enforcers is essential, especially since enforcers are often treated as part
of the trusted computing base. Prior work [54, 20, 44, 76] suggests that enforcers
must at least be both Sound and Transparent. A sound enforcer is one which
always manages to enforce the given property, while a transparent one only applies
enforcement when necessary i.e., if a system is well-behaved the enforcers should
not modify its runtime behaviour, and if they do, the modified behaviour should
be somehow equivalent to the original one.
Finally, issue (iii) concerns the fact that most work carried out so far on runtime
enforcement has either focussed entirely on its theoretical aspects (e.g., [20, 44, 54,
64, 81]), or else on the implementation aspect (e.g., [22, 23, 29, 75]). To our
knowledge, little to no work has been conducted to study the enforceability of a
logic, assess whether it is possible to synthesise sound and transparent enforcers
that are also implementable, and if so develop an actual implementation that is
based on these provably correct enforcers. Assessing whether these enforcement
3
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mechanisms can actually be implemented thus enables the understanding of the
potential of runtime enforcement wrt. to real world constraints.
Despite these issues, software development and maintenance can however ben-
efit from Runtime Enforcement in various ways. For instance, enforcement tech-
niques provide an excellent way of ensuring the correct functionality of critical
systems, i.e., systems which do not afford to misbehave. Such techniques can also
be used as a means of protecting systems against security attacks that attempt to
hijack the control flow of the enforced system, e.g., enforcers can shield the system
by suppressing harmful external stimuli [20], or steer the execution of the system
to a more stable state from where the system can be controlled using safe and
well-understood procedures [30].
1.1 Aims and Objectives
In this report we investigate ways of enabling correctness properties to first be
specified using a highly-expressive logic, which is independent of the verification or
enforcement technique, and then be automatically converted into an enforcer capa-
ble of enforcing the specified property by inserting or suppressing specific system
actions as necessary.
We thus follow the line of research investigated in [49, 50, 31, 2, 6] where they
establish a correspondence between a declarative model of correctness, i.e., the
logic, and an operational model of correctness, i.e., the monitors. We aim to apply
this methodology to runtime enforcement, and in turn develop a notion of enforce-
ability, i.e., a relation between the meaning of a property expressed as a logic
formula, and the ability to enforce it at runtime. Based on this notion, we iden-
tify a maximally expressive subset of our logic that allows for defining enforceable
properties.
More concretely, we aim to study the enforceability of properties defined in
terms of Hennessy Milner Logic with recursion (µHML) [5, 61, 49] − a well stud-
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ied branching time logic. Due to its high expressivity, µHML can allow for defining
a wide variety of properties, some of which might not be enforceable. It is, how-
ever, an ideal logic to use in a multi-pronged verification approach, by which a
large property can be rewritten into smaller parts and verified (or enforced) using
multiple techniques. Moreover, since µHML is one of the most expressive logics,
it embeds other widely used logics and formalisms, such as LTL [77, 15, 14], CTL
and CTL* [33]. By conducting this study in the context of highly expressive logics,
we permit for less expressive logics to also benefit from some results obtained for
this logic.
To our knowledge, the enforceability of properties expressible via a highly ex-
pressive logic such as µHML, has never been studied in depth since no one has
yet presented a formal relation between a logic and the existing enforcement mech-
anisms. To fulfil our aims we therefore subdivide our work in the following 4
objectives:
O1. Defining Enforceability and Abstract Enforcers: To address issue (i)
(expressivity), we investigate how µHML specifications can be synthesised
into enforcers. Enforcers will first be defined using automata-based abstrac-
tions as this permits the study of runtime enforcement without having to deal
with the complexities of a full implementation. This should lead to defining a
notion of enforceability wrt. which we can identify the maximally expressive
enforceable subset of µHML specifications.
O2. A Formal Evaluation for Abstract Enforcers: We aim to prove a number
of correctness guarantees about our enforcement enforcers, such as soundness
and transparency [54], in order to address issue (ii) (correctness), i.e., that of
guaranteeing that the abstract enforcers O1 exhibit a level of correctness.
O3. Defining Implementable Enforcers: In preparation for tackling issue (iii)
(implementability and feasibility), we intend to develop another synthesis
function that converts enforceable µHML properties into implementable en-
forcers. To completely address research problem (ii) (i.e., correctness) we
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must ensure that these enforcers follow the formal guarantees proven for the
abstract enforcers in O2. We thus intend to prove correspondence, ascertain-
ing that the behaviour of our implementable enforcers is equivalent to that
described by the abstract enforcers of O2. This allows the former to inherit
every guarantee proven for the latter.
O4. Tool Development and Evaluation: Finally, we intend to completely ad-
dress feasibility by developing a RE prototype tool which implements the syn-
thesis of implementable enforcers introduced in O3. Having an actual im-
plementation will permit us to analyse and assess the performance overheads
that the enforcers impose upon the enforced system during runtime.
1.2 Report Structure
In this report we discuss the initial investigations addressing our first two objectives
O1 and O2; this is presented in Chapters 3 and 4. We outline the rest of the
objectives as part of our future work in Chapter 6. We structure our document as
follows:
• In Chapter 2 we provide the necessary preliminary material required for un-
derstanding our novel contributions; in this chapter we thus explain the cho-
sen logic (µHML), labelled transition systems, detection monitors and mon-
itorability.
• In Chapter 3 we define a formal runtime enforcement model capable of trans-
forming system events, with the aim of converting invalid system executions
into valid ones. We also present novel definitions by which we formally define
the meaning of enforceability, i.e., we define the criteria required for a µHML
formula to be enforceable.
• In Chapter 4 we identify a subset of µHML formulae that are enforceable via
suppressions and establish a synthesis function that converts formulae from
the identified enforceable subset into the resp. suppression enforcers. To
6
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ensure that the synthesised enforcers behave deterministically, we first apply
a normalization algorithm that converts the given formula into a semantically
equivalent normalized formula from which we generate the required enforcer.
As means to assess the correctness of our synthesis function, we prove that
the synthesised enforcers are deterministic, sound and transparent.
• Finally, in Chapter 5 we compare other related research, and then we conclude
in Chapter 6 with a summary of our contributions and future work.
• The Appendix Chapters A to C resp. provide: additional background mate-
rial for better understanding the concept of bisimilarity; proofs for lemmas
required for the normalization algorithm presented in Chapter 4; and fur-
ther proofs for lemmas required for proving that the synthesised enforcers
are deterministic, sound and transparent as specified in Chapter 4.
7
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In this section we overview preliminary material that is required for understanding
the novel work that we will be presenting in the forthcoming chapters.
2.1 Runtime Monitoring
In general, monitoring can be seen as the empirical observation of the behaviour of
some dynamic entity; when applied to software verification, the dynamic entity is
the software system being verified, while its behaviour is its runtime execution. In
software verification, monitoring is therefore a lightweight compromise for automat-
ically assessing the correctness of a system by observing and analysing its current
execution. Runtime monitoring constitutes the basis of several other techniques
including Runtime Verification, Adaptation and Enforcement.
In Runtime verification (RV) [62, 48] monitors adopt a passive role [15, 8] and
are exclusively concerned with receiving system events, analysing them, and detect-
ing (flagging) violations (or satisfactions) of their respective correctness properties;
this is illustrated in Figure 2.1a. Hence, RV monitors are capable of recognising
a (valid or invalid) execution and produce a verdict accordingly, while refraining
from directly modifying the system’s behaviour in any way.
By contrast, monitors in Runtime Adaptation (RA) [26, 56, 25, 53] break this
passivity by executing adaptation actions after analysing a particular sequence of
8
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Monitor System
events
flag
(a) Runtime Verification.
Monitor Systemevents
actions
(b) Runtime Adaptation.
Monitor System
events
modified events
(c) Runtime Enforcement.
Figure 2.1: Distinguishing between Runtime Verification, Adaptation and Enforce-
ment
system events. As shown in Figure 2.1b, rather than flagging violations, RA moni-
tors can execute adaptation actions upon recognising a specific execution sequence,
e.g., one which denotes incorrect behaviour. The adaptation actions executed by
the RA monitor do not necessarily correct or revert the detected misbehaviour
[66, 56]; instead they attempt to mitigate its effect by changing certain aspects of
the system as it executes, with the aim of preventing either future occurrences of
the same error, or of other errors that may potentially occur as a side-effect of the
detected violation. RA may also be used to optimise [1, 56] the system’s behaviour
based on the information collected by the monitor, e.g., switching off redundant
processes when under a small load, or increasing processes and load balancing when
under a heavy load.
In Runtime Enforcement (RE) [45, 54, 64] the system behaviour is kept in line
with the correctness requirement by anticipating incorrect behaviour and coun-
tering it before it actually happens. In RE the monitor (a.k.a. the enforcer) is
typically designed to act as a proxy which wraps around the system and analyses its
external interactions (see the dotted-line in Figure 2.1c). The allows the enforcer
to transform incorrect executions into correct ones by either suppressing incor-
rect events exhibited by the system, or by inserting events by executing actions
9
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on behalf of the system [54, 64]. This contrasts with runtime adaptation, where
the monitors may allow violations to occur but then execute remedial actions to
mitigate the effects of the violation.
2.2 Concrete Events and System Actions
Monitors have the task of observing and analysing the behaviour of a given system.
System behaviour is generally represented as a stream of observable discrete oper-
ations that can be performed by the system. We thus represent these operations
as atomic concrete events. Concrete events, α, β ∈ ConcEvt, are used to explic-
itly represent and identify a single, specific system operation, e.g., i?3 denotes an
atomic input operation where a process with identifier i inputs the value 3, while
i!4 denotes an output operation where process i outputs the value 4. Given that
concrete events describe only actual values (e.g., i?3 describes an actual process
id i and value 3), these events can easily be distinguished depending on the type
of operation they describe, and the concrete data values they specify. We thus
say that two concrete events are disjoint from one another whenever they are not
syntactically equal, i.e., as formally defined below.
Definition 2.1 (Disjoint Concrete Events). Two Concrete Events α and β are
disjoint (#) whenever they are distinct, i.e.,
α#β
def
= α 6= β
We abuse notation and define a list of disjoint concrete events as follows:
#
i∈Q
αi
def
= ∀i, j ∈ Q · αi 6= αj
where Q is a set of indices, i.e., Q = {1, . . . , n}. 
Example 2.1 (Disjoint Concrete Events). Consider the following input events i?3,
i?4 and output event i!3. Even though the data specified by events i?3 and i!3
is the same, namely id i and value 3, these two events differ since they describe a
10
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different operation, i.e., input (i?3) vs. output (i!3). The input events i?3 and
i?4 differ since they define different values, i.e., since 3 6= 4.
System Actions. Systems in general can act either in a verbose manner by
executing operations that are perceivable by external entities, or else, silently by
executing internal unobservable actions. We thus represent the set of actions that
a system can perform as µ∈Act=ConcEvt∪{τ} which include all the system’s
observable concrete events, α, β ∈ ConcEvt, along with a distinguished silent
action, τ /∈ ConcEvt, denoting unobservable internal system operations.
2.3 Pattern Matching, Data-binding and Sym-
bolic Events
Pattern matching allows for open values a.k.a. patterns, o, l ∈Pat, defining data
variables, to be compared to closed values such as concrete events. As defined
below pattern o serves to define the operation type (e.g., input or output operation),
along with concrete values (including process identifiers, i, j∈Pid, or generic data,
v, u∈Val), or variables, d, f, g∈Var.
Definition 2.2 (Patterns).
o, l ∈ Pat ::= δ ? γ (Input) | δ ! γ (Output)
δ ∈ SymId ::= Var | Pid
γ ∈ Data ::= Var | Val 
For instance, pattern o = i?d describes the set of all input operations that can
be performed by a process i, i.e., pattern i?d describes the following set of concrete
events {. . . , i?1, i?2, . . .}; hence this pattern specifies that a concrete process i may
input any value d, where d is a variable. When referring to a symbolic pattern, o,
defining an arbitrary system operation (i.e., input or output) ranging over variables
x0 . . . xn, we abuse notation and use o(x0 . . . xn).
11
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2.3.1 Pattern Matching
We follow the standard way of representing pattern matching functionality in terms
of the function mtch(o,α). As stated in Definition 2.3, this function matches a
(possibly) open pattern (i.e., defining data variables) with a concrete event α, and
upon a successful match returns substitution environment σ, where σ defines a
bijective function which maps the variables, d, f ∈ Vars, defined in the pattern o
to the respective values, v, u ∈ Vals, defined in the matching concrete event α.
Definition 2.3 (Pattern Matching). Given a pattern o and a concrete event α,
mtch(o, α) = σ such that oσ = α 
Example 2.2 (Pattern Matching). Consider the following pattern matching ap-
plications:
mtch( d?f , i?3 ) = {d 7→ i, f 7→ 3} (2.1)
mtch( i?3 , i?3 ) = {} (2.2)
mtch( i?f , j?3 ) = undef (2.3)
mtch( d?f , i!3 ) = undef (2.4)
In (2.1) the input pattern d?f is successfully matched with the concrete input event
i?3, where d and f are pattern matched with the values i and 3 resp. In (2.2) the
two concrete events are matched (exactly), returning the empty substitution. The
mismatch in (2.3) is due to mismatching identifiers of the input events i.e., i vs. j,
whereas the mismatch in (2.4) is because the input pattern d?f cannot be matched
with actions defining a different operation, e.g., output event i!3. 
Pattern Variants. A pattern is said to be fully closed if it only defines concrete
values, e.g., i?3, while a fully open pattern does not define any concrete value, i.e.,
defines data variables only, e.g., d?f .
12
2. Preliminaries
Pattern Equivalence. We identify patterns up to the consistent renaming of
their variables, i.e., two patterns η1 and η2 are equivalent if there exists a bijective
relation σ : Vars 7→ Vars, such that η1 = ση2, e.g., o(d0, . . . , dn) and o(f0, . . . , fn)
are equivalent since o(f0, . . . , fn)[d0/f0, . . . , dn/fn] becomes syntactically equal to
o(d0, . . . , dn). Hence, two equivalent patterns can match the same set of concrete
events and can thus define the exact same set of concrete events as shown in the
definition below.
Definition 2.4 (Equivalence). Patterns o1 and o2 are equivalent (≡) whenever
o1 ≡ o2 def= Jo1K=Jo2K 
2.3.2 Symbolic Events
A generalization of concrete events can be attained through Symbolic Events, η∈
SymEvt, denoting a set of concrete events specified by a fully open pattern, o∈
Pat, (as defined earlier) and a filtering condition c∈Cond; a symbolic event η is
thus defined as η= ⁅o, c⁆.
Filtering conditions specified in symbolic events represent a decidable predi-
cate, c, ranging over the variables, d0, . . . , dn, defined in the respective pattern
o(d0, . . . , dn). Once again we abuse notation and use c(d0 . . . dn) to denote any
condition that analyses the values bound to variables d0 . . . dn. Finally, we define
condition evaluation as follows
Definition 2.5 (Condition Evaluation). Given a closed, decidable condition c,
• c ⇓ t iff c evaluates to true.
• c ⇓ f iff c evaluates to false. 
For example, by using these filtering conditions we can restrict the range of
input operations described by o=d?f via condition c=(d=i ∧ f≥10 ∧ f≤15) such
that the resultant symbolic event ⁅o, c⁆, defines a set containing every concrete input
event (as stated by pattern d?f) that is performed by a process with identifier i
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in which the input value is between 10 and 15 (as specified by conditions d=i and
f≥10 ∧ f≤15 resp.), such that the resultant set is {i?10, . . . , i?15}.
As specified by the denotational semantics given in Definition 2.6 (below), a
symbolic event η= ⁅o, c⁆ thus defines a set containing every concrete event which
matches pattern o and satisfies condition c as a result of the pattern match.
Definition 2.6 (Denotational Semantics for Symbolic Events). For an arbitrary
symbolic event η = ⁅o, c⁆,
J⁅o, c⁆K def= { α ∀α ·mtch(o, α)=σ and cσ ⇓ t }
We therefore say that a concrete event α is an element of a symbolic event η=⁅o, c⁆
whenever α∈JηK, i.e., when α pattern matches o creating substitution σ as a result
( i.e., mtch(o, α) = σ), such that when σ is applied to the filtering condition c, this
evaluates to true ( i.e., cσ ⇓ t).
Alternatively, we use notation η(α) (as defined below) whenever we need to be
aware about the substitution environment, σ, that is obtained when α matches the
pattern o of η and satisfies the associated filtering condition c.
η(α)
def
=
{
σ when mtch(o, α)=σ ∧ cσ ⇓ t
undef otherwise 
Shorthand Notations Although we assume that symbolic events define fully
opened patterns, i.e., o(d0, . . . , dn), we adopt a shorthand notation and write
⁅o(v0, . . . , vn), t⁆ in lieu of ⁅o(d0, . . . , dn), d0=v0 ∧ . . . dn=vn⁆.
Example 2.3. Consider event ⁅d?f, d=i∧f=req⁆, as a shorthand we can represent
this as ⁅i?req, t⁆, since conditions d=i and f=req evaluate to false in case d and f
are matched with some other value. 
Moreover, whenever the filtering condition c evaluates to true, we simply write
o instead of ⁅o, t⁆. We will be using these shorthand notations interchangeably
throughout this report.
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Singleton Symbolic Events As specified in Definition 2.6, a symbolic event
⁅o, c⁆ denotes a set of 0 or more concrete events. A symbolic event is said to be
singleton whenever it denotes a set containing a single concrete event.
Example 2.4 (Singleton Symbolic Event). Recall from Example 2.3 that i?req
is a shorthand for symbolic event ⁅d?f, d=i ∧ f=req⁆. This symbolic event is a
singleton event since J⁅d?f, d=i ∧ f=req⁆K={i?req } where the resultant set of the
denotation only contains concrete event i?req. 
Distinguishing between Symbolic Events. Contrary to concrete events, dis-
tinguishing between symbolic events is, however, not quite straight forward. As
an example, consider events ⁅d?3, d 6= j⁆ and ⁅i?f, f>2⁆, although these events are
syntactically different, concrete events such as i?3 is an element of both ⁅d?3, d 6=j⁆
and ⁅i?f, f>2⁆, since it defines an output action (?) and the concrete values i and
3 which match and satisfy the patterns and conditions of both symbolic events. By
Definition 2.6 we thus know that the sets of concrete events denoted by these two
symbolic events intersect with one another. Hence, as defined by Definition 2.7,
symbolic events are said to be disjoint whenever the sets of concrete events they
denote are disjoint. This happens whenever they define, either:
(i) a different operation, e.g., ⁅d1?f1, c1⁆ and ⁅d2!f2, c2⁆;
(ii) conflicting concrete data, e.g., ⁅i?f1, c1⁆ and ⁅j?f1, c1⁆, where i 6= j; or
(iii) conditions which contradict each other, eg ⁅i?f,f>10⁆ and ⁅i?f,y≤10⁆.
Definition 2.7 (Disjoint Symbolic Events). Two Symbolic Events η1 and η2 are
disjoint whenever:
η1#η2
def
= Jη1K ∩ Jη2K = ∅
Once more we abuse this notation to define a list of disjoint symbolic events as
follows:
#
i∈Q
ηi
def
=
⋂
i∈Q
JηiK = ∅
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where Q is a set of indices, i.e., Q= {1, . . . , n}. 
Example 2.5 (Disjoint Symbolic Events). Consider events ⁅d?3, d 6=j⁆, ⁅i?f, f >2⁆
and ⁅i?g, g≤ 2⁆. Notice that the sets denoted by the first two events, ⁅d?3, d 6= j⁆
and ⁅i?f, f >2⁆, intersect with each other on event i?3 as shown by (2.5), meaning
that they are not disjoint.
J⁅d?3, d 6=j⁆K ∩ J⁅i?f, f >2⁆K = {i?3} (2.5)
J⁅d?3, d 6=j⁆K ∩ J⁅i?g, g≤2⁆K = ∅ (2.6)
J⁅i?f, f >2⁆K ∩ J⁅i?g, g≤2⁆K = ∅ (2.7)
By contrast, (2.6) shows that even though patterns d?3 and i?f can match the
same concrete event i?3, symbolic event ⁅d?3, d 6= j⁆ is disjoint from ⁅i?g, g ≤ 2⁆
(and vice-versa) since this concrete event does not satisfy the filtering condition of
⁅i?g, g≤ 2⁆, i.e., (g≤ 2){3/g} ≡ 3≤ 2 = false. Similarly, (2.7) states that events
⁅i?f, f >2⁆ and ⁅i?g, g≤2⁆ are disjoint from each other even though their patterns
can match the exact same set of concrete events. They are, however, guaranteed to
be disjoint as they define contradicting filtering conditions, i.e., @n·n>2∧n≤2. 
2.4 Labelled Transition Systems
Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs) provide a convenient framework for defining
an operational description of the behaviour of a system. An LTS, is a triple
〈Proc,Act,→〉 which is composed from:
(i) a set of states, p, q, r ∈ Proc, corresponding to processes;
(ii) a set of actions, µ, γ ∈ Act, which include all the system’s observable (α, β ∈
ConcEvt) and internal τ /∈ Evt actions; and
(iii) a transition relation, −→ ⊆ (Proc×Act×Proc) that relates the state on
the RHS, to the other state on the LHS of the transition via a unidirectional
reduction from left to right over a specific action, e.g., (p, α, p′) ∈−→ describes
a unidirectional reduction from state p to p′ over action α.
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Syntax
p, q, r ∈ Proc ::= nil (inaction) |µ.p (prefixing) |∑
i∈Q
pi (choice)
| recx.p (recursion) |x (rec. variable)
Dynamics
Act
µ.p
µ−→ p
Sel
pj
µ−→ qj∑
i∈Q
pi
µ−→ qj
j ∈ Q Rec p{recx.p/x}
µ−→ p′
recx.p
µ−→ p′
Figure 2.2: A Model for describing Systems
For convenience, we define processes, Proc, using the regular fragment of CCS
[70] as defined by the syntax in Figure 2.2. Assuming a specific set of (visible)
concrete events, α and a denumerable set of (recursion) variables x, y, z ∈ Vars,
processes are defined as either the inactive process nil, an action-prefixed process
µ.p i.e., prefixed by an action µ where µ is either a visible (α) or a silent (τ) action,
a mutually-exclusive choice amongst processes where
∑
i∈Q
pi sums up the processes
identified by the unique indices in Q (such that
∑
i∈Q
pi represents p1 + . . . + pn,
where 1, . . . , n ∈ Q), or a recursive process where recx.p acts as a binder for x in p.
We work up to alpha-conversion of bound recursion variables and assume that all
recursive processes are guarded, meaning that all occurrences of bound recursion
variables occur under an action prefix (either directly or indirectly). Closed terms
are processes where all occurrences of recursion variables are bound.
When describing the dynamic behaviour of processes, we use the more intuitive
notation p
µ−→ p′ in lieu of (p, µ, p′) ∈−→, along with notation p 6µ−→ to denote
¬(∃p′ · p µ−→ p′). The rules in Figure 2.2 are standard. Rule Act allows a µ-
prefixed process µ.p to reduce over action µ to the derivative p, i.e., µ.p
µ−→ p,
while by rule Sel, a choice process,
∑
i∈Q
pi reduces to qj whenever there exists a
process identified by some index j ∈ Q in this summation, i.e., pj which performs
a µ-transition, i.e., pj
µ−→ qj (resp. q µ−→ q′). By rule Rec, a recursive process
recx.p can reduce to p′ over action µ, i.e., recx.p
µ−→ p′, when its unfolded version,
p{recx.p/x}, reduces to p′ over µ, i.e., p{recx.p/x} µ−→ p′.
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p1p2 p3
i?req
i!ans
i?cls
q1q2 q3
i?req
i?req
i!ans
i?cls
r1 r2
r3r4
r5
i?req
i!ans
i?cls
i?req
i!ans
i?cls s1
s2
s3 s4
τ
i?req
i!ans
i?cls
Figure 2.3: A depiction of the system in Example 2.6
We also employ the usual notation p =⇒ p′ and p α=⇒ p′ to denote weak tran-
sitions representing p(
τ−→)∗p′ and p =⇒ · α−→ · =⇒ p′ resp., referring to p′ as a
µ-derivative of p. We also employ notation p
µˆ
=⇒ p′ to collectively refer to p =⇒ p′
and p
α
=⇒ p′. Sequences of visible actions are expressed as traces t, u ∈ ConcEvt∗,
such that sequences of transitions are defined as p
α1=⇒ . . . αn=⇒ pn as p t=⇒ pn, where
a trace t = α1, . . . , αn. For more details, consult standard texts such as [70, 5].
Example 2.6. Consider a (reactive) system that acts as a server that is identified
with process id i, and which repeatedly accepts requests and subsequently responds
by outputting an answer, with the possibility of terminating through the special
close request (cls). Such a system may be expressed as the following process, p1.
p1 = recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?cls.nil
)
We can outright notice that process p1 is designed to output an answer (i!ans)
for every input request (i?req). The same behaviour can also be represented by
processes r1 and s1 (below), which differ from p1 since r1 is an unfolded version of
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r1, while s1 performs an internal τ action before inputting a request.
r1
def
= recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?cls.nil
)
+ i?cls.nil
)
s1
def
= recx.
(
τ .i?req.i!ans.x+ i?cls.nil
)
By contrast, process q1 denotes a server that, although similar to p1, can also
non-deterministically refuse to answer for a given request.
q1 = recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?req.x+ i?cls.nil
)
Pictorially, the resp. LTSs denoted by processes p1, q1, r1 and s1 may be represented
by the graphs in Figure 2.3, where the nodes correspond to processes and the arcs
correspond to transitions,
µ−→.
Bisimilarity of LTSs Intuitively, a bisimulation [5, 70] is a binary relation that
associates the behaviour of two Labelled Transition Systems that exhibit the same
behaviour, i.e., in a way that one system simulates the other and vice versa. Vari-
ants of bisimulation includes Strong and Weak Bisimulation (see Definitions 2.8
and 2.9, below).
Definition 2.8 (Strong Bisimulation). A binary relation R is a Strong Bisimula-
tion relation whenever (p, q) ∈ R, such that
(a) if p
µ−→ p′ then there exists a strong transition q µ−→ q′ such that (p′, q′) ∈ R
(b) if q
µ−→ q′ then there exists a strong transition p µ−→ p′ such that (p′, q′) ∈ R 
Hence, for a pair of processes, (p, q), to be in a Strong Bisimulation relation,
it is required that each process is able to simulate both visible (α) and internal
(τ) actions of the other process, e.g., if p
α−→ p′ then q α−→ q′ and if q τ−→ q′ then
p
τ−→ p′. By contrast, Weak Bisimulation abstracts away from internal (τ) actions,
i.e., each process is only required to simulate the visible actions of the other process,
and can thus simulate visible actions after performing a zero or more internal (τ)
transitions, e.g., if p
α−→ p′ then q τ−→∗ α−→ τ−→∗ q′ ≡ q α=⇒ q′ and if q τ−→ q′ then
p
τ−→0p′.
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Definition 2.9 (Weak Bisimulation). A binary relation R is a bisimulation rela-
tion whenever (p, q) ∈ R, such that
(a) if p
µ−→ p′ then there exists a weak transition q µˆ=⇒ q′ such that (p′, q′) ∈ R
(b) if q
µ−→ q′ then there exists a weak transition p µˆ=⇒ p′ such that (p′, q′) ∈ R 
Proving Bisimilarity of LTS processes Since Strong ( resp. Weak) Bisimilar-
ity is the largest Strong (resp. Weak) Bisimulation relation, proving that two LTS
processes p and q are Strong (resp. Weak) Bisimilar, i.e., p ∼ q (resp. p ≈ q), only
requires showing that there exists a Strong (resp. Weak) bisimulation relation R
that can relate them as stated by Definitions 2.8 and 2.9. Note that since Strong
Bisimilarity is stricter than its Weak counterpart, two Strong bisimilar processes
are inherently Weak bisimilar as well.
However, proving the contrary i.e., p 6∼q (resp. p 6≈q) is not as straight forward.
In fact, to show that a process p is not Strong (resp. Weak) bisimilar to q, we
must show that every binary relation that exists between p and q do not satisfy
Definition 2.8 (resp. Definition 2.9), and hence do not constitute towards valid
bisimulation relations. Given the lack of practicality of this exhaustive approach,
a game characterization for Strong ( resp. Weak) bisimulation [5, 82] is generally
employed to prove that two LTS processes are either bisimilar (p ∼ q) or not (p 6∼q);
in the former case, a relation R can be deduced from the game derivation. The
definition for a bisimulation game is given below. For more information regarding
the bisimulation game characterisation one may consult Appendix Section A.1 or
standard texts such as [5, 82].
Example 2.7 (Proving Strong Bisimilarity). To prove that p1 ∼ r1, consider the
following relation R,
R def= {(p1, r1), (p2, r2), (p1, r3), (p2, r4), (p3, r5)}
Since p1 ∼ r1 is the largest strong bisimulation relation relating processes p1 and
r1, it thus suffices showing that relation R is a Strong Bisimulation Relation as
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stated by Definition 2.8; we prove that this is true as follows:
Proof p1 ∼ r1. To prove that the pair (p1, r1) ∈ R satisfies Definition 2.8,
we show that p1
i?req−−−→ p2 can be strongly simulated by r1 i?req−−−→ r2 and vice-versa,
such that the resultant process pair (p2, r2) ∈ R is true. In addition, we show that
similarly reduction p1
i?cls−−−→ p3 can be simulated by r1 i?cls−−−→ r5 and vice-versa, such
that (p3, r5) ∈ R is also true.
The same argument applies for pairs (p2, r2), (p1, r3) and (p2, r4), i.e.,
(p2, r2) : p2
i!ans−−−→ p1 bisimulates r2 i!ans−−−→ r3 such that (p1, r3) ∈ R is true.
(p1, r3) : p1
i?req−−−→ p2 bisimulates r3 i?req−−−→ r4 such that (p2, r4) ∈ R is true.
and p1
i?cls−−−→ p3 bisimulates r3 i!ans−−−→ r5 such that (p3, r5) ∈ R is true.
(p2, r4) : p2
i!ans−−−→ p1 bisimulates r4 i!ans−−−→ r1 such that (p1, r1) ∈ R is true.
Finally, since both processes in the pair (p3, r5) are unable to perform any further
reductions, i.e., p3 6µ−→ and r5 6µ−→, they still satisfy the constraints of Definition 2.8.
−−− End of Proof. −−−
Hence, with the above proof we can conclude that relation R is a Strong Bisimu-
lation relation, such that since (p1, r1) ∈ R, we can also conclude that p1 ∼ r1.
Similarly, to prove that p1 ∼ s1, we must once again find a binary relation and
prove that it is a Strong Bisimulation Relation as defined by Definition 2.8. Hence,
we consider relation R′,
R′ def= {(p1, s1), (p1, s2), (p2, s3), (p3, s4)}
From the case of (p1, s1) ∈ R′, we can immediately notice that relation R′ is
not a Strong Bisimulation relation since reduction p1
i?req−−−→ p2 cannot be strongly
simulated by process s1, i.e., s1 6i?req−−−→. Hence, from relation R′ we are unable to
conclude whether p1 ∼ s1 or not.
However, as proven below, by abstracting over internal (τ) transitions, by Def-
inition 2.9 we can conclude that relation R′ is a Weak Bisimulation relation.
Proof p1 ≈ s1. To prove that the pair (p1, s1) ∈ R′ satisfies Definition 2.9,
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we show that transitions p1
i?req−−−→ p2 and p1 i?cls−−−→ p3 can be weakly simulated as
s1
τ−→ i?req−−−→ s3 and s1 τ−→ i?cls−−−→ s4 resp., such that (p2, s3) ∈ R′ and (p3, s4) ∈ R′
are both true; while transition s1
τ−→ s2 can also be weakly simulated as p1 τ−→0 p1,
where (p1, s2) ∈ R′ is true.
In the case of (p1, s2) ∈ R′, we show that transitions p1 i?req−−−→ p2 and p1 i?cls−−−→ p3
can be simulated by s2
i?req−−−→ s3 and resp. by s2 i?cls−−−→ s4, such that (p2, s3) ∈ R′ is
true and (p3, s4) ∈ R′ is true as well; dually, s2 i?req−−−→ p3 and s2 i?cls−−−→ s4 can also
be simulated by p1
i?req−−−→ p2 and resp. by p1 i?cls−−−→ p3.
Finally, we know that the pair (p3, s4)R′ satisfies the constraints of Definition 2.9
since neither of the two processes can perform a µ-reduction.
−−− End of Proof. −−−
Since R′ is a Weak Bisimulation relating processes p1 and s1, we can therefore
conclude that p1 ≈ s1. 
One may already notice that processes p1 and q1 from Figure 2.3 appear to
behave differently even when observed as a black box from an external perspective;
this is because p1 is always obliged to provide an answer to an external request,
while q1 may occasionally refuse to do so.
In general, proving that p1 6∼q1 is an exhaustive technique that requires proving
that all binary relations R that can relate processes p1 and p2 are not a Strong
Bisimulation; this inherently proves that there does not exist some Strong Bisim-
ulation relation R, such that (p1, q1) ∈ R. Alternatively, the bisimulation game
characterisation provides a more practical alternative to formally prove that p1 6∼ p2
(see Appendix Section A.1 for more details).
2.5 Linear vs Branching Time Logics
As advocated by [49, 14, 15], in runtime monitoring and enforcement, correctness
properties can be defined in a wide variety of logics. These logics can be categorized
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into two major classes [34, 71], namely, Linear Time and Branching Time Logics.
Linear Time Logics, [34, 71] treat time as if each moment has a unique possible
future. Hence, formulas expressed in linear time logics are regarded as specifying
the behaviour of a single program computation, as they are interpreted over linear
sequences of system actions. By contrast, in Branching Time Logics [34, 71], each
moment in time may split into several possible futures. Hence, branching time
formulas describe properties of both finite and infinite computation trees, each of
which describes the behaviour of the possible computations of a non-deterministic
program.
Several researchers [71, 38, 32, 17, 59, 39, 40] have been discussing the relative
advantages of linear versus branching time logics wrt. system specification and
verification, since the 1980s. Certain discussions [32, 59, 39] led to the conclusion
that linear and branching time logics are expressively incomparable. However in
[71], the authors discuss that branching time logics are more expressive in the
context of algorithmic verification.
Due to their high expressiveness, branching time logics such as µHML [5] and
CTL*, thus allow for specifying a wide variety of properties which can be verified us-
ing various verification techniques. However, since dynamic verification techniques,
such as monitoring, are incapable of verifying every expressible property [50], these
logics are instead often favoured to be used with static analysis techniques such as
model checking [5].
Multi-pronged verification approaches that combine static and dynamic verifica-
tion [10], provide a practical compromise for verifying such properties by employing
dynamic verification as much as possible and only use static verification for those
parts that cannot be verified statically. This helps minimize the state explosion
problems that are inherent to classic static verification techniques such as model
checking [34, 5].
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2.6 The Logic
Hennessy-Milner Logic with recursion (µHML) [61, 5] is a highly expressive, branching-
time logic that allows for defining correctness properties as logical formulae. µHML
assumes a countable set of logical variables X, Y ∈LVars, and is defined as the set
of closed formulae generated by the grammar of Figure 2.4. The logic is equipped
with the standard constructs for truth, falsehood, conjunction and disjunction,
where
∧
i∈Q
ϕi (resp.
∨
i∈Q
ϕi) describes a compound conjunction, ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ϕn, (resp.
disjunction, ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕn) where 1 . . . n ∈ Q.
µHML also provides the possibility and necessity modal operators, together
with recursive formulae expressing least or greatest fixpoints denoted by formulae
minX.ϕ and maxX.ϕ resp. Fixpoints bind free instances of the logical variable X
in ϕ, inducing the usual notions of open/closed formulae and formula equality up
to alpha-conversion. Modal operators allow for defining symbolic events η=⁅o, c⁆,
consisting in a pattern o and filtering condition c. As defined in Section 2.2, the
pattern may contain data variables d, f, g ∈ Var that bind to system data from a
matching concrete system event and can be used to evaluate the associated filtering
condition.
Formulae are interpreted over the process powerset domain where S ∈ P(Proc).
The semantic definition of Figure 2.4 is given for both open and closed formulae
and employs a valuation (i.e., a map) from logical variables to sets of processes,
ρ ∈ (LVars → P(Proc)), where ρ′ = ρ[X 7→ S] denotes a valuation such that
ρ′(X) = S and ρ′(Y ) = ρ(Y ) for all other Y 6= X. This permits an inductive defi-
nition for Jϕ, ρK, the set of processes satisfying the formula ϕ wrt. an environment
ρ, based on the structure of the formula.
For instance, in Figure 2.4, the semantic meaning of a variable X in relation
to a map ρ is the mapping ρ(X). The semantics of truth, falsehood, conjunction
and disjunction are standard, i.e., ∨ and ∧ are interpreted as set-theoretic union
and intersection. Possibility formulae 〈η〉ϕ describe processes that can perform an
action α, where η(α) = σ (see Definition 2.3), such that at least one α-derivative
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Syntax
ϕ, ψ ∈ µHML ::= tt (truth) |ff (falsehood)
|∨
i∈Q
ϕi (disjunction) |
∧
i∈Q
ϕi (conjunction)
| 〈η〉ϕ (possibility) | [η]ϕ (necessity)
|minX.ϕ (min. fixpoint) |maxX.ϕ (max. fixpoint)
| X (rec. variable)
SemanticsJtt, ρK def= Proc Jff, ρK def= ∅ JX, ρK def= ρ(X)J∧
i∈Q
ϕi, ρK def= ⋂
i∈Q
Jϕi, ρKJ∨
i∈Q
ϕi, ρK def= ⋃
i∈Q
Jϕi, ρKJminX.ϕ, ρK def= ⋂{S | Jϕ, ρ[X 7→ S]K ⊆ S}JmaxX.ϕ, ρK def= ⋃{S | S ⊆ Jϕ, ρ[X 7→ S]K}
J[η]ϕ, ρK def= {p | (∀α, q · p α−→ q and η(α)=σ) implies q ∈ Jϕσ, ρK}J〈η〉ϕ, ρK def= {p | ∃α, q · p α−→ q and η(α)=σ and q ∈ Jϕσ, ρK}
Figure 2.4: µHML Syntax and Semantics
satisfies ϕσ. By contrast, necessity formulae [η]ϕ describe processes capable of per-
forming a compliant action α, where η(α) = σ, such that all of their α-derivatives
(possibly none) satisfy ϕσ.
The powerset domain P(Proc) is a complete lattice wrt. set-inclusion, ⊆,
which guarantees the existence of least and largest solutions for the recursive for-
mulae of the logic — these are defined resp. as the intersection of all the pre-fixpoint
solutions and the union of all post-fixpoint solutions [5]. Since the interpretation of
closed formulae is independent of the environment ρ, we write JϕK in lieu of Jϕ, ρK.
Example 2.8. Recall processes p1 and q1 from Example 2.6, using µHML we
can formally define that two consecutive requests indicate invalid behaviour, as
the desired behaviour entails that every request must be provided with an answer.
This safety property can be defined as formula ϕ0:
ϕ0
def
= maxX.[i?req] ([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff)
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Formula ϕ0 describes a recursive (maxX. . . .) property requiring that whenever a
process identified by process id i, inputs a first request (i?req), then it cannot
input a subsequent request (i.e., [i?req]ff), unless it outputs an answer beforehand,
in which case the formula recurses (i.e., [i!ans]X).
With formula ϕ1 (given below), we generalize formula ϕ0 to range over any
process id d, as opposed to a specific process id i. We however assume that this
formula should not apply for the process identified by id j, and hence we add this
restriction as the filtering condition d 6= j of the symbolic event defined in the first
necessity of ϕ1.
ϕ1
def
= maxX.[⁅d?req, d6=j⁆]([⁅d!ans, t⁆]X ∧ [⁅d?req, t⁆]ff)
Although ϕ0 and ϕ1 both describe the same system behaviour, they differ in terms
of the LTS they define. For instance, formula ϕ0 specifies a finite LTS describing
the finite set of actions of a server process that is specifically identified by id i,
namely actions i?req and i!ans. By contrast, since ϕ1 specifies an infinite LTS
since it describes the actions that can be preformed by an infinite number of server
processes each identified by some process id d 6= j. 
We say that a formula ϕ is satisfiable (i.e., ϕ ∈ Sat) whenever there exists
some process p such that p ∈ JϕK, i.e., as formally defined below. Hence, in order
to find whether ϕ1 is satisfiable or not it suffices finding a single process p which
satisfies the formula.
Definition 2.10 (Satisfiable Formulae).
ϕ ∈ Sat iff ∃p · p ∈ JϕK 
Satisfiable formulae can also be used to differentiate between processes. As
formally specified in Theorem 2.1, the Hennessy-Milner theorem [5, 52] dictates
that given an image-finite LTS (i.e., an LTS in which all of its states have a finite
number of outgoing transitions), two LTS states (processes) are bisimilar if they
both satisfy the same (non-recursive) µHML formulae (and vice-versa).
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Theorem 2.1 (The Hennessy-Milner Theorem). Given an image finite Labelled
Transition System, 〈Proc,Act,→〉, assuming two states p, q ∈ Proc,
p ∼ q iff ∀ϕ · p∈JϕK⇔ q∈JϕK 
Example 2.9. Using formula ϕ1 we can thus distinguish between processes p1 and
q1 by showing that process p1 satisfies ϕ1 (i.e., p1 ∈ Jϕ1K) and that q1 does not
(i.e., q1 /∈ Jϕ1K). We prove result using Tarski’s Fixpoint Algorithm [5, 85] in the
Appendix Section A.2.
Hence, since process q1 is unable to satisfy all µHML properties that can be
satisfied by p1 (this is proven to be true by ϕ1), by the Hennessy-Milner theorem
[5, 52] (recited in Theorem 2.1), we can also conclude that p1 6∼q1. 
2.7 A model for Detection Monitors
Runtime Verification provides an alternative mechanism for checking whether a
program exhibits the expected behaviour or not. In RV, this is achieved via de-
tection monitors, which analyse the current execution trace of the system so as
to determine whether this behaves correctly or not as specified by some correct-
ness property. Detection monitors are said to recognise a good (resp. bad) trace
whenever they are able to conclude that the program satisfies (resp. violates) the
given correctness property, by just analysing the trace of events generated by the
executing program.
In [49, 47], Francalanza et. al defined the structure and dynamic behaviour of
detection monitors in terms of the LTS syntax and semantics provided in Figure 2.5.
Assuming a specific set of symbolic events, SymEvt, and a denumerable set of
(recursion) variables x, y ∈ Vars, detection monitors are defined as either a verdict
v, a prefixed process by a symbolic action η = ⁅o, c⁆, a mutually-exclusive choice
amongst two monitors, or a recursive monitor.
A monitor can issue one of three verdicts, namely, yes, no and end, resp. denot-
ing acceptance, rejection and termination (i.e., an inconclusive outcome). Verdicts
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Syntax
m,n ∈Mon ::= v | η.m |∑
i∈Q
mi | recx.m |x
v, u ∈ Verd ::= end | no | yes
Dynamics
mAct
η(α)=σ cσ ⇓ t
η.m
α−→ m
mRec
m{recx.m/x} α−→ n
recx.m
α−→ n
mSel
mj
µ−→ nj∑
i∈Q
mi
µ−→ nj
j ∈ Q mVer
v
α−→ v
Instrumentation
iMon
p
α−→ p′ m α−→ m′
m / p
α−→ m′ / p′
iAsyP
p
τ−→ p′
m / p
τ−→ m / p′
iTer
p
α−→ p′ m 6α−→
m / p
α−→ end / p′
Figure 2.5: Monitors and Instrumentation
in detection monitors are irrevocable as specified by rule mVer, which states that
a verdict may transition with any system action α ∈ Act and go back to the same
state. The monitor recX.m acts as a binder for recursion variable x in m where,
by rule mRec a recursive monitor can reduce over α, i.e., recx.m
α−→ n, whenever
its unfolded version reduces over α, i.e., m{recx.m/x} α−→ n. All recursive moni-
tors are assumed to be guarded, meaning that all occurrences of bound recursive
variables occur under an action prefix (either directly or indirectly).
As specified by rule mAct, a prefix monitor ⁅o, c⁆.m binds in m any concrete
event α that is within the constraints of the symbolic event prefix, i.e., ⁅o, c⁆.m α−→
mσ whenever α matches the pattern o and satisfies condition c via ⁅o, c⁆(α) = σ.
Substitution environment σ is used to bind in the derived monitor m, any data
variable, d ∈ Var, (defined in pattern o), to the resp. concrete values provided
by the concrete system event α. For example, if ⁅i?d, d > 5⁆(i?6) = {6/d} then
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⁅i?d, d > 5⁆.⁅i?f, f > d⁆.m i?6−−→ ((⁅i?f, f > d⁆.m){6/d} ≡ ⁅i?f, f > 6⁆.(m{6/d})).
The behaviour of a mutually exclusive choice is specified by rule mSel, which states
that
∑
i∈Q
mi
α−→ nj if there exists an index j ∈ Q such that mj α−→ nj.
The rules we have seen so far, specify the runtime behaviour of monitors in
isolation, without describing any notion of interaction between the monitor and
the process under scrutiny. Hence, Figure 2.5 also describes an instrumentation
relation, connecting the behaviour of a process p with that of a monitor m such
that the configuration m / p denotes a monitored system.
In an instrumentation, the process leads the (visible) behaviour of a monitored
system (i.e., if the process cannot α-transition, then the monitored system will
not either) while the monitor passively follows, transitioning accordingly. Specif-
ically, rule iMon states that if a process can transition with action α and the
assigned monitor can follow this by transitioning with the same action, then in an
instrumented monitored system they transition in lockstep.
However, if the monitor is unable to perform such a transition, i.e., m 6α−→,
even after any number of internal actions, i.e., m 6 τ−→, the instrumentation rule
iTer forces it to terminate with an inconclusive verdict, end, while the process is
allowed to proceed unhindered. Also, note that since end can follow any visible
system event, future transitions by p are still allowed while the terminated monitor
maintains its state, using the rule iMon. Finally, rule iAsyP allows processes to
transition independently from the monitor wrt. internal moves, thus reducing the
coupling between the process and the monitor.
Example 2.10. By using detection monitors we can analyse the runtime execu-
tion of processes p1 and q1 from Example 2.6 (restated below) in order to recognise
witness traces that testify for negative behaviour as specified by ϕ1 (given in Ex-
ample 2.8), i.e., when monitoring for ϕ1, the monitor should be able to detect the
cases where processes do not always provide an answer for a given request.
p1
def
= recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?cls.nil
)
q1
def
= recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?req.x+ i?cls.nil
)
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To detect such instances consider monitor m1 (defined below) that reaches a
violation verdict, no, after observing that a process that is identified by any process
id d, has executed two consecutive request actions (i.e., ⁅d?req, d6=j⁆.⁅d?req, t⁆.no),
but recurses after observing that the request was serviced by an answer output
action, i.e., ⁅d?req, d6=j⁆.⁅d!ans, t⁆.x.
m1
def
= recx.
(
d?req.
(
d!ans.x+ d?req.no
))
When instrumented with process q1 from Example 2.6, we observe the following
behaviour for the monitored system whereby on line (∗) the monitor preserves the
no verdict for all remaining transitions.
m1 / q1
i?req−−−→ (⁅d!ans, t⁆.m1 + ⁅d?req, t⁆.no){i/d} / q1
≡ i!ans.m1 + i?req.no / q1 using iMon (mRec +mAct)
i?req−−→ no∅ / q2 ≡ no / q2 using iMon (mSelR +mAct)
t′
==⇒ no / q1 using iMon (mVer) (∗)
Note how the monitor’s runtime analyses abstracts over the system’s data via
variables defined in the prefixing symbolic events, e.g., ⁅d?req, d6=j⁆ and ⁅d!ans, t⁆.
This allows the monitor to detect the specified behaviour regardless of the data
associated to the system’s action, e.g., if the process id of q1 changes from i to j,
monitor m1 would still be able to analyse the behaviour this modified version of
q1, since variable d can match with any process id.
Also, note that monitor m1 was only able to detect a property violation since
q1 has actually executed two consecutive request, such that t= i?req.i?req.t
′. How-
ever, given the non-deterministic behaviour of q1, it is possible that while executing,
this process provides an answer for every request and never executes two consec-
utive requests. In this way, the monitor would never be able to conclude any
verdict about q1, despite the fact that q1 actually violates ϕ1, i.e., q1 /∈ Jϕ1K (see
Example 2.9). Hence, this shows that the monitor’s verdicts are limited to the
behaviour exhibited by the process at runtime, and can only be issued when the
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system actually executes the specified behaviour.
Similarly, in the case of process p1, the monitors are unable to issue a negative
verdict, no, since the process is designed to always issue an answer for any given
request; they are also incapable of producing a positive verdict, yes, since the
monitor keeps on recursing upon perceiving a request-answer sequence. 
2.8 The monitorability of µHML
One can immediately start to notice the structural resemblance that exists between
monitor m1, defined in Example 2.10, and formula ϕ1, defined in Example 2.8
(both restated below). Intuitively, the maximal fixpoint and fixpoint variable, the
conjunction operation and the necessity operations in ϕ1, resp. map to the recursive
constructs, the choice operation and the action prefixes in m1.
m1
def
= recx.
(
d?req.
(
d!ans.x+ d?req.no
))
ϕ1
def
= maxX.[⁅d?req, d6=j⁆]([⁅d!ans, t⁆]X ∧ [⁅d?req, t⁆]ff)
In [49], Francalanza et. al proved the existence a formal correspondence between
monitors and logic formulae. In their work they present a notion of monitorability
as a property of a correctness specification describing the ability to be adequately
analysed at runtime. This definition is fundamentally dependent on the monitoring
setup assumed and the conditions that constitute an adequate runtime analysis.
The authors start by distinguishing between acceptance and rejection monitors
(i.e., monitors that yield a yes and no verdicts resp.), by defining the predicates in
Definition 2.11.
Definition 2.11 (Acceptance and Rejection Predicates).
1. acc(p,m)
def
= ∃t, p′ ·m / p t=⇒ yes / p′
2. rej(p,m)
def
= ∃t, p′ ·m / p t=⇒ no / p′ 
The acceptance predicate, acc(p,m), states that a program p is accepted by a
monitorm whenever the process is able to generate a trace of execution t from which
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the monitor can deduce a positive verdict, yes. Similarly, the rejection predicate,
rej(p,m), states that a process p is rejected by a monitor m whenever the process
is capable of generating an execution trace t from which the monitor can conclude
a negative verdict, no.
Example 2.11 (Rejecting a Process). Recall process q1 defined in Example 2.6,
and monitor m1 defined in Example 2.10 (both restated below).
q1
def
= recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?req.x+ i?cls.nil
)
m1
def
= recx.
(
d?req.
(
d!ans.x+ d?req.no
))
As shown in Example 2.10, monitor m1 issues a no verdict when process q1 executes
trace t = i?req.i?req.t′. Hence, by the definition of rej(p,m), we can conclude that
monitor m1 is capable of rejecting process q1, i.e., rej(q1,m1). 
Based on the predicates discussed in Definition 2.11, the authors define the
criteria expected of a monitor m when it monitors soundly for a property ϕ as
smon(m,ϕ) in Definition 2.12.
Definition 2.12 (Sound Monitoring). A monitor m monitors soundly for the prop-
erty represented by the formula ϕ, denoted as smon(m,ϕ), whenever for all pro-
cesses p ∈ Proc the following hold:
(i). acc(p,m) implies p ∈ JϕK
(ii). rej(p,m) implies p /∈ JϕK
Sound monitoring thus relates a logic formula ϕ to a monitor m in such a way that
whenever the monitor is able to accept (resp. reject) any process p ∈ Proc, then
the related formula must be satisfied (resp. violated) by the same set of processes,
i.e., Proc.
Example 2.12 (Sound Monitoring). In general it is very difficult to prove that a
monitor m soundly monitors for a formula ϕ, since as stated by Definition 2.12,
this requires proving that predicates (i) and (ii) hold for every possible process
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p ∈ Proc (where Proc can be an infinite set). However, to better explain the
concept of soundness, in this example we limit ourselves to processes p1 and q1
(i.e., we assume that Proc is restricted to {p1, q1}). Therefore, using the result
from Example 2.11 and the result from Example 2.9, i.e., that q1 /∈ Jϕ1K, we can
conclude
rej(q1,m1) implies q1 /∈ Jϕ1K (2.1)
Since m1 is incapable of producing a positive verdict, yes, none of the processes in
Proc can ever generate a trace that can be accepted by m1. Since this premise is
false, we can conclude
acc(q1,m1) implies q1 ∈ Jϕ1K (2.2)
acc(p1,m1) implies p1 ∈ Jϕ1K (2.3)
On the other hand, from the LTS given in Figure 2.3, we can deduce that process
p1 is incapable of producing a trace that can be rejected by monitor m1, which
allows us to conclude
rej(p1,m1) implies p1 /∈ Jϕ1K (2.4)
Hence by (2.1), (2.4) and (2.2), (2.3), and since we assume that Proc is restricted
to just {p1, q1}, we can deduce
∀p ∈ Proc · rej(p,m1) implies p /∈ Jϕ1K (2.5)
∀p ∈ Proc · acc(p,m1) implies p ∈ Jϕ1K (2.6)
Finally, by (2.5), (2.6) and Definition 2.12 we can conclude that monitor m is able
to soundly monitor processes p1 and q1, wrt. formula ϕ, i.e., we can conclude that
smon(m1, ϕ1). 
In addition, the authors also define relate formula satisfactions and violation
to monitor detections in the opposite direction, by defining the notion of partially
complete monitoring in Definition 2.13. This notion entails that monitoring should
be either satisfaction or violation complete, i.e., if a formula ϕ is satisfiable (resp.
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unsatisfiable), the monitor should accept (resp. reject) it at runtime.
Definition 2.13 (Satisfaction, Violation, and Partially-Complete Monitoring).
scmon(m,ϕ)
def
= ∀p · p∈JϕK implies acc(p,m) (satisfaction complete)
vcmon(m,ϕ)
def
= ∀p · p /∈JϕK implies rej(p,m) (violation complete)
cmon(m,ϕ)
def
= scmon(m,ϕ) or vcmon(m,ϕ) (partially complete) 
Example 2.13 (Partially-Complete Monitoring). Same as per Sound Monitoring,
in general, proving that a monitor m monitors for a formula ϕ in a Partially
Complete manner is a very hard task, since as stated by Definition 2.13, this
requires proving satisfaction and violation completeness for every possible process
p ∈ Proc (where Proc can be an infinite set). Once again, in this example we
simplify the proof by limiting ourselves to just processes p1 and q1 (i.e., we assume
that Proc is limited to just {p1, q1}). Hence, using the result from Example 2.9,
i.e., that q1 /∈ Jϕ1K, and the result from Example 2.11 i.e., that rej(q1,m1), we can
conclude
q1 /∈ Jϕ1K implies rej(q1,m1) (2.7)
Although from Example 2.9 we know that p1 ∈ Jϕ1K, since monitor m1 is unable
to produce positive verdicts, we can conclude
(p1 ∈ Jϕ1K implies acc(p1,m1)) is false (2.8)
Hence, the result in (2.8) prevents us from immediately deducing partial complete-
ness, however, we also know that p1∈Jϕ1K, which inherently means that p1 /∈Jϕ1K is
a false statement. Therefore, given that a false statement can imply any result, we
can simply conclude
p1 /∈ Jϕ1K implies rej(p1,m1) is true (2.9)
Therefore, from (2.7), (2.9) and the definition of vcmon(m,ϕ) we can conclude that
monitor m can monitor processes p1 and q1 wrt. formula ϕ in a violation-complete
manner, i.e., we know vcmon(m1, ϕ1). Finally, by the definition of cmon(m,ϕ)
we can conclude that there exists a partially-complete monitoring relation between
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monitor m1 and formula ϕ1, i.e., we can conclude cmon(m1, ϕ1). 
Finally, using Definition 2.12 and Definition 2.13, the authors thus define a monitor-
formula correspondence relation as stated by Definition 2.14. This relation states
that a monitor m is said to monitor for a formula ϕ, whenever it can do so in a
sound and partially-complete manner.
Definition 2.14 (Monitor-Formula Correspondence).
mon(m,ϕ)
def
= smon(m,ϕ) and cmon(m,ϕ) 
Example 2.14 (Establishing a Monitor-Formula Correspondence). The results of
Examples 2.12 and 2.13, i.e., smon(m1, ϕ1) and cmon(m1, ϕ1), along with Defini-
tion 2.14, allow us to conclude that there exists a correspondence relation between
monitor m and formula ϕ1, meaning that m1 is able to monitor forϕ1. Hence, we
can conclude mon(m1, ϕ1). 
Based on the correspondence that was established between monitors and logic
formulae in Definition 2.14, the authors define the meaning of a monitorable formula
and a monitorable language subset as monitorability (stated by Definition 2.15,
below).
Definition 2.15 (Monitorability). Formula ϕ is monitorable iff there exists a
monitor m such that mon(m,ϕ). A logical language L ⊆ µHML is monitorable iff
every ϕ ∈ L is monitorable. 
Example 2.15 (Monitorability). Using the result obtained in Example 2.14, i.e.,
mon(m1, ϕ1), we know that since monitor m1 is able to monitor for formula ϕ1,
then this µHML formula is monitorable. 
Francalanza et. al also showed that not all logical formulae are monitorable and
as a result, they identified a syntactic subset of µHML formulae called mHML, for
which they proved it is a monitorable subset. The language subset consists of the
safe and co-safe syntactic subsets of µHML, denoted as sHML and cHML resp.
in Definition 2.16.
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Definition 2.16 (Monitorable Logic). ϕ, ψ ∈ mHML def= sHML ∪ cHML where:
θ, ϑ ∈ sHML ::= tt |ff | [η]θ | θ ∧ ϑ |maxX.θ |X
pi,$ ∈ cHML ::= tt |ff | 〈η〉pi | pi ∨ $ |minX.pi |X 
Example 2.16 (Monitorable Formulae). Reconsider formula ϕ1, from Example 2.8
(restated below), along with formulae ϕ2 and ϕ3 (defined below).
ϕ1
def
= maxX.[⁅d?req, d6=j⁆]([⁅d!ans, t⁆]X ∧ [⁅d?req, t⁆]ff)
ϕ2
def
= 〈⁅d?req, t⁆〉〈⁅d!ans, t⁆〉tt
ϕ3
def
= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
The syntactic restrictions given in Definition 2.16 allow us to conclude that for-
mula ϕ1 ∈ sHML, while ϕ2 ∈ cHML, thus meaning that both are monitorable
according to Definitions 2.15 and 2.16. However, since ϕ3 can neither be defined
in terms of sHML nor cHML, we are unable to draw any conclusion regarding its
monitorability, i.e., we cannot say whether it is monitorable or not. 
To show that mHML is monitorable as implied by Definition 2.15, the authors
define the synthesis function {|−|} (defined in Figure 2.6) that generates a detection
monitor for each ϕ ∈ mHML. They also show that {|ϕ |} is able to generate the
witness monitor required by Definition 2.15 to demonstrate the monitorability of ϕ,
i.e., they show that the synthesis generates sound and partially-complete detection
monitors.
Their synthesis (restated in Figure 2.6) converts the logic falsehood ff∈mHML
and truth tt∈mHML into monitor verdicts no, yes∈Verd resp., and logical vari-
ables X ∈mHML into the corresponding recursive variables x∈Mon. Logic neces-
sities, [η]ϕ∈ sHML, and possibilities, 〈η〉ϕ∈cHML, are both mapped to monitor
actions, η.{|ϕ |}∈Mon in the general case, yet in certain cases, the synthesis sim-
plifies the monitor based on logical equivalences, e.g., since [η]tt ≡ tt, {| [η]tt |}
synthesises monitor yes instead of η.yes, similarly since 〈η〉ff ≡ ff, {| 〈η〉ff |} synthe-
sises monitor no.
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{|ff |} def= no {|tt |} def= yes {|X |} def= x
{|[η]ϕ |} def=
{
η.{|ϕ|} if {|ϕ|} 6= yes
yes otherwise
{|〈η〉ϕ |} def=
{
η.{|ϕ|} if {|ϕ|} 6= no
no otherwise
{|∧
i∈Q
ϕi |} def=

no ∃j ∈ Q · {|ϕj |}6=no
∑
i∈Q′
{|ϕi |}
ifQ=Q
′ +∪Q′′ st.
{| ∧
j∈Q′′
ϕi |}=
∑
j∈Q′′
yes
{|∨
i∈Q
ϕi |} def=

yes ∃j ∈ Q · {|ϕj |}6=yes
∑
i∈Q′
{|ϕi |}
ifQ=Q
′ +∪Q′′ st.
{| ∨
j∈Q′′
ϕi |}=
∑
j∈Q′′
no
{|maxX.ϕ |} def=
{
recx.{|ϕ|} if {|ϕ|} 6= yes
yes otherwise
{|minX.ϕ |} def=
{
recx.{|ϕ|} if {|ϕ|} 6= no
no otherwise
Figure 2.6: The Synthesis function for Detection Monitors.
Conjunctions,
∧
i∈Q
ϕi ∈ sHML, and disjunctions,
∨
i∈Q
ϕi ∈cHML, are mapped to
a monitor summation,
∑
i∈Q
{|ϕi |} unless they can be optimized. One optimiza-
tion for conjunctions and resp. disjunctions consists in synthesising a single no
(resp. yes) monitor when there exists at least one formula in the conjunction
(resp. disjunction) which yields a no (resp. yes) monitor, e.g., since ff ∧ ϕ = ff
and tt ∨ ϕ = tt, then {| ff ∧ ϕ |} and {| tt ∨ ϕ |} resp. yield monitors no and yes,
rather than no+{|ϕ |} and yes+{|ϕ |}. Another optimization serves to yield smaller
summations
∑
i∈Q′
{|ϕi |} (where Q′ ⊆ Q), whenever there exists a disjoint subset of
indices Q′′, i.e., Q = Q′
+∪Q′′, such that every formula identified by the indices in
Q′′ yield yes for conjunctions, and no for disjunctions, e.g., since ff ∨ ϕ ≡ ϕ and
tt ∧ ϕ ≡ ϕ, then {| ff ∨ ϕ |} and {| tt ∧ ϕ |} both yield {|ϕ |} instead of no +{| ff ∨ ϕ |}
and yes + {| ff ∨ ϕ |} resp..
In the general case, the fixpoint binders, maxX.ϕ∈ sHML and minX.ϕ∈cHML,
are both mapped to the recursive construct recx.{|ϕ |}∈Mon. However, in certain
cases the synthesis also optimizes the synthesised monitors, e.g., since maxX.tt ≡
tt, {| maxX.tt |} synthesises a monitor yes instead of recx.yes, since {| tt |} = yes;
same applies for minX.ff ≡ ff, where {| minX.ff |} synthesises monitor no instead of
recx.no.
Although the synthesis covers both sHML and cHML, the syntactic con-
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straints of Definition 2.16 implicitly infer that the synthesis for a formula ϕ uses at
most the first row and then either the first column (in the case of sHML) or the
second column (in case of cHML).
Example 2.17 (Synthesising Detection Monitors). Recall formula ϕ defined in
Example 2.8, from this formula we can synthesise a detection monitor using the
synthesis function defined in Figure 2.6.
{| maxX.[⁅d?req, d6=j⁆]([⁅d?req, t⁆]ff ∧ [⁅d!ans, t⁆]X) |}
= recx.
({| [⁅d?req, d6=j⁆]([⁅d?req, t⁆]ff ∧ [⁅d!ans, t⁆]X) |})
= recx.
(
⁅d?req, d6=j⁆.({| [⁅d?req, t⁆]ff ∧ [⁅d!ans, t⁆]X |}))
= recx.
(
⁅d?req, d6=j⁆.({| [⁅d?req, t⁆]ff |} + {| [⁅d!ans, t⁆]X |}))
= recx.
(
⁅d?req, d6=j⁆.(⁅d?req, t⁆.L ff M + ⁅d!ans, t⁆.LX M))
Resultant Monitor:
recx.
(
d?req.
(
d!ans.x+ d?req.no
))
Notice how the resultant monitor is identical to monitor m1 (defined earlier in Ex-
ample 2.10). Hence, this derivation demonstrates an automated way of constructing
monitors directly from a formula, such that the derived monitor corresponds (in
the sense of Definition 2.14) to the formula it was derived from. 
Finally, the authors also proved that sHML and cHML are maximally expres-
sive wrt. safety and co-safety properties i.e., every safety (resp. co-safety) property
that can be defined in µHML can be converted into a semantically equivalent prop-
erty expressed in sHML (resp. cHML).
Example 2.18 (Maximally expressive subsets). Consider the following safety prop-
erty J[a]ff ∨ [a]ffK /∈ sHML. This property can be redefined into the semantically
equivalent sHML property J[a]ffK ∈ sHML. 
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Enforcement
Enforcement monitors (a.k.a. enforcers) implement mechanisms which ensure that
the runtime behaviour of some process is kept in line with some correctness prop-
erty. Hence, unlike detection monitors, enforcers are not only capable of recognising
execution traces by detecting whether they satisfy or violate some property, but
are also able to transform invalid executions into valid ones, thereby enforcing the
behaviour dictated by the said property upon the process under scrutiny.
Chapter Overview We open this chapter by giving a brief background in re-
lation to runtime enforcement in Section 3.1. Following this, in Section 3.2 we
define a formal mechanism for transforming concrete system events which are then
employed by the runtime enforcement framework, presented in Section 3.3, to trans-
form invalid system executions into valid ones.
In Section 3.4, we present novel definitions by which we formally define the
meaning of enforceability, i.e., we define the criteria required for a µHML formula
to be enforceable. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.4.1 with a summary
of the presented content, in which we highlight the main contributions of this
chapter.
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3.1 A brief account of Runtime Enforcement
Runtime Enforcement (RE) [44, 54, 64] is a monitoring technique that aims to
ensure that a given system always behaves in accordance to a given correctness
property. Enforcement monitors are thus used to keep track of the system’s be-
haviour at runtime, and if necessary, modify the system’s dynamic behaviour to
keep it in line with the given property.
Runtime Enforcement is used in areas such as software security [81, 54], since
enforcement monitors provide an excellent mechanism to counter malicious attacks
that hijack the control flow of the enforced system. Runtime Enforcement, however,
raises a number of issues relating to the expressiveness of the logic used for defining
specifications, the correctness of the enforcers themselves, and the performance
overheads imposed by the enforcers.
In general, the more expressive the logic is, the more types of correctness prop-
erties one can express. Despite the high expressiveness of the logic, it may allow for
defining properties that cannot be enforced at runtime by an enforcer − identifying
which parts of the logic are enforceable is therefore crucial. Moreover, ensuring that
the derived enforcers behave correctly is also essential as they must ensure correct
system behaviour, meaning that if they behave erroneously, they might corrupt
well-behaved systems. Furthermore, designing the enforcers to be as efficient as
possible is necessary since the enforcers need to execute alongside the system un-
der scrutiny. Hence, an enforced system needs to make use of additional hardware
resources (CPU time, memory, etc.) when executing, since it must also execute
the enforcer’s code; this is often seen as an overhead which must be minimized so
to avoid rendering the enforced system unusable in practice.
The notion of Runtime Enforcement was first introduced by Schneider et. al
[41, 81] as Security Automata — later renamed to Truncation Automata by Ligatti
et. al in [54]. These automata, however, are limited wrt. the type of properties that
they can enforce, since these automata can only prevent the specified bad behaviour
from occurring by terminating the system just before the property is violated − this
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means that Truncation automata can only enforce safety properties. Truncation
Automata are sequence recognizers, i.e., they are only able to read an action from
a trace of system events, and transition from one state to another without altering
the trace in any way.
Ligatti et. al [16, 54] sought to widen the set of enforceable properties by
defining Suppression and Insertion automata. These two enforcement mechanisms
differ from Truncation automata as they are based on sequence transformation,
rather then recognition. Sequence transformers are automata that are not only
capable of reading an action from the system’s trace and of transitioning from one
state to another accordingly (as in a standard automaton), but are also capable of
modifying the trace as a result of the applied transition.
A Suppression automaton is able to enforce properties by suppressing specific
program actions; this allows for enforcing safety properties by suppressing violating
actions rather than by terminating the program outright. Insertion automata seek
to enforce properties by inserting (executing) a sequence of one or more actions
on behalf of the enforced program; this allows for enforcing more expressive types
of properties such as co-safety and infinite-renewal properties, amongst others.
Automata defining both suppressions and insertions are known as Edit Automata
[54, 64].
Ligatti et. al realised the importance of providing correctness guarantees about
enforcement automata, and thus proposed that enforcement automata should at
least guarantee Soundness and Transparency [54, 64]. Soundness requires that a
system that is being enforced by a monitor must never violate the enforced property,
while Transparency states that valid executions should not be altered in any way
by the enforcement automaton.
Bielova [21, 18] however stressed that until now there is no distinction between
the specification and the enforcement monitor, which burdens the specifier with
having to specify the enforcers themselves in terms of edit-automata. This means
that the specifier must manually identify the points in which the monitor must
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suppress or insert a system action.
3.2 From Symbolic Events to Transformations
As described in Section 2.3, symbolic events, η = ⁅o, c⁆, provide a neat way for
describing a set of concrete events, thereby enabling monitors to recognise a wider
range of execution traces. However, by themselves symbolic events are not capable
of modifying the events that they describe. We thus introduce Symbolic Transfor-
mations, ⁅o, c, o′⁆, which extend symbolic events by allowing for replacing concrete
events which match pattern o and satisfy condition c σ, with the concrete event
o′σ, where σ is obtained as a result of successful pattern matching. This behaviour
is formally defined below.
Definition 3.1 (Denotational Semantics for Symbolic Transformations). For an
arbitrary Symbolic Transformation ⁅o, c, o′⁆,
J⁅o, c, o′⁆K def= λx. { (o′σ, σ) when ⁅o, c⁆(x) =σ⊥ otherwise
A symbolic transformation, ⁅o, c, o′⁆, thus denotes a function which accepts a con-
crete event α via argument x, and returns a pair containing a (possibly) different
concrete event o′σ along with the substitution environment, whenever the input
concrete event α satisfies the symbolic event ⁅o, c⁆, i.e., when ⁅o, c⁆(x) =σ (see Def-
inition 2.6).
As a result of this function application, i.e., J⁅o, c, o′⁆K(α), the input concrete
event α is transformed into another concrete event o′σ = β, where the transforma-
tion pattern o′ is a closed symbolic pattern, i.e., any data variables present in o′
must also be defined in o, such that when substitution σ is applied on o′, this yields
a concrete event β = o′σ.
We abuse notation and say that two symbolic transformations are disjoint when-
ever the symbolic events they define are disjoint, i.e., ⁅o1, c1, o′1⁆#⁅o2, c2, o′2⁆ when-
ever ⁅o1, c1⁆#⁅o2, c2⁆. Finally, we adopt the shorthand notation ⁅o, c, o′⁆(α) to
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denote J⁅o, c, o′⁆K(α). 
Example 3.1 (Symbolic Transformations). Symbolic Transformations thus allow
for replacing a concrete event with another. For instance, consider event i!3 and
transformation ⁅i!d, d>2, i!err(d)⁆, where the latter transformation replaces input
i!3 into an error report i!err(3), since value 3 was matched with variable d, such
that (d > 2){3/d}, i.e., 3 > 2 evaluates to true.
As τ -transitions are not perceivable by external observers, the replacement
mechanism provided by the Symbolic Transformations, can also be used to re-
place visible concrete events into unobservable silent τ -actions. For instance, by
using ⁅i!d, d>2, τ ⁆ we can suppress events such as i!3 by transforming them into
a τ -action, thereby making them invisible to external observers.
By omitting transformation, an identity transformation such as ⁅i!d, d>2, i!d⁆
can simulate action recognition by outputting the original input event, and hence
⁅i!d, d>2, i!d⁆(i!3) produces the pair (i!3, {3/d}). 
Symbolic Transformations will therefore serve to provide the bases for action trans-
formation in our enforcement framework.
3.3 The Framework
We model enforcers in terms of LTSs, through the syntax of Figure 3.1. The
syntax allows for defining: the identity enforcer (id), enforcers that are prefixed by
symbolic transformations (⁅o, c, o′⁆.e), recursive enforcers (recx.e), and selections
(
∑
i∈Q
ei where Q is a set of indices such that
∑
i∈Q
ei represents e1 + . . . + en, where
1, . . . , n ∈ Q). The structure of enforcers is thus very similar to that of detection
monitors, with the exception that enforcers cannot issue verdicts yes and no, and
action recognition via symbolic events, is extended to action transformation via
symbolic transformations.
The behaviour of the enforcers is also similar to that of detection monitors for
the common constructs such as recursion (eRec) and selections (eSel. In fact,
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Syntax
e, f ∈ Enf ::= ⁅o, c, o′⁆.e |∑
i∈Q
ei | recx.e | x | id
Dynamics
eId
id
αIα−−−→ id
eSel
ej
αIµ−−→ e′j∑
i∈Q
ei
αIµ−−→ e′j
j ∈ Q eRec e{recx.e/x}
αIµ−−→ e′
recx.e
αIµ−−→ e′
eTrns
⁅o, c, o′⁆(α) = (µ, σ)
⁅o, c, o′⁆.e αIµ−−−→ eσ
Instrumentation
iTer
p
α−→ p′ e 6α−→
e[p]
α−→ id[p′]
iAsyP
p
τ−→ p′
e[p]
τ−→ e[p′]
iEnf
p
α−→ p′ e αIµ−−→ e′
e[p]
µ−→ e′[p′]
Figure 3.1: A model for Enforcement monitors
for recursion we use a τ -free semantics via rule eRec, which allows a recursive
enforcer, recx.e, to reduce to some e′ whenever its unfolded version, e{recx.e/x},
reduces to e′. For selections, rule eSel states that whenever a single enforcer ej
(where ej is part of the summation
∑
i∈Q
ei, i.e., j ∈ Q) is able to transform some
action α and reduce to e′j, i.e., ej
αIµ−−−→ e′j, then the entire summation reduces to
e′j i.e.,
∑
i∈Q
ei
αIµ−−−→ e′j.
As described by the transition rules in Figure 3.1, enforcer transitions range
over action transformation rather than action recognition, i.e., the enforcer is able
to modify an input action by outputting a different one, αIµ (where α might differ
from µ). Our enforcers thus achieve action transformation as described by rule
eTrns. This rule states that at runtime an enforcer prefixed by a symbolic trans-
formation, ⁅o, c, o′⁆.e, can replace an action α into a (possibly) different concrete
action µ, thereby reducing into its derivative eσ, where µ and σ are obtained by
applying the symbolic transformer to α, i.e., via ⁅o, c, o′⁆ (α) = (µ,σ).
Figure 3.1 also describes an instrumentation relation for enforcement monitors
which relates the behaviour of an LTS process p with that of an enforcer e where the
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resultant LTS process e[p] denotes the enforced system. As in the case of detection
monitors, in an enforcement instrumentation, the process leads the behaviour of an
enforced system: whenever the process cannot perform a transition, the enforced
system will not either. However, unlike detection monitors, this type of instru-
mentation also allows the enforcer to determine the visible actions of the enforced
system, i.e., this instrumentation allows the monitor to change an α-transition into
a µ-transition, where µ can either be the same as the input (i.e., remains α), be
changed into a different concrete event β, or else be suppressed into a τ -transition.
Specifically, rule iEnf states that if a process can transition with action α and
the resp. enforcer can transform this action into µ, then in an instrumented system,
e[p], the enforcer, e, and the system, p, transition in lockstep over the enforcer’s
output action µ. However, if the enforcer cannot perform such a reduction, e 6α−→ ,
i.e., @µ, e′ such that e αIµ−−−→ e′, the instrumentation forces it to terminate by reduc-
ing to the identity enforcer, id, while the process is allowed to proceed unaffected
as shown by rule iTer. Same as per the instrumentation for detection monitors,
rule iAsyP allows processes to transition independently wrt. internal transitions.
However, the instrumentation does not allow enforcers to transition independently
over τ -transitions, given that our enforcers are τ -free, i.e., do not perform silent
actions themselves.
We use the notation e
t .u
==⇒ e′, to denote a sequence of transformations, e.g.,
t .u = α1Iµ1, . . . , αnIµn, performed by enforcer e, where t denotes the input trace,
e.g., t = α1, . . . , αn, while u denotes the output trace, e.g., t = µ1, . . . , µn. Since the
instrumented system, e[p] is a standard LTS, we use standard notation e[p]
u
=⇒ e′[p′]
where u denotes the sequence of enforced events, i.e., u is the output trace generated
by the enforcer e.
Example 3.2. Consider processes p1 and q1 (defined in Example 2.6). Assume
that this time we want to enforce the property stated in Example 2.10, i.e., that
every request is followed by an answer, as formally specified by formula ϕ1 (see
Example 2.8). One drastic way to enforce this behaviour is by suppressing every
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request sent to the server which can be done by transforming every request action
matching pattern d?req, into a silent τ -action, when d 6= j, as shown below.
e1
def
= recx.
(
⁅d?req, d 6= j, τ ⁆.x+ ⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.x)
From an external point of view, by suppressing every request, the server can never
execute two requests in a row, and so it can never be the case where a request is
not followed by an answer. For instance, given the non-determinism inherent to
process q1, a violating trace, i?req.i?req.i!ans, may be exhibited. As shown in the
derivation below, enforcer e neutralises this invalid behaviour by suppressing every
request via transformation ⁅d?req, d 6= j, τ ⁆ such that the output trace is τ.τ.i!ans,
which is equivalent to i!ans.
e1[q1]
τ−−−→ e1[q1] when q1 i?req−−→ q1, since by iEnf, e1 i?reqIτ−−−−→ e1
τ−−−→ e1[q2] when q1 i?req−−→ q2 (same)
i!ans−−−→ e1[q1] when q2 i!ans−−−→ q1, since by iEnf, e1 i!ansIi!ans−−−−−−→ e1
. . .
Although e1 enforces the desired behaviour as required, it employs a premature
enforcement stance by which it may unnecessarily edit correct executions as well.
For instance, the derivation below shows how e1 needlessly modifies the behaviour
of q1 such that when it produces a correct execution trace i?req.i!ans.i?req, this is
transformed into, τ.i!ans.τ .
e1[q1]
τ−−−→ e1[q2] when q1 i?req−−→ q2, since by iEnf, e1 i?reqIτ−−−−→ e1
i!ans−−−→ e1[q1] when q2 i!ans−−−→ q1, since by iEnf, e1 i!ansIi!ans−−−−−−→ e1
τ−−−→ e1[q2] when q1 i?req−−→ q2, since by iEnf, e1 i?reqIτ−−−−→ e1
. . .
An alternative enforcer can be defined such that enforcement is delayed to the
very end, i.e., until the enforcer is sure that the desired behaviour will definitely
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be compromised; for instance consider e2 (defined below).
e2
def
= recx.
(
⁅d?req, d 6= j, d?req⁆.e′2
)
e′2
def
= rec y.
(
⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.x+ ⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.y
)
Enforcer, e2, prevents the violation by using an additional recursive construct,
rec y.(. . .), to continuously suppress every request matching pattern d?req such
that d 6= j, succeeding the primary occurrence of the request action. In this
way, whenever the enforced process executes two (or more) consecutive requests
matching d?req such that d 6= j, the enforcer keeps suppressing requests succeeding
an unanswered request until an answer matching d!ans is produced by the enforced
process.
The following derivation thus shows how enforcer e2 modifies the invalid exe-
cution trace i?req.i?req.i!ans, produced by q1, into the corresponding valid trace
i?req.τ.i!ans, i.e., i?req.i!ans.
e2[q1]
i?req−−→ e′2{e2/x}[q1] when q1 i?req−−→ q1, since by iEnf, e2 i?reqIi?req−−−−−−→ e′2{e2/x}
τ−−−→ e′2{e2/x}[q2] when q1 i?req−−→ q2, since by iEnf, e′2{e2/x} i?reqIτ−−−−→ y{e′2{e2/x}/y}
i!ans−−−→ e2[q1] when q2 i!ans−−−→ q1, since by iEnf, e′2{e2/x} i!ansIi!ans−−−−−−→ x{e2/x}
. . .
In contrast to enforcer e1, the derivation below demonstrates how the late enforce-
ment methodology adopted by e2 helps to preserve correct execution traces such
as i?req.i!ans.i?req by leaving them unchanged.
e2[q1]
i?req−−→ e′2{e2/x}[q2] when q1 i?req−−→ q2, since by iEnf, e2 i?reqIi?req−−−−−−→ e′2{e2/x}
i!ans−−−→ e2[q1] when q2 i!ans−−−→ q1, since by iEnf, e′2{e2/x} i!ansIi!ans−−−−−−→ x{e2/x}
i?req−−→ e′2{e2/x}[q2] when q1 i?req−−→ q2, since by iEnf, e2 i?reqIi?req−−−−−−→ e′2{e2/x}
. . . 
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3.4 Defining Enforceability of the Logic
In this section we shift back to the logic and investigate what it means for an
enforcer to enforce a property. As specified below, we define enforceability of a
logic as being the relationship between the meaning of a property, expressed in the
said logic, and the ability to enforce it at runtime upon a specific system.
Definition 3.2 (Enforceability). A µHML formula ϕ ∈ Sat is enforceable when-
ever
∃e ∈ Enf · e enforces ϕ 
Intuitively, for a property ϕ to be enforceable, there must exist an enforcer e
which is capable of modifying the dynamic behaviour of any process p in order
to keep it in line with the behaviour specified in ϕ. However, as discussed in
Example 3.2,an enforcer may adopt different approaches in order to enforce the
behaviour dictated by the given property, e.g., in Example 3.2 although e1 actually
prevents the violation of ϕ1, it unnecessarily modifies correct behaviours, whereas
e2 does not.
As stated by Ligatti et. al in [54, 44, 18] (see Section 3.1), for an enforcer to
adequately enforce a property, it must at least ensure that the enforced process al-
ways executes correctly wrt. ϕ, i.e., by either preventing it from executing violating
runtime behaviour, or by ensuring the execution of runtime behaviour satisfying ϕ.
An enforcer capable of doing so is said to be Sound. In our case, since we represent
the enforced system, e[p], as an LTS in itself, we can formally specify Enforcement
Soundness as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Sound Enforcement). We say that enforcer e soundly enforces a
formula ϕ, denoted as senf(e, ϕ), iff ∀p ∈ Proc · e[p] ∈ JϕK. 
The above definition specifies that enforcer e soundly enforces a formula ϕ if e can
enforce any process p such that the resultant enforced LTS, e[p], always satisfies ϕ.
Enforcement soundness on its own is, however, a relatively weak constraint as it
does not regulate the extent of the applied enforcement. For instance, Example 3.2
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demonstrates that enforcer although e1 manages to keep the execution of process
q1 in line with property ϕ1, it however adopts a conservative enforcement approach
which needlessly modifies the correct behaviour of q1 as well. Intuitively, this
example indicates1 that enforcer e1 soundly enforces property ϕ1, yet lacks an
element of Transparency [54, 44, 20], since the enforcer can unnecessarily modify
valid system behaviour. Similarly, to enforce a simple property ϕ = [a][b]ff on
a process p, we can use an enforcer that suppresses every action produced by p
thereby suppressing the entire execution: in doing so p will surely never violate ϕ,
but will neither exhibit any kind of valid behaviour.
Transparency [54, 44, 20], thus dictates that whenever a process p already satis-
fies the property ϕ, the assigned enforcement monitor e must refrain from altering
the runtime behaviour of p as this would not be necessary. Transparency therefore
aims to preserve the original behaviour of the process as much as possible by impos-
ing the least number of enforcement actions, i.e., enforcement is only applied when
necessary. For instance, enforcer e2 in Example 3.2, applies a lazy enforcement
approach whereby the behaviour of process q1 is only modified when the runtime
behaviour of q1 violates ϕ1. This ensures that valid behaviour is never modified
unnecessarily. Hence, once again Example 3.2 demonstrates that enforcer e2 is
more transparent then e1 when enforcing ϕ1 on q1, as unlike e1, it does not affect
the valid behaviour of q1. Hence, we formally define enforcement transparency in
Definition 3.4 below.
Definition 3.4 (Transparent Enforcement). An enforcer e is transparent when
enforcing a formula ϕ, denoted as tenf(e, ϕ), iff
∀p ∈ Proc · p ∈ JϕK implies e[p] ∼ p 
This definition states that an enforcer e enforces a formula ϕ in a transparent
manner, if for every LTS process p that satisfies ϕ, the enforced LTS e[p] is bisimilar
1In general proving enforcement soundness is very hard as it requires proving that e[p] ∈ JϕK,
for every possible process p. However, Example 3.2 only shows that e1 soundly enforces property
ϕ1 on q1 (it might not be the case other processes).
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to the original process p. This ensures that although the resultant enforced LTS,
e[p], is structurally different from the original LTS p, its behaviour is still perceived
to be the same as that of p. Based on Definitions 3.3 and 3.4 we can thus define a
stronger notion of enforcement as defined below.
Definition 3.5 (Strong Enforcement). We say that an enforcer e strongly enforces
formula ϕ, denoted as enf(e, ϕ), when
• senf(e, ϕ), i.e., e soundly enforces ϕ; and
• tenf(e, ϕ), i.e., e is transparent when enforcing ϕ. 
Strong enforcement thus requires an enforcer e to soundly and transparently enforce
a property ϕ.
Remark 3.1 (Novelty). It is important to note that unlike existing work [54, 64,
43, 44, 18], we define the resultant enforced system as the LTS e[p]. This allows
is to give stronger definitions for enforcement soundness and transparency (i.e.,
Definitions 3.3 and 3.4), as these are given in terms of the original LTS process p
and the enforced LTS process e[p], as opposed to the more classical definitions that
present them in terms of an input and output (enforced) trace.
In fact, the classic definitions for soundness (e.g., [54, 64, 43, 44, 18]) require that
every enforced execution trace that can be produced by an enforcement automaton
(monitor), e, should satisfy the enforced property ϕ. By contrast, in our definition
of soundness, we require that for every process p, the resultant enforced LTS process
e[p] must always satisfy property ϕ.
Similarly, unlike the classic definitions of transparency (e.g., [54, 64, 43, 44, 18]),
our definition does not only require trace equivalence between e[p] and p (as per
classic definitions), but instead imposes a stronger equivalence criterion, i.e., that
e[p] ∼ p (see [5] for Trace Equivalence vs Bisimilarity). 
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3.4.1 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have presented a novel framework describing the runtime be-
haviour of enforcers. The main novel contributions of this chapter include:
Symbolic Transformations , which formally define a mapping mechanism for
transforming a concrete system event into a (possibly) different one as spec-
ified the transformation pattern (see Section 3.2).
An LTS semantics for Enforcers , which formalise the structure and dynamic
behaviour of enforcers, along with the interaction between the enforcer, e and
the process under scrutiny, p, in the form of the instrumented LTS, e[p] (see
Section 3.3); and
A Formal Definition for Enforceability , defining the relationship between the
meaning of a µHML property and its ability to be adequately enforced at
runtime by an enforcer. With this definition we establish that an enforcer
e strongly enforces a formula ϕ whenever it is able to do it in a sound and
transparent manner. By defining the enforced system as an LTS, e[p], we
were able to provide novel definitions Soundness and Transparency which are
stronger than the classic definitions (see Section 3.4).
Discussion. So far we have defined the meaning of enforceability in relation to
our logic, however, we still have to explore which of the properties, expressible via
µHML, can actually be enforced. Several works in RE [54, 19, 44] have already
established that suppression enforcers are ideal for detecting potentially violating
executions and suppressing parts of them to prevent the violation of safety prop-
erties. Similarly, it was established that insertion enforcers can also be used to
enforce other types of properties such as co-safety.
We thus explore the enforceability of µHML properties in an incremental man-
ner. We will first start by exploring the enforceability of µHML properties,wrt.
suppression enforcement, and later on we aim to explore it wrt. insertion enforce-
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ment.
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4. Enforcing Safety Properties via
Suppressions
As stated in other work [54, 64, 18, 44], suppression enforcement is ideal to prevent
the violation of safety properties by stopping erroneous events from occurring. In
this chapter we limit ourselves to identifying a subset of µHML formulae that
are enforceable via suppressions and establish a synthesis function that converts
formulae from the identified enforceable subset into the resp. suppression enforcers.
Particularly, we investigate the enforceability of safety properties expressed in
terms of sHML since, in [49], this syntactic subset was proven to be maximally
expressive wrt. safety properties, i.e., any safety property that can be defined in
µHML can be expressed in terms of a semantically equivalent sHML formula.
In Figure 4.1 we recall the syntax for sHML. The logic is restricted to truth
and falsehood (tt and ff), conjunctions (ϕ ∧ ψ), and necessity modalities ([η]ϕ),
while recursion may only be expressed through maximal fixpoints (maxX.ϕ). The
semantics for these constructs follows from that of Figure 2.4.
Example 4.1 (Enforcing sHML formulae). Consider the following recursive for-
mula ϕ2,
ϕ2
def
= maxX.([i?req][i!ans]X) ∧ ([i?req][i?req]ff)
Formula ϕ2 defines the same invariant property as ϕ0 (defined in Example 2.8),
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ϕ, ψ ∈ sHML ::= tt | ff | X | maxX.ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [η]ϕ
Figure 4.1: The Syntax for the sHML subset.
which holds when a request is not immediately followed by a subsequent request af-
ter an arbitrary number of answered requests. The formula thus specifies that a pro-
cess is incorrect when it performs two consecutive requests, i.e., [i?req][i?req]ff, but
recurses whenever an answer is produced following a request, i.e., [i?req][i!ans]X.
One way how to enforce ϕ2 is by generating a suppression enforcer such as e0
that prevents a process from performing two or more subsequent requests.
e0
def
= recx.
(
⁅d?req, d= i, d?req⁆.rec y.
(
⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.y + ⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.x
))
Enforcer e0 enforces formula ϕ0 by suppressing every request action, i?req, that is
performed after an unanswered request, until an answer i!ans is produced, in which
case the enforcer recurses. This ensures that the invariant property is enforceable
after an arbitrary number of requests as defined by the property.
In Example 3.2 we had also shown that this invariant property (that is for-
malized by both ϕ0 and ϕ2) can also be enforced via enforcers e1 and e2 (restated
below).
e1
def
= recx.
(
⁅d?req, d 6= j, τ ⁆.x+ ⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.x)
e2
def
= recx.
(
⁅d?req, d 6= j, d?req⁆.rec y.(⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.y + ⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.x))
Notice how enforcer e0 is very similar to e2. Their main difference is that e0 only
enforces the property when the requesting process is identified by i (as defined
by ϕ0). Enforcer e2 is, however, more generic as it applies enforcement for any
requesting process that is identified by any identifier (including i) except for the
process identified by j. 
In general, a property can be enforced either deterministically or non-deterministically
as defined by Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.1 (Deterministic Enforcement). An enforcer e behaves deterministi-
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cally whenever
e
t . t′
===⇒ e′ and e t . t′′===⇒ e′′ implies e′= e′′ and t′= t′′
where t . t′ and t . t′′ represent sequences of transformations performed by enforcer e
over the same input trace t, that may result in different output (enforced) traces. 
Informally, an enforcer e is deterministic whenever it is unable to react dif-
ferently for the same input trace of events t, i.e., it always reduces to the same
state, i.e., e′= e′′, and always produces the same output (enforced) trace, i.e.,
t′= t′′. In general, an enforcer behaves non-deterministically whenever it defines
a selection of two (or more) non-disjoint symbolic transformations, e.g., enforcer
⁅d?req, d 6= j, d?req⁆.e′ + ⁅d?req, d= i, d?req⁆.e′′ is non-deterministic since the sym-
bolic transformations that are guarding the summation branches are not disjoint,
i.e., ⁅d?req, d 6= j, d?req⁆#⁅d?req, d= i, d?req⁆ is false.
Determining statically whether an enforcer is deterministic or not, is not a
straightforward task. In fact, concluding that two (or more) symbolic transforma-
tions are disjoint cannot be done via a simple syntactic check, instead it requires
making sure that there does not exist some concrete event α that can be trans-
formed by multiple transformations guarding different branches in the summation.
Example 4.2 (Deterministic Enforcement). In Example 4.1 we claimed that en-
forcers e1 and e2 behave deterministically. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that
the selections (+) in both e1 and e2 are guarded by disjoint symbolic transforma-
tions, i.e., in both cases ⁅d?req, d 6= j, τ ⁆ #⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆. This ensures that when
instrumented with a process p, the enforcers consistently make the same selections
upon analysing the same concrete events generated by p, and thus the enforcers
always behave in the same way.
In fact, enforcer e1 is bound to always choose: the left branch, i.e., ⁅d?req, d 6=
j, τ ⁆.x, upon analysing a request event i.e., i?req, the right branch, i.e., ⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.x,
upon an answer event i.e., i!ans, and reduces to the identity enforcer, id, upon a
close event, i.e., i?cls; a similar argument applies for the selection applied in e2.
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In this way, e1 and e2 can never reach a point in which they are able to (non-
deterministically) choose between two or more branches, and so they are always
bound to react in the same way for the same input events, thereby producing the
same output (enforced) events. 
Deterministic enforcers are appealing due to their predictable runtime behaviour,
i.e., it is easier to predict how a deterministic enforcer will transform a given con-
crete input event. By contrast, non-determinism introduces subtleties that can lead
to harmful unpredictable behaviour, in which the enforcer may sometimes (non-
deterministically) select a branch which does not adequately enforce the given
property.
Example 4.3 (Harmful Unpredictable Enforcement). Consider the non-deterministic
enforcer e3 (defined below) obtained by applying a “naive” synthesis function on
ϕ2, which informally converts the maximal fixpoint in ϕ2 into a recursive construct,
the modal necessities that are immediately followed by falsehood, into a suppres-
sion transformation, e.g., maxX.( . . . [i?req]ff) into recx.( . . . ⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.x), and
other necessities into the identity transformations, e.g., maxX.( . . . [i!ans]X) into
recx.( . . . ⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.x).
ϕ2
def
= maxX.([i?req][i!ans]X) ∧ ([i?req][i?req]ff)
e3
def
= recx.
( (
⁅d?req, t, d?req⁆.⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.x
)
+
(
⁅d?req, d= i, d?req⁆.⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.x
))
Now, consider a very simple process r which only issues two consecutive request
actions and terminates.
r
def
= i?req.r′
r′ def= i?req.nil
Since the transformations guarding the selections in e3, i.e., ⁅d?req, t, d?req⁆ and
⁅d?req, d= i, d?req⁆, are not disjoint (since i?req∈ J⁅d?req, t⁆K∩ J⁅d?req, d=i⁆K), en-
forcer e3 can make a non-deterministic selection (using rule eSel) whenever process
r makes an initial request. However, based on this choice, e3 might not always en-
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force the required behaviour. In the derivation below we can see that e3 manages
to enforce the required behaviour by non-deterministically choosing the second
branch.
e3[r]
i?req−−→ ⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.e3[r′] By iEnf, since r i?req−−→ r′ and e3 i?reqIi?req−−−−−−→ ⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.e3
τ−−−→ e3[nil] By iEnf, since r′ i?req−−→ nil and ⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.e3 i?reqIτ−−−−→ e3
However, being non-deterministic, e3 can also choose the other branch which allows
for the occurrence of violating runtime behaviour as shown below.
e3[r]
i?req−−→ ⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.e3[r′] By iEnf, since r i?req−−→ r′ and
e3
i?reqIi?req−−−−−−→ ⁅d!ans, t, d!ans⁆.e3
i?req−−→ id[nil] Since q1 i?req−−→ q2, but by iTer, ⁅d?req, t, τ ⁆.e3 6i?req−−→
Notice how in the above derivation, the monitored process still manages to issue
two subsequent request actions. 
If we want to adhere to the notion of enforceability from Section 3.4 (Defini-
tion 3.5), our enforcers must, first and foremost, guarantee soundness, i.e., that
a process p monitored by a sound enforcer e must always satisfy a given µHML
formula ϕ. This implies that the outcome of the applied transformations must
always prevent the property from being violated.
From Example 4.3 we can thus notice that enforcer e3 is not always capable of
is enforcing ϕ2, and is therefore unsound. In general, however, despite exhibiting
unpredictable behaviour, non-deterministic enforcers are not necessarily unsound.
Example 4.4 (Harmless Non-Deterministic Enforcement). Recall process q1, from
Example 2.6, and consider the non-deterministic enforcer e4 defined below.
q1
def
= recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?req.x+ i?cls.nil
)
e4
def
= e1 + e2
Enforcer e4 enforces property ϕ2 by first making a non-deterministic selection (using
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rule eSel) upon the occurrence of an initial request action i?req. Based on this
non-deterministic choice, it either enforces the property by eagerly suppressing each
and every request action via e1 or else on a by-need-basis, by suppressing requests
that occur after an initial unanswered request following an initial request via e2 (see
Example 3.2 for the resp. derivations). Despite being non-deterministic, enforcer
e4 still soundly enforces ϕ2, as it always prevent q1 from violating ϕ2, even though
it does not always apply the same enforcement strategy. 
However, recall from Definition 3.5 that soundness is not the only criterion that
an enforcer must abide by in order to strongly enforce a property; an enforcer is also
required to be transparent. Non-determinism can, once again, introduce intricate
behaviour that may breach the transparency criterion.
Example 4.5 (Non-Determinism and Transparency). Despite being sound, en-
forcer e4 is not transparent as it may occasionally select enforcer e1 which employs
an eager enforcement strategy causing it to unnecessarily modify valid system be-
haviour (as shown in Example 3.2). Hence, enforcer e4 fails to strongly enforce
formula ϕ2. 
A correct synthesis function must therefore be aware of the subtleties introduced
by non-deterministic behaviour. Since the runtime behaviour of deterministic en-
forcers is more predictable compared to non-deterministic ones, they are generally
less subtle and thus easier to understand and debug. For instance, if a deterministic
enforcer makes a mistake while enforcing a property, it is easier (or rather more
intuitive) to backtrack to the point where the mistake was made, since the enforcer
is always forced to react in the same way for the same input. By contrast, under-
standing the behaviour of a non-deterministic enforcer is harder as one needs to
take into consideration the selections that the enforcer chose during its execution,
thereby making it harder to understand and debug.
We thus develop a synthesis function which only yields deterministic enforcers
(as defined by Definition 4.1) from a given sHML formula. In Section 4.1 we
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present a normalization algorithm for converting a given sHML formula into a
semantically equivalent formula that is in a normal form, from which we can easily
synthesise deterministic enforcers. In Section 4.2, we then present a novel synthesis
algorithm which converts normalized sHML formulae into deterministic enforcers
for which we prove that the synthesised enforcers always behave deterministically
and are guaranteed to strongly enforce the formula they were derived from, i.e.,
the synthesised enforcers are guaranteed to adhere to soundness and transparency
(see Definition 3.5).
4.1 Towards Synthesising Deterministic Enforcers
through Normalization
In order to obtain deterministic monitors from a given logic formula, we follow the
approach presented in [3] and adapt it to our setting; the approach works in two
phases. The first phase converts the given sHML (resp. cHML) formula into a
semantically equivalent formula that is in an intermediary format which can then
be easily converted (by the second phase) into the required monitor. Since this
phase works at the level of the logic, namely wrt. the sHML and cHML subsets,
it is thus independent of the type of monitor (detection or enforcement) being
synthesised by the second phase.
The second phase thus employs a synthesis function that converts the result
obtained from the previous phase, into the required deterministic monitors; differ-
ent synthesis algorithms may be created depending on the desired type of resultant
monitor, e.g., the synthesis function in [49] can be used to obtain deterministic
detection monitors, while in our case, we must define a synthesis function that
converts the output of the first phase into a deterministic enforcement monitor.
In this section we focus on explaining the first phase of this approach wrt.
sHML formulae, as applying the same approach for cHML formula only requires
minimal (syntactic) changes. We thus subdivide this section as follows: in Sec-
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tion 4.1.1 we provide some preliminary material for understanding normalization,
then in Section 4.1.2 we present a normalization algorithm which only works for
sHML formulae defining singleton symbolic events. We then extend this algorithm
in Section 4.1.3 which enables for normalizing sHML (resp. cHML) formulae
defining symbolic events which are not necessarily singleton.
4.1.1 Preliminaries for Normalization
Normalization represents a conversion process which translates a given sHML
(resp. cHML) formula into an intermediary form known as the normal form1.
Definition 4.2 (Normal Form). A formula is in normal form when every con-
junction branch is guarded by a disjoint necessity modality, which denotes a set of
concrete events that does not intersect with the set denoted by any other symbolic
event defined in the necessities guarding the other branches, i.e., a concrete event
can only match one of the symbolic events. 
Example 4.6 (Normal Form Formulae). Recall formulae ϕ0 from Example 2.8,
and ϕ2 from Example 4.1 (both restated below).
ϕ0
def
= maxX.[i?req] ([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff)
ϕ2
def
= maxX.([i?req][i!ans]X) ∧ ([i?req][i?req]ff)
Notice how the conjunct branches in ϕ0 are guarded by necessities defining disjoint
concrete events i?req and i!ans, while the branches in ϕ2 are both guarded by the
same concrete event i?req. Hence, by Definition 4.2, we can deduce that ϕ0 is in
normal form, while ϕ2 is not. 
Based on Definition 4.2, in Figure 4.2 we restrict the syntax of our sHML
subset into sHMLnf. With this restricted syntax one can only define normalized
sHML formulae, i.e., sHML formulae that adhere to Definition 4.2. Concretely, in
1In [3] this is also referred to as the deterministic form.
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The Normalized Syntax
ϕ, ψ ∈ sHMLnf ::= tt | ff | X | maxX.ϕ |
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ϕi where #
i∈Q
ηi
where i∈Q is an index that identifies a branch in a conjunction.
Figure 4.2: The syntax of normal-form formulae.
sHMLnf we introduce a syntactic restriction which combines the conjunction oper-
ator (
∧
i∈Q
ϕi) with the necessity operator ([η]ϕ) into
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ϕi as shown in Figure 4.2.
One can immediately notice that this restriction forbids from defining sHML for-
mulae such as ϕ2, since the conjunct branches ([i?req][i!ans]X ∧ [i?req][i?req]ff)
do not define disjoint events.
We aim to prove that despite the syntactic restrictions, sHMLnf is still as
expressive as the unrestricted sHML subset2. To obtain this result, we devise a set
of conversion algorithms and prove Theorem 4.1, i.e., that any formula ϕ∈sHML
can be converted into a semantically equivalent normalized formula ψ∈sHMLnf.
Theorem 4.1 (Semantic Equivalence).
∀ϕ∈ sHML,∃ψ ∈ sHMLnf · JϕK = JψK
For instance, through the normalization algorithms we should be able to convert
formula ϕ2 into (an unfolded version of) ϕ0, since these two formulae are semanti-
cally equivalent to each other.
4.1.2 Reconstructing sHML into sHMLnf wrt. Singleton
Symbolic Events
Inspired from [3], we define the normalization algorithm for singleton sHML for-
mulae in terms of the four constructions given below; each construction is accom-
panied by a proof guaranteeing semantic preservation, i.e., that the result of each
translation is equivalent to its input. The construction sequence is as follows:
2In [3] the authors prove that this result holds in relation to a version of the logic which only
allows for defining concrete events, we thus follow up on their proofs and extend them to the
version that includes symbolic events.
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§1. Standardization of sHML: This step serves to convert a given sHML for-
mula into a semantically equivalent formula that is an intermediate form known
as the Standard Form; this is discussed in Section 4.1.2.1.
§2. Equation Form Conversion: As explained in Section 4.1.2.2, The standard
form formula is then reformulated into a system of equations which makes it
easier to manipulate in later stages.
§3. Normalization of Equations: The normalization procedure reviewed in Sec-
tion 4.1.2.3, restructures the obtained system of equations into an equivalent
system that is in the required normal form.
§4. sHML Form Conversion: Finally, the normal form system of equations is
converted back into an sHML formula that is in normal form; this conversion
is described in Section 4.1.2.4.
4.1.2.1 Standardization of sHML
The first step towards achieving the required normal form requires converting the
given sHML formula into a semantically equivalent sHMLsf formula, i.e., an
sHML formula that satisfies the structural constraints of standard formed formulae
as defined in Definition 4.3 below.
Definition 4.3 (Standard Form Formulae). According to [3], a formula ϕ ∈ sHML
is in standard form if all free and unguarded recursion variables Xi in ϕ, are at
the topmost level, i.e., if ϕ = ψ ∧ ∧
i∈Q
Xi where ψ does not contain any free and
unguarded recursion variables and Q is a finite set of indices. 
Example 4.7 (Standard Form Formulae). Formula (maxY.([i?3]Y ∧ X)) ∧ [i?3]ff
is not in standard form since the free logical variable X is not scoped under the top-
most conjunction, and instead it is scoped under the maximal fixpoint maxY.(. . .).
This formula can thus be easily standardized by elevating X to the topmost con-
junction and thus obtain ((maxY.([i?3]Y )) ∧ [i?3]ff ∧ X) ∈ sHMLsf. 
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Construction
〈〈ϕ〉〉1 def=

ψ{maxXj.ψ/Xj} ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ′)\{j}
Xi
{
if ϕ = maxXj .ϕ
′ and
〈〈ϕ′〉〉1 = ψ ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ′)\{j}
Xi
(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ1)
Xi ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ2)
Xi

if ϕ = (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) and
〈〈ϕ1〉〉1 = ψ1 ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ1)
Xi and
〈〈ϕ2〉〉1 = ψ2 ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ2)
Xi
ϕ otherwise
where f(ϕ) =
{
i
∣∣ if Xi occurs free and unguarded in ϕ}
Figure 4.3: The Standardization Algorithm
In Figure 4.3 we present the construction algorithm 〈〈−〉〉1 :: sHML 7→ sHMLsf.
This construction reformulates a given formula ϕ such that every occurrence of a
free and unguarded logical (recursion) variable, Xi (i.e., i ∈ f(ϕ)), is elevated to
the topmost conjunction to obtain the required standard form, and in the process,
any bound logical variable Xj /∈ f(ϕ) is also unfolded. The unfolding is required to
ensure that the resultant conjunction branches are always guarded by a necessity
operation. For example, the free logical variable X in formula (maxY.[i?3]Y ∧
X) ∧ [i?3]ff is elevated to the topmost conjunction, while the bound variable Y is
unfolded so to obtain ([i?3]maxY.[i?3]Y ∧ [i?3]ff) ∧ X.
More specifically, when analysing a conjunction, i.e., 〈〈ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2〉〉1, the construc-
tion is reapplied on the individual branches, i.e., 〈〈ϕ1〉〉1 and 〈〈ϕ2〉〉1, in order to
obtain ψ1 ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ1)
Xi and ψ2 ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ2)
Xi resp. Conjunctions
∧
i∈f(ϕ1)
Xi and
∧
i∈f(ϕ2)
Xi represent
every free and unguarded logical variable defined in ϕ1 and ϕ2 resp. These free
variables are added at the topmost conjunction such that the result of 〈〈ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2〉〉1
is (ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ1)
Xi ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ2)
Xi.
When analysing a maximal fixpoint, i.e., 〈〈maxXj.ϕ′〉〉1, the construction is
immediately reapplied on ϕ′, such that 〈〈ϕ′〉〉1 returns ψ ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ′)\{j}
Xi; the construction
then uses this result to construct ψ{maxXj.ψ/Xj} ∧
∧
i∈f(ϕ′)\{j}
Xi. Notice that the first
part of the reconstructed formula, i.e., ψ{maxXj.ψ/Xj} defines a substitution
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which unfolds the formula. The second part, i.e.,
∧
i∈f(ϕ′)\{j}
Xi then serves to ensure that
all the free and unguarded variables defined in ϕ, except Xj, are grouped and added
to the topmost conjunction layer; variable Xj is not included as this is now bound
under the maximal fixpoint, i.e., maxXj. . . ..
Example 4.8 (Standardization of sHML). Recall sHML formula ϕ2 from Exam-
ple 4.1 (restated below).
ϕ2
def
= maxX0.ϕ
′
2
ϕ′2
def
= ([i?req][i!ans]X0) ∧ ([i?req][i?req]ff)
We recursively apply 〈〈−〉〉1 on ϕ2 to obtain the result from the following derivation:
Derivation 1. Since ϕ2 = maxX0.ϕ
′
2 we know
〈〈maxX0.ϕ′2〉〉1 = ψ{maxX0. ψ′2/X0} ∧ tt
where 〈〈ϕ′2〉〉1 = ψ′2 ∧
∧
j∈f(ϕ′2)\{0}
Xj and since f(ϕ
′
2) \ {0} = ∅, then (
∧
j∈f(ϕ′2)\{0}
Xi) = tt.
Since ϕ′2 = ([i?req][i!ans]X0 ∧ [i?req][i?req]ff) we know
〈〈[i?req][i!ans]X0 ∧ [i?req][i?req]ff〉〉1 = (ψ′′2 ∧ ψ′′′2 ) ∧ tt ∧ tt
where ψ′′2 = 〈〈[i?req][i!ans]X0〉〉1= [i?req][i!ans]X0 ∧ tt
and ψ′′′2 = 〈〈[i?req][i?req]ff〉〉1= [i?req][i?req]ff ∧ tt
and since f(ϕ′′2) =∅= f(ϕ′′′2 ) then
∧
j∈f(ϕ′′2 )
Xj = tt =
∧
j∈f(ϕ′′′2 )
Xj.
Therefore, the resultant formula is the following:
〈〈ϕ2〉〉1 =
(
[i?req][i!ans]X0 ∧
[i?req][i?req]ff
)
{maxX0.[i?req][i!ans]X0 ∧ [i?req][i?req]ff/X0}{
By applying the substitution we obtain the following formula
}
= ([i?req][i!ans]maxX0.[i?req][i!ans]X0 ∧ [i?req][i?req]ff) ∧ ([i?req][i?req]ff)
=ϕsf2 
Proving Semantic Preservation for 〈〈−〉〉1. To prove that standardization con-
struction 〈〈−〉〉1 preserves the original semantics of the given sHML formula, we
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must prove that the following criterion holds:
∀ϕ∈sHML · 〈〈ϕ〉〉1 ≡ ϕ where ϕ ∈ sHMLsf
Proof. We refer to Lemma 8 from [3] in order to prove that construction 〈〈−〉〉1
preserves the semantics of the given formula ϕ and thus creates a semantically
equivalent standardized formula ϕsf. Although Lemma 8 is proven wrt. a version
of sHML that only allows for defining concrete events, the proof of this lemma
still applies to our setting.
In fact, Lemma 8 shows that semantics are preserved when moving the free
and unguarded logical variables to the topmost conjunction and when unfolding
the formula, i.e., as done by construction 〈〈−〉〉1, and pays no regard to the type
of events described in the necessities; adapting the proof for our setting thus only
requires minor syntactic changes, i.e., changing α into η.
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
4.1.2.2 Equation Form Conversion
The second construction reformulates sHMLsf formulae into an equivalent system
of equations. As defined in Definition 4.4 (below), systems of equations provide an
alternative way of defining µHML formulae in terms of a set of equations between
a logical variable and a formula.
Definition 4.4 (System of Equations). A system of equations SYS is defined as a
triple (Eq , X, Y ), where X represents the principle logical variable which identifies
the starting equation, Y is a finite set of free logical variables, and Eq is an n-tuple
of equations, i.e.,
{
X1 = ϕ1, X2 = ϕ2, . . . , Xn = ϕn
}
, where for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, Xi
is different from Xj, and each ϕi is a (possibly open) sHML expression.
Maximal fixpoints within a system of equations are denoted by referring to a
priorly defined recursion variable. We sometimes abuse the notation of Eq and
use it as a map from logical variables to the equated expression, i.e., we denote
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Eq(Xi) = ϕi in lieu of Xi = ϕi ∈ Eq. 
The equation form construction also needs to ensure that the constructed equa-
tions are also in standard form as defined by Definition 4.5.
Definition 4.5 (Standard Form Equations). Similar to Definition 4.3, we say that
an equation Xi = ϕi is in standard form if ϕi ∈ sHMLeq, where sHMLeq is defined
as follows:
ϕ ∈ sHMLeq ::= ff |
∧
j∈Q
[ηj]Xj ∧ (
∧
k∈Q′
Yk)
for some finite sets of indices Q and Q′. A system SYSsfis in standard form if
every equation in the system is in standard form, i.e., SYSsf = (Eqsf , X, Y ) such
that ∀X=ϕ ∈ Eq · ϕ ∈ sHMLeq. 
Example 4.9 (System of Equations vs. Formulae). Intuitively, a recursive formula
such as ϕ = maxX0.[i?3]([i!4]X0 ∧ [i!4]ff) can be represented in standard form
via the following system of 3 equations:
Eq
def
=
{
X0=[i?3]X1, X1=[i!4]X0 ∧ [i!5]X2, X2 = ff
}
Notice how recursion is represented by referring to X0 in the second equation.
Also, notice that since ϕ starts with a maximal fixpoint defining X0, we know that
X0 is also the principle logical variable of this system of equations. Moreover, we
know that Y=∅ since all the logical variables defined in the system are bound,
i.e., variables X0, X1 and X2 are all equated to some sHMLeq formula. Hence,
the resultant system of equations is (Eq , X0, ∅). 
The construction 〈〈−〉〉2 :: sHMLsf 7→ (Eqsf,Var,P(Var)), defined in Fig-
ure 4.4, compositionally inspects a given standard form formula ϕ and translates
it into an equivalent system of equations in standard form. For instance, truth,
tt, and falsehood, ff, are respectively translated into equations X = tt and X = ff,
with X being the principle variable of the resultant system of equations. Similarly,
a logical variable Y is translated into equation X = Y , with the addition that Y
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Construction
〈〈ϕ〉〉2 def=

({
X = tt
}
, X, ∅
)
if ϕ = tt ∧ ∧
j∈Q
Yj({
X = ff
}
, X, ∅
)
if ϕ = ff ∧ ∧
j∈Q
Yj({
X = Y
}
, X,
{
Y
})
if ϕ = Y(
Eq1 ∪ Eq2 ∪{
X0 =
(
Eq1(X1)∧
Eq2(X2)
)}
, X0, Y1∪Y2
)
if ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
and 〈〈ϕ1〉〉2 = (Eq1 ,X1,Y1)
and 〈〈ϕ2〉〉2 = (Eq2 ,X2,Y2)(
Eq ∪ {Y = Eq(X1)} , Y, Y \ {Y }) if ϕ = maxY.ϕ′and 〈〈ϕ′〉〉2 = (Eq , X1, Y )({
X0 = [η]X1
} ∪ Eq , X0, Y ) if ϕ = [η]ϕ′and 〈〈ϕ′〉〉2 = (Eq , X1, Y )
Figure 4.4: The conversion algorithm from a sHMLsf formula to a Standard Form
System of equations.
is marked as being a free logical variable in Y to indicate that Y is not currently
bound to some fixpoint.
Maximal fixpoints are converted into equation Y = Eq(X1), where X1 is the
principle variable of the system of equations obtained from the recursive application
on the continuation ϕ′ i.e., 〈〈ϕ′〉〉2=(Eq , X, Y ), and Eq(X1) refers to the formula
F1 equated to variable X1 in Eq, i.e., if X1=F1 then Eq(X1)=F1. Upon analysing
a maximal fixpoint maxY.ϕ′, variable Y is removed from Y , thus denoting that
although Y is free in ϕ′, this is no longer the case in ϕ=maxY.ϕ′.
In the case of conjunctions, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, these are reconstructed into a system of
equations consisting in the systems of equations obtained from analysing ϕ1 and
ϕ2, i.e., Eq1 and Eq2, along with equation X0 = Eq1(X1) ∧ Eq2(X2), where X1
and X2 are the principle variables of ϕ1 and ϕ2 resp. Finally, necessity modalities,
[η]ϕ′, are translated into a system consisting in the equations, Eq, obtained from
〈〈ϕ′〉〉2, along with equation X0 = [η]X1, where X1 is the principle variable obtained
from 〈〈ϕ′〉〉2.
Example 4.10. Recall the standard form, singleton sHML formula ϕsf2 obtained
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in Example 4.8:
ϕsf2 = ϕ
sf
2a ∧ ϕsf2b ϕsf2d = ϕsf2e ∧ ϕsf2f
ϕsf2a = [i?req][i!ans]ϕ
sf
2c ϕ
sf
2e = [i?req][i!ans]X
ϕsf2b = [i?req][i?req]ff ϕ
sf
2f = [i?req][i?req]ff
ϕsf2c = maxX.ϕ
sf
2d
We recursively apply 〈〈ϕ〉〉2 to obtain the resultant system of equations from the
following derivation:
Derivation 2. Since ϕsf2 = ϕ
sf
2a ∧ ϕsf2b we know
〈〈ϕsf2a ∧ ϕsf2b〉〉2 =
({
X0 = Eq1(X1) ∧ Eq1(X2)
} ∪ Eq1 ∪ Eq2 , X0, ∅)
where 〈〈ϕsf2a〉〉2 = (Eq1 , X1, ∅) and 〈〈ϕsf2b〉〉2 = (Eq2 , X2, ∅).
We now consider 〈〈ϕsf2a〉〉2 (LHS) and 〈〈ϕsf2b〉〉2 (RHS) separately.
LHS
Since ϕsf2a = [i?req][i!ans]ϕ
sf
2c we know
〈〈[i?req][i!ans]ϕsf2c〉〉2 =
({
X1 = [i?req]X3, X3 = [i!ans]X
} ∪ Eq′1 , X1, ∅)
where 〈〈ϕsf2c〉〉2 = (Eq′1 , X, ∅).
Since ϕsf2c = (maxX.ϕ
sf
2d) we know
〈〈maxX.ϕsf2d〉〉1 =
({
X = Eq′′1(X4)
} ∪ Eq′′1 , X, ∅)
where 〈〈ϕsf2d〉〉2 = (Eq′′1 , X4, ∅).
Since ϕsf2d = ϕ
sf
2e ∧ ϕsf2f we know
〈〈ϕsf2e ∧ ϕsf2f〉〉1 =
({
X4 = Eq3(X5) ∧ Eq4(X6)
} ∪ Eq3 ∪ Eq4 , X4, {X})
where 〈〈ϕsf2e〉〉2 =
(
Eq3 , X5,
{
X
})
and 〈〈ϕsf2f〉〉2 = (Eq4 , X6, ∅).
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Since we have 〈〈ϕ3〉〉2 (LHS) and 〈〈ϕ4〉〉2 (RHS) we consider them separately.
LHS
Since ϕsf2e = [i?req][i!ans]X we know
〈〈[i?req][i!ans]X〉〉2 =
({
X5 = [i?req]X7, X7 = [i!ans]X8, X8 = ff
}
, X5,
{
X
})
RHS
Since ϕsf2f = [i?req][i?req]ff we know
〈〈[i?req][i?req]ff〉〉2 =
({
X6 = [i?req]X9, X9 = [i?req]X10, X10 = ff
}
, X6, ∅
)
RHS
Since ϕsf2b = [i?req][i?req]ff we know
〈〈[i?req][i?req]ff〉〉2 =
({
X2 = [i?req]X11, X11 = [i?req]X12, X12 = ff
}
, X2, ∅
)
Hence, the result of this derivation is 〈〈ϕ〉〉2 = (Eq , X0, ∅) where
Eq =

X0 = [i?req]X3 ∧ [i?req]X11, X1 = [i?req]X3 , X3 = [i!ans]X,
X = [i?req]X7 ∧ [i?req]X9, X4 = [i?req]X7 ∧ [i?req]X9 , X5 = [i?req]X7 ,
X7 = [i!ans]X8, X8 = X, X6 = [i?req]X9 , X9 = [i?req]X10,
X10 = ff, X2 = [i?req]X11 , X11 = [i?req]X12, X12 = ff

Note that the greyed formulae were are redundant since they are not reachable from
the principle logical variable X0; for conciseness we will ignore them in forthcoming
examples. 
Proving Semantic Preservation for 〈〈−〉〉2. To prove that construction 〈〈−〉〉2
preserves the semantics of the given sHMLsf formula, we must prove that the
following criterion holds:
∀ϕ∈sHMLsf · 〈〈ϕ〉〉2 ≡ SYS where SYS is in Standard Form.
Proof. The proof guaranteeing that the resultant system of equations SYS,
constructed via 〈〈−〉〉2, is semantically equivalent to the given standard form formula
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ϕsf follows from Lemma 10 given in [3]. Although this lemma is proven in relation to
formulae that define concrete events, this lemma still applies for formulae defining
symbolic events, since the construction is independent of the type of event described
in the modal necessities.
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
4.1.2.3 Normalization of Equations
The third construction performs the actual normalization procedure as it converts
systems of equations that are in standard form, into an equivalent systems of equa-
tions that are in normal form as defined in Definition 4.6.
Definition 4.6 (Normalized System of Equations). An equation Xi=ϕi is in nor-
mal form if the subformulae of a conjunction are either free and unguarded logical
variables, or else guarded by a disjoint necessity. This ensures that at most only
one necessity guarding a branch in a conjunction can match a system action, i.e.,
ϕi has the form ff or
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ϕi∧
∧
j∈Q
Y where #i∈Q ηi. A system of equations SYS
nfis
in normal form when all of its equations, Eqnf, are in normal form. 
Construction
〈〈(Eq , Xi, Y )〉〉3 def= (Eqnf , X{i}, Y )
Eqnf
def
=
{
XQ =
∧
η∈S(Q)
[η]XD(Q,α) ∧
∧
j∈E(Q)
Yj #S(Q) and Q ⊆ I(Eq) and
ff is not a subformula of Eq(XQ)
}
∪
{
XQ = ff
∣∣∣ Q ⊆ I(Eq) and ff is a subformula of Eq(XQ)}
where S(Q)
def
=
⋃
i∈Q
{
η
∣∣∣ [η]Xj is a subformula in ϕi}
D(Q, η)
def
=
⋃
i∈Q
{
r
∣∣∣ [η]Xr is a subformula in ϕi}
E(Q)
def
=
⋃
i∈Q
{
r
∣∣∣Yr is unguarded in ϕi}
I(Eq)
def
=
{
i
∣∣∣ Xi = ϕi ∈ Eq}
Figure 4.5: The Normalization Algorithm for Systems of Equations
70
4. Enforcing Safety Properties via Suppressions
Figure 4.5 presents the normalization algorithm in terms of the construction
function 〈〈−〉〉3 :: (Eqsf ,Var, P(Var)) 7→ (Eqnf ,Var, P(Var)). This construc-
tion generates a new system of equations which contains the powerset combinations
of the equations from the original system of equations. Intuitively, the construction
takes two or more equations and combines the equated formulae with a conjunction.
Example 4.11. Consider the system of equations (Eq , X0, ∅), where Eq con-
tains 3 equations X0=ϕ0, X1=ϕ1 and X2=ϕ2. The construction thus takes all the
combinations and creates a new system, namely, (Eqnf , X{0}, ∅) where
Eq =
{
X{0} = ϕ0, X{0,1} = ϕ0 ∧ϕ1, X{0,1,2} = ϕ0 ∧ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, X{1} = ϕ1,
X{1,2} = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, X{2} = ϕ2, X{0,2} = ϕ0 ∧ϕ2
}
As in the original system of equations, the principle variable X0 equates to ϕ0, the
new principle variable for the reconstructed equation is therefore variable X{0}, as
this also equates to ϕ0. 
While combining the equated formulae, the construction also normalizes the
combined equated formulae. The first part of the construction, i.e.,
∧
η∈S(Q)
[η]XD(Q,α),
thus makes sure that whenever the conjunction branches are guarded by necessities
specifying a set of disjoint events S(Q), then the conjunction is normalized by
merging together the syntactically equal necessities in the conjunction. This merger
provides a resultant conjunction that has branches which are guarded by disjoint
(syntactically different) necessities, e.g., equation X0 = [η]X1 ∧ [η]X2 ∧ [η′]X3 can
be normalized into X{0} = [η]X{1,2} ∧ [η′]X{3} by merging the first two branches,
i.e., [η]X1 and [η]X2 into [η]X{1, 2}.
Note how only the branches which guarded by syntactically equal necessities
are being merged together; this is done by taking a subset Q of the powerset
combinations of the indices provided by I(Eq), i.e., Q ⊆ I(Eq), where I(Eq) returns
all the indices specified in the set of equations Eq. The merged indices are obtained
using D(Q,η) which returns the index r of every logical variable Xr that is guarded
by the same symbolic event η.
Finally, the second part of the construction, i.e.,
∧
j∈E(Q)
Yj, ensures that every un-
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guarded logical variable Yj defined in the equation, is kept at the topmost level of
the conjunction, therefore retaining the equation in standard form as defined by
Definition 4.6.
Example 4.12. Recall the standard form system of equations obtained in Exam-
ple 4.10, i.e., (Eqsf , X0, ∅) where
Eqsf =
{
X0 = [i?req]X3 ∧ [i?req]X11, X3 = [i!ans]X,X = [i?req]X7 ∧ [i?req]X9,
X7 = [i!ans]X8, X8 = X,X9 = [i?req]X10, X10 = ff, X11 = [i?req]X12,
X12 = ff
}
When the construction rule is applied, it generates every possible combination and
merges the modal necessities where necessary. By definition of 〈〈(Eq , X0, ∅)〉〉3 we
therefore obtain (Eqnf , X{0}, ∅) where
Eqnf =
{
X{0} = [i?req]X{3,11}
} ∪ Eq′nf
For instance, note how this construction collapses X0 = [i?req]X3 ∧ [i?req]X11
into X{0} = [i?req]X{3,11}, where continuations X3 and X11 were combined into a
single conjunct continuation X{3,11}, in this way every event specified by a neces-
sity in the conjunction becomes disjoint, i.e., none of the reconstructed singleton
symbolic events can denote a set containing the same concrete event as another
symbolic event residing in the same conjunction. Similarly, the algorithm also
merges X=[i?req]X7 ∧ [i?req]X9 into X=[i?req]X7,9. The combined formulae for
variables X{3,11} and X{7,9} are also constructed by the normalization algorithm as
defined in Eq′nf below:
Eq′nf =
{
X{3,11} = [i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]X{12}, X = [i?req]X{7,9},
X{7,9} = [i!ans]X{8} ∧ [i?req]X{10}, X{8} = X,
X{10} = ff, X{11} = [i?req]X{12}, X{12} = ff, . . .
}
For conciseness, some combinations have been ignored from the resultant set as they
are not reachable from the principle variable X{0} and are thus redundant. 
Proving Semantic Preservation for 〈〈−〉〉3. To prove that construction 〈〈−〉〉3
preserves the semantics of the given standardized system of equations, we must
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prove that the following holds:
SYS is in Standard Form implies 〈〈SYS〉〉3 ≡ SYS where 〈〈SYS〉〉3 is in Normal Form.
Proof. In order to prove that construction 〈〈−〉〉3 produces a normalized system
of equations SYSnfthat is semantically equivalent to the given system of equations
SYS, we refer to Lemma 11 in [3].
However, Lemma 11 holds wrt. a version of our construction which requires
that the necessities define concrete events; this is necessary since the construction
must merge together the conjunct branches that are prefixed by syntactically equal
modal necessities, e.g., X0=[i?3]X1 ∧ [i?3]X2 becomes X0=[i?3]X{1,2} since both
branches are prefixed by the same concrete necessity [i?3].
Lemma 11, however, still holds for our construction since 〈〈−〉〉3 requires condi-
tion #S(Q) to hold. This condition states that all the symbolic events guarding a
conjunction must be disjoint unless syntactically equal. In this way, if two or more
symbolic events are syntactically equal, they would be merged by the construction,
while the other (non-syntactically equal) necessities are guaranteed to be disjoint.
Hence, a concrete system event can only satisfy at most one symbolic modal neces-
sity, i.e., in the same way as per normalized conjunctions defining concrete events.
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
4.1.2.4 sHML Form Conversion
The final step for obtaining the final normalized formula only requires regenerating
the normalized formula, ψ ∈ sHMLnf, from a given normalized system of equations,
SYSnf= (Eqnf , X, Y ).
Figure 4.6 presents the final construction, 〈〈−〉〉4 :: (Eqnf ,Var, P(Var)) 7→
sHMLnf, which converts a normalized system of equations into a semantically
equivalent sHMLnf formula. The algorithm internally employs function σshml ::
(sHMLnf × Eq) 7→ sHMLnf to create a normalized sHMLnf formula that is se-
mantically equivalent to the given system of equations. This function starts by
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Construction
〈〈(Eq , Xi, Y )〉〉4 def= σshml(Xi,Eq)
σshml(ϕ,Eq)
def
=
ϕ if fv(ϕ)=∅σshml(ϕσ,Eq) if fv(ϕ)=Y then σ={ maxX0.ϕ0/X0 X0=ϕ0 ∈Eqand X0∈Y
}
Figure 4.6: Converting a normalized system of equations into an sHMLnf formula.
taking as input the principle variable Xi along with the set of equations Eq, it
then searches for the equation Xi=ϕi in Eq and converts it into a substitution
environment which substitutes variable Xi with maxXi.ϕi, i.e., {maxXi.ϕi/Xi}.
This substitution is then applied to Xi and the function recurses with the
substituted value, i.e., σshml(maxXi.ϕi,Eq); recursion stops when the resultant
formula ϕ becomes closed, in which case it is returned as the normalized sHMLnf
formula.
Example 4.13. Consider the following normalized system of equations obtained
in Example 4.12, (Eq , X{0}, ∅) where
Eqnf =
{
X{0} = [i?req]X{3,11}, X{3,11} = [i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]X{12},
X = [i?req]X{7,9}, X{7,9} = [i!ans]X{8} ∧ [i?req]X{10}, X{8} = X,
X{10} = ff, X{11} = [i?req]X{12}, X{12} = ff
}
By 〈〈(Eq , X{0}, ∅)〉〉4 we obtain ϕ ∈ sHMLnf where
ψ2
def
= σshml(X{0},Eqnf)
def
= maxX{0}.

[i?req]maxX{3,11}
.
[i!ans]maxX.([i?req]maxX{7,9}.[i!ans]maxX{8}.X∧ [i?req]maxX{12}.ff
)
∧ [i?req]maxX{10}.ff


The above formula can be optimized by removing redundant maximal fixpoint dec-
larations such as maxX{0}. and maxX{3,11}., i.e., fixpoints that declare a variable
which is never referenced to throughout the rest of the formula. Hence we can
optimize our formula as follows:
ψ2
def
= [i?req]([i!ans]maxX.[i?req]([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff) ∧ [i?req]ff) ∈ sHMLnf
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Notice that the obtained optimized formula, i.e., ψ2 is in fact an unfolded version of
formula ϕ0, and that both ϕ0 and also ψ2 are in normal form i.e., ϕ0, ψ2 ∈ sHMLnf.
ϕ0
def
= maxX.[i?req] ([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff)
{ By unfolding maxX0. we obtain }
= [i?req]([i!ans]maxX.[i?req]([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff) ∧ [i?req]ff)
= ψ2 ∈ sHMLnf 
Proving Semantic Preservation for 〈〈−〉〉4. To prove that construction 〈〈−〉〉4
preserves the semantics of the given normalized system of equations, we must prove
that the following holds:
SYS is in Normal Form implies 〈〈SYS〉〉4 ≡ SYS where 〈〈SYS〉〉4∈sHMLnf
Proof. Since construction 〈〈−〉〉4 is independent of the type of events defined in
the modal necessities of the given system of equations, we refer to Lemma 12 as
proof that this construction preserves the semantics of the given system of equations
SYSnf, such that it produces a semantically equivalent formula ϕ∈sHMLnf.
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
4.1.3 Reconstructing sHML into sHMLnf wrt. any Sym-
bolic Event
Up until now we have only considered normalizing sHML formulae defining single-
ton symbolic events, as these events are easy to statically differentiate from each
other as required for merging conjunct branches in Item 3 (see Section 4.1.2.3).
However, the necessities in the logic we consider can also describe symbolic events
which denote wider sets of concrete events e.g., [⁅d?req, d6=j⁆]ϕ where J⁅d?req, d6=j⁆K
= {. . . , i?req, k?req, . . . }.
One major difference between singleton and other symbolic events is that the
former can easily be distinguished from one another by a simple syntactic check
e.g., singleton events ⁅d1?f1, d1=i∧ f1=req⁆ and ⁅d2?f2, d2=i∧ f2=cls⁆ can be repre-
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sented as i?req and i?cls resp. and can thus be easily distinguished since i?req 6= i?cls.
In general, however, this distinction is not always possible with symbolic events.
For instance, consider d?5 and i?f , these two events, although syntactically
different, they define intersecting sets of input events, i.e., Jd?5K∩Ji?fK, meaning
that both symbolic events can match the same concrete system event i?5. Hence,
this makes it harder to statically differentiate and distinguish between symbolic
events, which is crucial when applying the normalization construction step §3.
As shown in Example 4.14, normalizing a non-singleton symbolic formula using
the algorithm we presented so far, may sometimes fail to produce an equivalent
formula that is in normal form.
Example 4.14 (Normalizing Symbolic Formulae). Consider the non-singleton
symbolic formula ϕ3 given below.
ϕ3
def
= maxX.([⁅d?req, d6=h⁆][⁅d!ans, t⁆]X) ∧ ([⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆][⁅f?req, t⁆]ff)
By applying §1 on ϕ3 we obtain the following standard form formula,
ϕsf3 = 〈〈ϕ3〉〉1 = ([⁅d!ans, t⁆][⁅d!ans, t⁆](ϕ3)) ∧ ([⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆][⁅f?req, t⁆]ff)
By §2 we then obtain the following system of equations which we can then nor-
malize via §3 as shown below.
SYSsf3 = 〈〈ϕsf3 〉〉1 =
(
Eqsf3 , X0, ∅
)
where
Eqsf3 =

X0 = [⁅d?req, d6=h⁆]X3 ∧ [⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆]X11, X3 = [⁅d!ans, t⁆]X,
X = [⁅d?req, d6=h⁆]X7 ∧ [⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆]X9, X7 = [⁅d!ans, t⁆]X8, X8 = X,
X9 = [⁅f?req, t⁆]X10, X10 = ff, X11 = [⁅f?req, t⁆]X12, X12 = ff

However, when applying §3 on SYSsf3 , the algorithm fails to combine symbolic
events ⁅d?req, d6=h⁆ and ⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆ as despite not being disjoint, they are neither
syntactically equal. Hence, equation X0 = [⁅d?req, d6=h⁆]X3 ∧ [⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆]X11 is
not merged into X0 = [⁅d?req, d6=h∧ d 6=j⁆]X{3,11}, but simply remains the same as
shown below.
SYSnf3 = 〈〈SYSsf3 〉〉2 =
(
Eqnf3 , X{0}, ∅
)
where
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Eqnf3 =

X{0} = [⁅d?req, d6=h⁆]X{3} ∧ [⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆]X{11}
X = [⁅d?req, d6=h⁆]X{7} ∧ [⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆]X{9},
X{7} = [⁅d!ans, t⁆]X{8}, X{8} = X, ,X{3} = [⁅d!ans, t⁆]X,
X{9} = [⁅f?req, t⁆]X{10}, X{10} = ff,
X{11} = [⁅f?req, t⁆]X{12}, X{12} = ff

Due to this, when applying §4, we end up with ψ3 (stated below), which despite
being semantically equivalent to the original formula ϕ3, it is still not in normal
form (i.e., ψ3 /∈ sHMLnf), since its conjunctions are not guarded by necessities
defining disjoint events.
ψ3 = 〈〈ϕ3〉〉1 = ([⁅d!ans, t⁆][⁅d!ans, t⁆](ϕ3)) ∧ ([⁅f?req, f 6=j⁆][⁅f?req, t⁆]ff)
= ϕsf3
Even though formula ϕ3 is a generic version of ϕ2 (i.e., ϕ3 is less restrictive than
ϕ2), our normalization algorithm fails to produce an equivalent normalized formula
since ψ3 /∈ sHMLnf. 
Therefore, to be able to use the existing normalization procedure introduced
in [3], we must add extra steps to make sure that we can clearly distinguish be-
tween symbolic events, e.g., d?5 and i?f can be replaced by the following guarded
patterns:
• d?5 can be encoded as ⁅d?f, f=5 ∧ d=i⁆ or ⁅d?f, f=5 ∧ x 6=i⁆; while
• i?f can be encoded as ⁅d?f, f=5 ∧ d=i⁆ or ⁅d?f, f 6=5 ∧ x=i⁆.
Using this technique we are able to statically tell whether one encoded symbolic
event is equal to another event or not. For instance, the reconstructed symbolic
events ⁅d?f, d = 5 ∧ x = i⁆ and ⁅d?f, f 6= 5 ∧ d = i⁆ can now be statically
distinguished by using a simple syntactic check, since their contradicting conditions,
i.e., f=5 and f 6=5 resp., guarantee that the reconstructed events are also disjoint,
i.e., J⁅d?f, f=5 ∧ d=i⁆K ∩ J⁅d?f, f 6=5 ∧ d=i⁆K=∅.
In the following section we thus formalize and present the additional steps that
must be performed when working wrt. symbolic events in order to ensure that the
obtained conjunct branches are unable to match the same concrete event.
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4.1.3.1 Additional Steps for Normalizing Necessities defining Symbolic
Events
We formally define three additional construction rules that must be applied between
steps §2 and §3. These new constructions convert conjunctions that are guarded
by necessities defining non-disjoint symbolic events, into equivalent conjunctions
guarded by disjoint necessities, i.e., necessities describing symbolic events that are
both syntactically and semantically different such that the sets of concrete events
they denote do not intersect. The additional steps are the following:
§i. Uniformity of Symbolic Events: In this step, we inspect conjunct modal
necessities and substitute their data variables with the same fresh variable
whenever they define pattern equivalent symbolic events, e.g., we convert
[⁅d1?d2, c(d1, d2)⁆][⁅d3?d4, c(d3, d4)⁆]ff∧ [⁅f1?f2, c(f1, f2)⁆][⁅f3?d4, c(f3, f4)⁆]ff into
[⁅g1?g2, c(g1, g2)⁆][⁅g3?g4, c(g3, g4)⁆]ff∧ [⁅g1?g2, c(g1, g2)⁆][⁅g3?g4, c(g3, g4)⁆]ff; we
discuss this in detail in Section 4.1.3.2.
§ii. Condition Reformulation of Conjunct Symbolic Events: Once uni-
formed, the conjunctions are recomposed such that the reconstructed con-
junctions are guaranteed to define necessities that define disjoint symbolic
events; the details on how this is done are discussed in Section 4.1.3.3.
Internally, the constructions presented in Sections 4.1.3.2 and 4.1.3.3 both make
use of the traverse function in order to process the given set of equations in a tree-
like manner as defined in Figure 4.7.
The function traverse :: (Eq × P(Index) × Fun × Acc) 7→ Acc is a higher
order function which takes as input: a set of equations Eq, a set of indices Q an
arbitrary projection function λ, and an accumulator argument δ.
(i) Performing a Traversal. The traverse function is generally used to con-
duct a breath first traversal on the given equation set, starting from the equation
that equates to the principle variable as the root of the tree traversal, e.g., as shown
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Traversal Functions.
traverse(Eq, Q, λ, δ)
def
=

traverse(Eq′, Q′, λ, δ′) if Eq6=∅ and Q6=∅
then δ′=λ(Eq, Q, δ)
and Eq′=Eq\Eq//Q
and Q′=
⋃
j∈Q
child(Eq, j)
δ otherwise
child(Eq, i)
def
=
{
j
∣∣∣ Eq(Xi)=∧
j∈Q
[ηj]Xj ∧ϕ and j 6=i and Xj∈dom(Eq)
}
Eq//Q
def
= {Xi=ϕi (Xi=ϕi)∈Eq and i∈Q}
Figure 4.7: The Breath First Traversal Algorithm.
traverse(Eq, { 0 }, λ, δ)
traverse(Eq′, {1, 2, 3}, λ, δ′)
traverse(Eq′′, {5}, λ, δ′′)
λ({X0=[η1]X1 ∧ [η2]X2 ∧ [η3]X3} ∪ Eq′, {0}, δ) = δ′
child(Eq, 0) ={1,2,3}
λ
({
X1=[η4]X0, X2=[η5]X5 , X3=[η6]X3
}
∪ Eq′′, {1, 2, 3}, δ′
)
=δ′′
child(Eq′, 1)=∅ child(Eq′, 2)={5} child(Eq′, 3)=∅
λ({ X5=ff }, {5}, δ′′) = δ′′′
Figure 4.8: A pictorial view of an example equation set traversal.
in Figure 4.8, for system (Eq , X0, Y ), equation X0=[η1]X1 ∧ [η2]X2 ∧ [η3]X3 is the
root of the traversal since X0 is the principle variable.
The children of the root are calculated via the child :: (Eq×Index)7→P(Index)
function. This function takes as input a set of equations Eq along with the index
of the parent equation, e.g., index 0 for equation X0=[η1]X1 ∧ [η2]X2 ∧ [η3]X3. It
then scans the equated formula and returns the set containing the indices of every
branch, defined in the equated formula, which is prefixed by a modal necessity,
e.g., in Figure 4.7, the children of X0=[η1]X1 ∧ [η2]X2 ∧ [η3]X3 are
{
1, 2, 3
}
, such
that branches [η1]X1, [η2]X2 and [η3]X3 are siblings as they are defined at the same
conjunction layer.
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Cycles in the traversal are avoided since the child function is always executed
wrt. a restricted set of equations, i.e., one which does not include the parent
equation. For instance, while analysing equation X1=[η4]X0 (see Figure 4.7), tra-
verse is evaluated wrt. Eq′ which does not include the parent equation, i.e., since
Eq′=Eq\Eq//{0} where Eq//{0} = {X0=[η1]X1 ∧ [η2]X2 ∧ [η3]X3}. sIn this way,
when computing the children of X1 (via child(Eq
′, 1)) index 0 is not added to the
resultant set of child indices, since X0 /∈ dom(Eq′)’; this avoids cycling back to
some (grand) parent equation.
Additionally, the child function avoids cycling back to the (immediate) parent
by removing the parent’s index form the returned set of child indices, e.g., when
evaluating child(Eq′, 3) to retrieve the child indices of equation X3=[η6]X3, index
3 is removed thus avoiding the creation of a loop in the traversal.
(ii) Applying the projection function during traversal. While traversing
the equation set, the traverse function can apply an arbitrary projection function
λ. Despite being an arbitrary function, λ must adhere to the following type: λ ::
(Eq×P(Index)×Acc)7→Acc, i.e., λ must be a function which takes three inputs,
including the current set of equations Eq, a set of indices Q and an accumulator
value δ; as a result λ must return an updated version of the accumulator, i.e., δ′.
(iii) Traversal Termination and Return Value. The traversal terminates
when either all the equations in Eq have been process such that the traverse function
is applied wrt. Eq=∅, or whenever no further children can be visited since none of
the branches have any valid children, i.e., for every branch i, child(Eq, i)=0. The
latter is an optimization which omits the redundant processing of equations that
are not reachable from the principle equation.
Example 4.15. Consider the system of equations (Eq , X0, ∅) where
Eq=
{
X0=[η]X1, X1=ff, X2=ff
}
The traversal starts from equation X0=[η]X1 as the root, followed by X1=ff as its
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immediate child, however equation X2=ff is the child of neither equation and is
thus ignored by the traversal. 
The latest version of the accumulator value is returned once the traversal is
complete.
4.1.3.2 Uniformity of Symbolic Events
Intuitively, this part of the normalization algorithm renames the data variables
of the pattern equivalent symbolic events (i.e., symbolic events defining equivalent
patterns; see Section 2.3.1) defined in necessity operations guarding branches within
the same conjunction level, to the same variable names to obtain a uniform system
of equations as defined in Definition 4.7.
Definition 4.7 (Uniform System of Equations). An equation is uniform when it
is in standard form and when every pattern equivalent event (see Section 2.3)
defined by sibling necessities within a conjunction defines the exact same data
variable names. A system of equations is uniform when all of its equations are
uniform. 
Example 4.16. The symbolic necessity events defined inX0= [⁅d1?d2, c1(d1, d2)⁆]X1∧
[⁅f1?f2, c2(f1, f2)⁆]X2 are both pattern equivalent, however they are not uniform
since they do not define the same variables. This formula can however be easily
made uniform by applying 〈〈−〉〉(i) which renames d1 and f1 to the same g1 and
similarly d2 and f2 to a fresh variable g2, so to obtain X0= [⁅g1?g2, c1(g1, g2)⁆]X1 ∧
[⁅g1?g2, c2(g1, g2)⁆]X2 
In Figure 4.9, we present the construction 〈〈−〉〉(i) :: (Eqsf ,Var, P(Var)) 7→
(Equni ,Var, P(Var)). This construction internally uses the uni function to create
the required uniform set of equations Equni from the given standardized equation
set Eqsf. More specificallym uni reconstructs the equation set by performing a
linear scan during which it converts equations of the form Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[ηjζ(j)]Xj ∧ϕ
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Construction
〈〈(Eq , X0, Y )〉〉(i) def= (uni(Eq, ζ) , X0, Y )
where ζ=traverse(Eq, {0}, partition,∅)
uni(Eq, ζ)
def
=
{
Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[ηj(ζ(j))]Xj ∧ϕ
∣∣∣ Xi=∧
j∈Q
[ηj]Xj ∧ϕ ∈ Eq
}
partition(Eq, Q, ζ)
def
=

j 7→ ζ(i) +∪ {gn/dn}
k 7→ ζ(l) +∪ {gn/fn}
∀i, l ∈ Q · Eq(i)=∧
j∈Q′
[ηj(d
n)]Xj ∧ϕ
and Eq(l)=
∧
k∈Q′′
[ηk(f
n)]Xk ∧ϕ s.t.
if ηj(d
n) is pattern equivalent to
ηk(f
n), then we assign the same
set of fresh variables gn.

+∪ ζ
Figure 4.9: The Uniformity Algorithm for Symbolic Events
where ζ :: Index 7→σ is a map that provides a substitution environment σ for a
given index i.
Intuitively, a well-formed ζ map should provide substitutions that uniformly
rename the data variables of pattern equivalent modal necessities that are defined
as siblings within a tree of conjunctions, i.e., the data variables defined in such
necessities are renamed to the same fresh set of variable names, such that the
patterns of the renamed necessities become syntactically equal.
Definition 4.8 (A Well-Formed ζ Map). We say that ζ is a well-formed map for
a set of equations Eq, whenever it provides a set of mappings which allow for
(i) renaming the data variables of each pattern equivalent sibling necessity, de-
fined in Eq, to the same set of fresh variables, and for
(ii) renaming any reference to a data variable that is bound by a renamed parent
necessity defined in Eq. 
We assume that when an index i is not in the domain of the ζ map (i.e.,
i /∈ dom(ζ)) then ζ(i) = ∅.
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X0=[⁅f 1?f 2, f 1 6=i⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅f 1?f 2, f 2 6=3⁆]X2
uni
X1=[⁅f 3!f 4, t⁆]X3
uni
X2=[⁅f 3!f 4, f 3=f 1⁆]X4
uni
X0=[⁅d1?d2, d1 6=i⁆ζ(1)]X1 ∧ [⁅d3?d4, d4 6=3⁆ζ(2)]X2
X1=[⁅d5!d6, t⁆ζ(3)]X3 X2=[⁅d7!d8, d7=d3⁆ζ(4)]X4
X3=ff X4=ff
Figure 4.10: A Tree representation of the uni traversal performed on Eq.
Example 4.17. Consider the following system of equations (Eq , X0, ∅) where
Eq =
{
X0=[⁅d1?d2, d1 6=i⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅d3?d4, d4 6=3⁆]X2, X1=[⁅d5!d6, t⁆]X3,
X2=[⁅d7!d8, d7=d3⁆]X4, X3=ff, X4=ff
}
For convenience, we also represent these equations as a tree starting from equation
X0=[⁅d1?d2, d1 6=i⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅d3?d4, d4 6=3⁆]X2 as the root of the tree. We also assume
the knowledge of a well-formed ζ map that has the following form, i.e.,
ζ =
{
1 7→ {d1/f 1, d2/f 2}, 2 7→ {d3/f 1, d4/f 2},
3 7→ ζ(1) +∪ {d5/f 3, d6/f 4}, 4 7→ ζ(2) +∪ {d7/f 3, d8/f 4}
}
.
As shown by the tree representation in Figure 4.10, necessities [⁅d1?d2, d1 6=i⁆] and
[⁅d3?d4, d4 6=3⁆] are pattern equivalent siblings within the conjunction defined by
equationX0; in order to be uniformed, the substitution map ζ projects indices 1 and
2 onto environments {d1/f 1,d2/f 2} and {d3/f 1,d4/f 2} resp. Once the substitution
is applied to both necessities we obtain [⁅f 1?f 2, f 1 6=i⁆] and [⁅f 1?f 2, f 2 6=3⁆], in
lieu of [⁅d1?d2, d1 6=i⁆] and [⁅d3?d4, d4 6=3⁆]. Notice how the patterns in both of
the resultant necessities are now syntactically equal, meaning that the resultant
equation X0=[⁅f 1?f 2, f 1 6=i⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅f 1?f 2, f 2 6=3⁆]X2is now uniform.
As illustrated in the equation tree above, necessities [⁅d5!d6, t⁆] and [⁅d7!d8, d7=d3⁆]
are also pattern equivalent siblings within the conjunction defined in X0. In order
to make them uniform, ζ provides the following mappings, namely, 3 7→ ζ(1) +∪
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{d5/f 3, d6/f 4} and 4 7→ ζ(2) +∪{d7/f 3, d8/f 4}, where enable for renaming the afore-
mentioned necessities into [⁅f 3!f 4, t⁆] and [⁅f 3!f 4, f 3=f 1⁆].
Notice how the filtering condition d7=d3 in [⁅d7!d8, d7=d3⁆] was also renamed to
f 3=f 1 as variable d7is substituted by f 3when its binding necessity [⁅d3?d4, d4 6=3⁆] is
uniformed into [⁅f 1?f 2, f 2 6=3⁆]. This substitution was made possible since mapping
ζ(4) includes the substitutions returned by the parent’s index, i.e., ζ(2); this allows
applying the substitutions performed upon the parent, to its children, which is
important to keep the equation closed wrt. the data variables. 
(i) Creating a Well-Formed ζ Map. Up until now we have been assuming
the existence of a well-formed ζ map which provides all the necessary information,
without having any knowledge as to how it is created.
The ζ map is created as a result of conducting a breath first traversal, via
the traverse function, on the given equation set, using the partition function as
the λ projection function required by traverse. The function partition :: (Eq ×
P(Index)×Acc)7→Acc follows the format dictated by λ, i.e., it takes as input a
set of equations Eq, a set of indices Q and an accumulator, in this case ζ; it returns
an updated version of ζ as a result.
In order to update ζ, the partition function inspects the sibling equations de-
noted by the indices in Q and as a result it creates a substitution environment which
renames the variables of each pattern equivalent sibling necessity, to the same fresh
set of variables.
Example 4.18. Recall the system of equations defined earlier in Example 4.17,
i.e., (Eq , X0, ∅) where
Eq =
{
X0=[⁅d1?d2, d1 6=i⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅d3?d4, d4 6=3⁆]X2, X1=[⁅d5!d6, t⁆]X3,
X2=[⁅d7!d8, d7=d3⁆]X4, X3=ff, X4=ff
}
Figure 4.11 depicts the breath first traversal performed by the traverse func-
tion in which the projection function partition was applied on each set of siblings.
Notice that when partition is applied on the root equation, the initially empty
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partition({X0=[⁅d1?d2, d1 6=i⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅d3?d4, d4 6=3⁆]X2} ∪ Eq′, {0},∅) = ζ
child(Eq, 0) ={1,2}
partition
({
X1=[⁅d5!d6, t⁆]X3, X2=[⁅d7!d8, d7=d3⁆]X4
}
∪ Eq′′, {1, 2}, ζ
)
= ζ ′
child(Eq′, 1)={3} child(Eq′, 2)={4}
partition({X3=ff X4=ff}, {5}, ζ ′) = ζ ′
Figure 4.11: A breath first traversal using partition to obtain ζ.
map gets extended by 2 entries, namely ζ=∅
+∪{1 7→∅ +∪ {f 1/d1, f 2/d2}, 2 7→∅ +∪
{f 1/d3, f 2/d4}}; as shown in Example 4.17, this allows for the sibling necessities
defined in X0 to be uniformed.
The ζ map is further extended into ζ ′=ζ
+∪{3 7→ ζ(1) +∪{f 3/d5, f 4/d6}, 4 7→ ζ(2) +∪
{f 3/d7, f 4/d8}}, since the partition function recognises that the sibling necessities
[⁅d5!d6, t⁆] and [⁅d7!d8, d7=d3⁆] are also pattern equivalent; it therefore maps vari-
ables d5and d7to the same fresh variable f 3, and d6and d8to f 4. 
Example 4.19. We now recall the standardized system of equations SYSsfobtained
from Example 4.14 (restated below); for convenience, we will stop using the short-
hand notation and we will instead use guarded symbolic event notation in which
the patterns are fully opened and guarded by a filtering equation, e.g., we write
⁅d?d1, d1=req∧d 6=h⁆ instead of ⁅d?req, d6=h⁆.
SYSsf3 =
(
Eqsf3 , X0, ∅
)
where
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Eqsf3 =
{
X0 = ∧
[⁅d?d1, d1=req∧d6=h⁆]X3
[⁅f?f 1, f 1=req∧f 6=j⁆]X11
}
∪ Eqsf’3
Eqsf’3 =
{
X3 = [⁅d2!d3, d2=d∧ d3=ans⁆]X13,
X11 = [⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=f ∧ f 3=req⁆]X12
}
∪ Eqsf”3
Eqsf”3 =

X13 = ∧ [⁅d
4?d5, d4=d∧ d5=req∧d4 6=h⁆]X7
[⁅f 4?f 5, f 4=f ∧ f 5=req∧f 4 6=j⁆]X9 ,
X7 = [⁅d6!d7, d6=d∧ d7=ans⁆]X8,
X9 = [⁅f 6?f 7, f 6=d∧ f 7=req⁆]X10,
X8 = X13, X10 = ff, X12 = ff

To attain the uniform equivalent of SYSsf3 via construction 〈〈−〉〉(i) we must first
create a well-formed ζ map using traverse(Eqsf3 , {0}, partition,∅). The traversal is
initiated with the initial set of indices Q, as being equal to {0}, this is required
since our formula starts from the principal logical variable X0, i.e., the traverse
function starts by inspecting equation X0=ϕ0.
Since the sibling necessities define equivalent patterns d?d1 and f?f 1, once
applied the traverse function applies partition(Eqsf, {3, 11},∅) over these sibling
necessities, and creates an initial ζ map, where
ζ =
{
3 7→ {g1/d, g2/d1}, 11 7→ {g1/f, g2/f 1}}.
Hence, this map will later on permit the uni function to replace d and f with the
same fresh variable g1 by applying {g1/d} and {g1/f}, and similarly f and f 1 with
g2 via {g2/d1} and {g2/f 1} accordingly.
The traverse function is subsequently applied wrt. the children of X0 i.e.,
Q′={3, 11}, during which it applies the partition function on equations X3 =
[⁅d2!d3, d2=d∧ d3=ans⁆]X13, and X11 = [⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=f ∧ f 3=req⁆]X12. Since pat-
terns d2!d3 and f 2?f 3 are not equivalent, they do not require renaming as they are
already uniform, hence partition(Eqsf’3 , {13, 12}, ζ) (where {13, 12} are the children
of X3 and X11) returns
ζ ′ = ζ
+∪ {13 7→ ζ(3), 12 7→ ζ(11)}.
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Although none of the variables declared in these patterns require renaming, the
substitution map still includes mappings 13 7→ ζ(3) and 12 7→ ζ(11) which allows
for renaming variable references d and f (which are bound by a parent necessity
defined in X0), into g
1, thus keeping the system of equations closed wrt. data
variables.
The traverse function keeps on performing the breath first traversal until finally
it creates the required map, i.e.,
ζ ′′ = ζ ′
+∪ {7 7→ ζ ′(13) +∪ {g3/d4, g4/d5}, 9 7→ ζ ′(13) +∪ {g3/f 4, g4/f 5}}
ζ ′′′ = ζ ′′
+∪ {8 7→ ζ ′′(7), 10 7→ ζ ′′(9)}
Finally, when we apply the uni function using the mappings provided in ζ ′′′, we
obtain the following system of equations, i.e., SYS uni3 =
(
Equni3 , X0, ∅
)
where
Equni3 =

X0 = [⁅g1?g2, g2=req∧g1 6=h⁆]X3 ∧ [⁅g1?g2, g2=req∧g1 6=j⁆]X11
X3 = [⁅d2!d3, d2=g1 ∧ d3=ans⁆]X13,
X11 = [⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆]X12
X13 = ∧ [⁅g
3?g4, g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧g1 6=h⁆]X7
[⁅g3?g4, g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧g1 6=j⁆]X9 ,
X7 = [⁅d6!d7, d6=g1 ∧ d7=ans⁆]X8,
X9 = [⁅f 6?f 7, f 6=g1 ∧ f 7=req⁆]X10,
X8 = X13, X10 = ff, X12 = ff
 
(ii) Proving Semantic Preservation for 〈〈−〉〉(i). To prove that construction
〈〈−〉〉(i) preserves the semantics of the given standardized system of equations, we
must prove that the following criterion holds:
SYS is in Standard Form implies 〈〈SYS〉〉(i) ≡ SYS where 〈〈SYS〉〉(i) is Uniform.
In the proof given below, we make use of the following lemmas:
Lemma 4.1. traverse(Eq, {0}, partition,∅)=ζ implies
ζ is a well-formed map for Eq.
Lemma 4.2. ∀(Xj=ϕj)∈Eq· equation Xj=ϕj is in Standard form, and ζ is a well-
formed map for Eq implies uni(Eq, ζ)≡Eq and ∀(Xk=ψk)∈ uni(Eq, ζ)· equation
(Xk=ψk) is Uniform.
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Lemma 4.1 dictates that whenever a ζ map is obtained by conducting a breath
first traversal on an equation set Eq using the partition projection function, then
the resultant map is well-formed wrt. Eq.
Lemma 4.2 builds on the result of the previous lemma by stating that upon ob-
taining a well-formed map for Eq and when all the equations in Eq are in Standard
Form, a semantically equivalent, Uniform equation set can be obtained by apply-
ing the uni function on Eq using the well-formed ζ map to obtain the required
uniformity.
The proofs for both of these lemmas are provided in Appendix Section B.1.
Proof. Initially we know
SYS is in Standard Form (4.1)
By (4.1) and definition of SYS we also know
(Eq , X0, Y ) is in Standard Form (4.2)
because
∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq · equation Xj=ϕj is in Standard Form (4.3)
We create a ζ map for our equation set Eq by using a breath first traversal that
applies the partition projection function, such that we know
traverse(Eq, {0}, partition,∅) = ζ (4.4)
By (4.4) and Lemma 4.1, we know
ζ is a well-formed map for Eq (4.5)
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By (4.3), (4.5) and Lemma 4.2, we know
uni(Eq, ζ)≡Eq (4.6)
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ uni(Eq, ζ) · equation (Xk=ψk) is Uniform (4.7)
By (4.6), (4.7) and the definition of 〈〈SYS〉〉(i) we can conclude
〈〈SYS〉〉(i) ≡ SYS where 〈〈SYS〉〉(i) is Uniform.
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
4.1.3.3 Condition Reformulation of Conjunct Symbolic Events
Reformulating the filtering conditions of conjunct symbolic events involves recon-
structing a uniform system of equations into a semantically equivalent equi-disjoint
conjunction as defined in Definition 4.9 below.
Definition 4.9 (System of Equi-Disjoint Equations). An equation is equi-disjoint
when it is uniform, and when multiple necessities defined at the top-level of the
same conjunction i.e.,
∧
j∈Q
[ηj]Xj, are unable to be matched by the same concrete
system action α, unless they are syntactically equal; formally defined as:
if Xi =
∧
j∈Q
[ηj]Xj then ∀k, l ∈ Q · JηkK∩JηlK 6= ∅ =⇒ ηk = ηl
A system of equations is equi-disjoint when all of its equations are equi-disjoint. 
Example 4.20. As defined by Definition 4.9, we can deduce that equation X0 =
([⁅d?f, f>5⁆]X1) ∧ ([⁅d?f, f>5⁆]X2) ∧ ([⁅d?f, f≤5⁆]X3) is equi-disjoint since there
does not exist a system action that is able to satisfy both [⁅d?f, f>5⁆] and [⁅d?f, f≤5⁆],
i.e., J⁅d?f, f≤5⁆K∩ J⁅d?f, f>5⁆K=∅.
The only two branches that are satisfiable by the same system actions are
[⁅d?f, f>5⁆]X1 and [⁅d?f, f>5⁆]X2 but they are both prefixed by syntactically equal
necessities i.e., J⁅d?f, f>5⁆K∩ J⁅d?f, f>5⁆K 6=∅ since ⁅d?f, f>5⁆= ⁅d?f, f>5⁆.
However, equation X1 = [⁅d1?f1, t⁆]X4 ∧ [⁅d1?f1, f1 6= 5⁆]X5 is not equi-disjoint
since J⁅d1?f1, t⁆K∩ J⁅d1?f1, f1 6= 5⁆K 6=∅ but ⁅d1?f1, t⁆ 6= ⁅d1?f1, f1 6= 5⁆. 
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Construction
〈〈(Eq , X0, Y )〉〉(ii) def= (traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅) , X, Y )
cond comb(Eq, Q, ω)
def
=
Xi=
∧
ck∈C(j,Q′)
[⁅o, ck⁆]Xj ∧ϕ
(Xi=
∧
j∈Q′′
[⁅o, cj⁆]Xj ∧ϕ)∈Eq//Q
and Q′=
⋃
l∈Q
child(Eq, l)
such that Q′′ ⊆ Q′

+∪ ω
C(i, Q) def=
{ ci∧cj . . . ∧ck,
ci∧¬cj . . . ∧ck,
ci∧¬cj . . . ∧¬ck
∀j . . . n ∈ Q where i 6= j 6= . . . 6= n
such that oi = oj = . . . = ok
}
Figure 4.12: The Conjunction Reformulation Algorithm.
Remark 4.1. Note that normalization construction §3 actually checks that the
branches are Equi-Disjoint by using #S(Q). This is since S(Q) returns the set of
symbolic events defined by the branches in the guarded conjunction that is being
analysed, i.e.,
⋃
i∈Q
{ ηj [ηj]Xj is a subformula in ϕi }. Since sets do not contain
repeated (syntactically equal) values, the predicate #S(Q) can only return false
when two or more events in S(Q) are syntactically different yet still non-disjoint. 
Figure 4.12 presents the construction function, 〈〈−〉〉(ii) :: (Equni ,Var, P(Var))
for recomposing a uniform system of equation into an equi-disjoint one. Internally,
this construction uses the traverse function to perform a breath first traversal on
the given uniform equation set, Equni, starting from the equation that equates
to the principle variable, i.e., with Q={0}. While conducting the traversal, this
construction applies the cond comb function in order to reconstruct the uniform
conjunctions, i.e.,
∧
j∈Q
[⁅o, c⁆j]Xj defined in (Xi=ϕi) ∈ Equni, into equi-disjoint ones,
thereby producing an equi-disjoint equation set Eqcomb at the end of the traversal.
The function cond comb :: (Equni × P(Index) × Acc)7→Acc is a projection
function that takes as input a uniform equation set Equni, a set of indices Q, and an
accumulator ω. The accumulator ω contains a partial equi-disjoint set of equations
which is first initialized to ∅ and is constantly extended by repeated cond comb
applications until the traversal is complete, in which case ω is returned as the
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resultant equi-disjoint equation set.
In order to update ω, the cond comb function inspects the sibling equations de-
noted by the indices in Q, i.e., (Xi=ϕi) ∈ Eq//Q, and computes the truth combina-
tions of the filtering conditions defined by the sibling symbolic necessities (specified
in these equations) which define the same (syntactically equal) patterns.
To compute these truth combinations, the cond comb function starts by com-
puting the child indices of the current sibling equations, denoted by Q, by using the
child function, i.e., Q′=
⋃
l∈Q
child(Eq, l). Following this, it inspects the conjunctions
defined in the selected equations, i.e.,
∧
j∈Q′′
[⁅oj, cj⁆]Xj ∧ ϕ, and reconstructs them
into
∧
ck∈C(j,Q′)
[⁅oj, ck⁆]Xj ∧ ϕ. Notice that ck is a truth combination of all the filtering
conditions that are defined by symbolic necessities that specify syntactically equal
patterns and which are defined by the branches identified by the indices in Q′, e.g.,
if Q′={1, 2, 3}, then one possible truth combination ck is c1∧¬c2∧c3.
The truth combinations, such as ck, are generated through the combinato-
rial function C :: (Index × P(Index)). This function takes as input the in-
dex of the branch that is being analysed, i.e., the one identified by index j,
along with the indices of all the sibling branches specified in Q′. As a result,
C(j,Q′) returns the truth combinations in the which filtering condition, cj, of
the branch that is currently being reconstructed, i.e., [⁅oj, cj⁆]Xj, is true, i.e.,
C(1, {1, 2, 3})={(c1∧c2∧c3), (c1∧c2∧¬c3), (c1∧¬c2∧c3), (c1∧¬c2∧¬c3)}. These truth
combinations are then used to reconstruct the existing branch into a collection of
equi-disjoint branches.
Example 4.21. Consider equation X0 = [⁅o, c1⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c2⁆]X2 ∧ [⁅o, c3⁆]X3,
using the truth combinations provided by C(1, {1, 2, 3}) we can reconstruct branch
[⁅o, c1⁆]X1 into:
[⁅o, c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧c2∧¬c3⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧¬c2∧c3⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧¬c2∧¬c3⁆]X1.
Similarly, with C(2, {1, 2, 3}) and C(3, {1, 2, 3}), we can reconstruct branches [⁅o, c2⁆]X2
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and [⁅o, c3⁆]X3 in the same way such that the resultant equation is:
X0=

[⁅o, c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧c2∧¬c3⁆]X1 ∧
[⁅o, c1∧¬c2∧c3⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧¬c2∧¬c3⁆]X1 ∧
[⁅o, c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X2 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧c2∧¬c3⁆]X2 ∧
[⁅o,¬c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X2 ∧ [⁅o,¬c1∧c2∧¬c3⁆]X2 ∧
[⁅o, c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X3 ∧ [⁅o,¬c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X3 ∧
[⁅o, c1∧¬c2∧c3⁆]X3 ∧ [⁅o,¬c1∧¬c2∧c3⁆]X3


Note that the resultant reconstructed equations (case in point X0 in Exam-
ple 4.21) are equi-disjoint as the truth combination conditions ensure that a con-
crete system event α can never satisfy multiple symbolic necessities in the recon-
structed branches, unless these are syntactically equal.
Moreover, note that the truth combinations generated by function C(j,Q′) do
not include the cases where cj is false. This is essential to ensure that none of
the reconstructed branches can be satisfied when the original condition cj is true,
thereby preserving the semantics of the original branch.
Example 4.22. Recall equation X0 = [⁅o, c1⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c2⁆]X2 ∧ [⁅o, c3⁆]X3 from
Example 4.21. Note that logical variables X1, X2 and X3 can only be evaluated
when their prefixing necessities are satisfied by some concrete system event, mean-
ing that continuation X1 is reachable when c1 is true, and resp. X2 and X3 when
c2 and c3 are true. Hence, in the reconstructed equation, the conditions are never
negated when prefixing resp. logical variable as highlighted below:
X0=

[⁅o, c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧c2∧¬c3⁆]X1 ∧
[⁅o, c1∧¬c2∧c3⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧¬c2∧¬c3⁆]X1 ∧
[⁅o, c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X2 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧c2∧¬c3⁆]X2 ∧
[⁅o,¬c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X2 ∧ [⁅o,¬c1∧c2∧¬c3⁆]X2 ∧
[⁅o, c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X3 ∧ [⁅o,¬c1∧c2∧c3⁆]X3 ∧
[⁅o, c1∧¬c2∧c3⁆]X3 ∧ [⁅o,¬c1∧¬c2∧c3⁆]X3


Once the traversal completes, the construction outputs the final accumulator
value ω containing the required equi-disjoint equation set.
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Example 4.23 (Applying the Construction). Recall the uniform system of equa-
tions SYS uni3 obtained from Example 4.19 (restated below):
SYS uni3 =
(
Equni3 , X0, ∅
)
where
Equni3 =
{
X0 = ∧
[⁅g1?g2, g2=req∧ g1 6=h⁆]X3
[⁅g1?g2, g2=req∧ g1 6=j⁆]X11
}
+∪ Equni’3
Equni’3 =
{
X3 = [⁅d2!d3, d2=g1 ∧ d3=ans⁆]X13,
X11 = [⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆]X12
}
+∪ Equni”3
Equni”3 =

X13 = ∧ [⁅g
3?g4, g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h⁆]X7
[⁅g3?g4, g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j⁆]X9 ,
X7 = [⁅d6!d7, d6=g1 ∧ d7=ans⁆]X8,
X9 = [⁅f 6?f 7, f 6=g1 ∧ f 7=req⁆]X10,
X8 = X13, X10 = ff, X12 = ff

The construction initiates the traversal from the principle equation, i.e., X0=ϕ0,
by invoking traverse(Equni, {0}, cond comb,∅), which inspects the conjunct ne-
cessities defined in the root equation. Since events ⁅g1?g2, g2=req∧ g1 6=h⁆ and
⁅g1?g2, g2=req∧ g1 6=j⁆ define the same pattern g1?g2, by applying the cond comb
projection function this construction generates all the truth combinations of the
filtering conditions defined in the aforementioned necessities of the formula, i.e.,
(g2=req∧ g1 6=h) and (g2=req∧ g1 6=j), by using:
C(3, {3, 11}) =
(
((g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)),
((g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=j))
)
and
C(11, {3, 11}) =
(
((g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)),
(¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j))
)
Notice that the results of both C(3, {3, 11}) and C(11, {3, 11}) do not in-
clude combinations in which the original condition (i.e., c3 = (g
2=req∧ g1 6=h)
and c11 = (g
2=req∧ g1 6=j) resp.) is negated, i.e., truth combinations such as
¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=h)∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j) and ¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=h)∧¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=j) are
not included in the resultant set returned by C(3, {3, 11}), since they negate parts
of the original condition i.e., c3.
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A branch is thus added to the reconstructed formula whenever the guard of the
original necessity is not negated in the generated truth combination, e.g., branch
[⁅g1?g2, g2=req∧ g1 6=h⁆]X3 must only be replaced by
[⁅g1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X3 and
[⁅g1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X3
but not
[⁅g1?g2,¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X3 and
[⁅g1?g2,¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X3
since the original condition is negated in these last two necessities, and hence,
function cond comb(Equni, {0},∅) evaluates to ω, where
ω =
X0 =
[⁅g1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X3
∧ [⁅g1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X3
∧ [⁅g1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X11
∧ [⁅g1?g2,¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X11

The traversal proceeds by computing the children of X0 via
⋃
l∈{0}
child(Equni, l)
which returns {3, 11} as the set of child indices; it then it recurses wrt. these
indices, i.e., via traverse(Equni’, {3, 11}, cond comb, ω). Once again the traversal
applies cond comb which attempts to generate the new truth combinations for
⁅d2!d3, d2=g1 ∧ d3=ans⁆ and ⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆, defined in X3 and X11 resp.
via C(13, Q′′) and C(12, Q′′) where Q′′ =
⋃
l∈{3,11}
child(Equni’, l)={12, 13}. However,
since these two symbolic events do not define syntactically equal patterns, i.e.,
d2!d3 6=f 2?f 3, their filtering condition remains intact, i.e., C(13, Q′′) = {d2=g1 ∧
d3=ans} and C(12, Q′′) = {f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req}. Hence, cond comb(Equni’, {3, 11}, ω)
evaluates to ω’, where
ω′ = ω
+∪
{
X3 = [⁅d2!d3, d2=g1 ∧ d3=ans⁆]X13,
X11 = [⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆]X12
}
The breath first traversal continues until all the remaining equations have been
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analysed and reconstructed into:
ω′′ = ω′
+∪
X13=

[⁅g3?g4, (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X7
∧ [⁅g3?g4, (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X7
∧ [⁅g3?g4, (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X9
∧ [⁅g3?g4,¬(g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X9
 ,
X7 = [⁅d6!d7, d6=g1 ∧ d7=ans⁆]X8,
X9 = [⁅f 6?f 7, f 6=g1 ∧ f 7=req⁆]X10,
X8 = X13, X10 = ff, X12 = ff

Hence, the resultant system of equations is SYScomb =
(
Eqcomb3 , X0, ∅
)
where
Eqcomb3 = ω.
Since all the necessities guarding conjunctions are now equi-disjoint, i.e., they
can only be satisfied by the same action iff they are syntactically equal, the resultant
equation can now be converted into normal form by continuing from step §3 of
the normalization algorithm presented Section 4.1.2. Hence, by applying §3 on
SYScomb, we obtain SYSnf3 =
(
Eqnf3 , X{0}, ∅
)
where Eqnf3 is defined as:

X{0} =
 [⁅g
1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X{3,11}
∧ [⁅g1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X{3}
∧ [⁅g1?g2,¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X{11}

X{3,11} = ([⁅d2!d3, d2=g1 ∧ d3=ans⁆]X{13} ∧ [⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆]X{12}),
X{3} = [⁅d2!d3, d2=g1 ∧ d3=ans⁆]X{13}, X{11} = [⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆]X{12},
X{13} =
 [⁅g
3?g4, (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X{7,9}
∧ [⁅g3?g4, (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X{7}
∧ [⁅g3?g4,¬(g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]X{9}
 ,
X{7,9} = ([⁅d6!d7, d6=g1 ∧ d7=ans⁆]X{8} ∧ [⁅f 6?f 7, f 6=g1 ∧ f 7=req⁆]X{10}),
X{7} = [⁅d6!d7, d6=g1 ∧ d7=ans⁆]X{8}, X{9} = [⁅f 6?f 7, f 6=g1 ∧ f 7=req⁆]X{10},
X{8} = X{13}, X{10} = ff, X{12} = ff

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such that by §4 we finally obtain the required normalized formula ψ3 ∈ sHMLnf.
ψ3 =

(
[⁅g1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]
[⁅d2!d3, d2=g1 ∧ d3=ans⁆]
([⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆]ff ∧ ψ′3)
)
∧(
[⁅g1?g2, (g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]
[⁅d2!d3, d2=g1 ∧ d3=ans⁆]
[⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆]ff ∧ ψ′3
)
∧ (
[⁅g1?g2,¬(g2=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g2=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]
[⁅f 2?f 3, f 2=g1 ∧ f 3=req⁆]ff
)

ψ′3 = maxX13.
[⁅g3?g4, (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆](
[⁅d6!d7, d6=g1 ∧ d7=ans⁆]X13 ∧ [⁅f 6?f 7, f 6=g1 ∧ f 7=req⁆]ff
)
∧
[⁅g3?g4, (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ ¬(g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]
[⁅d6!d7, d6=g1 ∧ d7=ans⁆]X13
∧
[⁅g3?g4,¬(g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=h) ∧ (g3=g1 ∧ g4=req∧ g1 6=j)⁆]
[⁅f 6?f 7, f 6=g1 ∧ f 7=req⁆]ff


Proving Semantic Preservation for 〈〈−〉〉(ii). To prove that construction 〈〈−〉〉(ii)
preserves the semantics of the given uniform system of equations, we must prove
that the following criterion holds:
SYS is Uniform implies 〈〈SYS〉〉(ii) ≡ SYS where 〈〈SYS〉〉(ii) is Equi-Disjoint .
In the proof given below, we make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3. Lemma 4.3. ∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq· equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform implies
Eq≡ traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅) and
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅)· equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint.
This lemma states that whenever the equations in an equation set Eq are all
Uniform, then a semantically equivalent, equi-disjoint equation set can be obtained
by performing a breath first traversal upon Eq using the cond comb projection
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function. The proof for this lemma is provided in Appendix Section B.2.
Proof. Initially we know
SYS is Uniform (4.1)
By (4.1) and definition of SYS we also know
(Eq , X0, Y ) is Uniform (4.2)
because
∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq · equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform (4.3)
By applying 〈〈−〉〉(ii) on (Eq , X0, Y ) we know
〈〈(Eq , X0, Y )〉〉(ii) = (traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅) , X0, Y ) (4.4)
By (4.3) and Lemma 4.3, we know
Eq≡ traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅) (4.5)
∀(Xk=ψk)∈ traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅) · equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint
(4.6)
Hence, by (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) we can conclude
〈〈SYS〉〉(ii) ≡ SYS where 〈〈SYS〉〉(ii) is Equi-Disjoint.
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
4.2 Synthesising Deterministic Enforcers
In the previous section we have presented an algorithm which demonstrates that
for every formula ϕ ∈ sHML we can find a semantically equivalent normalized
formula ψ ∈ sHMLnf. By working on normalized formulae we are able to provide
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a more intuitive synthesis function which maps formulae to enforcement monitors
in a similar way as was done in [49] for detection monitors (see Figure 2.6).
Optimization Function
opt(ϕ)
def
=

ϕ if ϕ∈{ff, tt}
opt(ϕ′) if ϕ=maxX0.ϕ′ and X0 /∈fv(ϕ′)
maxX0.opt(ϕ
′) if ϕ=maxX0.ϕ′ and X0∈fv(ϕ′)∧
i∈Q
[ηi]opt(ϕi) if ϕ=
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ϕi
Synthesis FunctionLϕ M def= L opt(ϕ) M⊥ whereLX Mρ def= xL ff Mρ def= y when ρ=yL tt Mρ def= idL maxX.ϕ Mρ def= recx.Lϕ Mρ
L∧
i∈Q
[⁅o, c⁆i]ϕi Mρ def= rec y.∑
i∈Q
{
⁅o, c, τ ⁆i.Lϕi My if ϕi=ff
⁅o, c, o⁆i.Lϕi My otherwise
Figure 4.13: Synthesis of Enforcement Monitors from sHMLnf formulae.
The synthesis function, Lϕ M :: sHMLnf 7→Enf, presented in Figure 4.13 com-
positionally analyses a given formula ϕ∈ sHMLnf in order to produce the required
enforcement monitor. Before initiating the synthesis, function Lϕ M optimizes the
given normalized formula ϕ via the function opt :: sHMLnf 7→ sHMLnf. This func-
tion compositionally inspects a given formula ϕ and removes maximal fixpoint
declarations whenever their variable is never referenced in ϕ. This ensures the re-
moval of any redundant fixpoint declarations that might have been added during
normalization (see Section 4.1).
Once the formula is optimized, function Lϕ M initiates the synthesis, for obtain-
ing the required enforcer, by invoking function L− M :: (sHMLnf× State) 7→Enf.
This recursive function produces the required enforcer by compositionally analysing
the given formula ϕ∈sHMLnf. During analysis, it also maintains a state ρ which
can either be ⊥, or may contain some recursive variable, y; initially, ρ is set to ⊥,
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but is then modified accordingly during the synthesis derivation.
The synthesis converts truth formulae, tt∈ sHMLnf, into the identity enforcer
id, and logical variables, X ∈ sHMLnf, into the corresponding recursion enforce-
ment variable, whereas maximal fixpoints, maxX.ϕ∈ sHMLnf, are converted into
a recursive enforcer; these three conversions are performed irrespective of the con-
tents of ρ.
Normalized conjunctions,
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi, are synthesised into a recursive summa-
tion of enforcers, i.e., rec y.
∑
i∈Q
e.Lϕi My, where e can be either an identity transforma-
tion, ⁅o, c, o⁆i, or a suppression transformation, ⁅o, c, τ ⁆i whenever the continuation
ϕi is a falsehood, i.e., ϕi=ff. The latter ensures that the synthesised enforcer
is capable of suppressing any system action α that satisfies necessities that lead
to a falsehood (e.g., ⁅o, c⁆(α) =σ such that α satisfies necessity [⁅o, c⁆]ff), thereby
preventing the system from violating the property.
Also, notice how the fresh recursive variable, y, introduced by the synthesised
recursive construct, rec y., is passed on to the subsequent applications of the syn-
thesis function, i.e., Lϕi My. This is required to enable converting falsehood, ff, into
the newly introduced recursive variable. In this way, an action is only suppressed
whenever it satisfies a necessity that is followed by a falsehood, e.g., [⁅i?x, x=5⁆ ]ff
becomes rec y.⁅i?x, x= 5, τ ⁆.y. This ensures that any action leading to a violation
is continuously suppressed until a non-matching action occurs, thereby preventing
the violation from occurring.
Example 4.24. Recall formula ϕ1 ∈ sHMLnf from Example 2.8:
ϕ1 = maxX.[i?req]([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff)
Using the synthesis function defined in Figure 4.13 we can automatically generate
enforcer e2 (defined in Example 3.2) as shown by the derivation below.
L maxX.[i?req]([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff) M⊥
= recx.L [i?req]([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff) M⊥
= recx.rec z.i?req.L ([i!ans]X ∧ [i?req]ff) Mz
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Since [i?req] is followed by ff, we need to suppress every i?req action.
= recx.rec z.⁅i?req, t, i?req⁆.rec y.(⁅i!ans, t, i!ans⁆.LX My + ⁅i?req, t, τ ⁆.L ff My)
= recx.rec z.⁅i?req, t, i?req⁆.rec y.(⁅i!ans, t, i!ans⁆.X + ⁅i?req, t, τ ⁆.y)
In practice, the resultant monitor can be further optimized by removing any re-
dundant recursive constructs such as rec z., thereby obtaining:
recx.⁅i?req, t, i?req⁆.rec y.(⁅i!ans, t, i!ans⁆.X + ⁅i?req, t, τ ⁆.y) 
4.2.1 Providing Formal Guarantees
Now that we have established a synthesis function for normalised formulas, we
proceed to prove that our synthesis actually generates deterministic monitors (as
defined by Definition 4.1) that strongly enforce sHMLnf formulas (as defined by
Definition 3.5).
4.2.1.1 Ensuring Deterministic Behaviour of the Synthesized Enforcers
We ensure the deterministic behaviour (as defined by Definition 4.1) of any enforcer
that can be synthesised by the synthesis algorithm provided in Figure 4.13, by
proving Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2 (Deterministic Behaviour). For every enforcer, Lϕ M, that can be
synthesised from a normalized formula ϕ∈sHMLnf,
Lϕ M tIt′==⇒ e′ and Lϕ M tIt′′===⇒ e′′ implies e′=e′′ and t′=t′′
In order to prove Theorem 4.2, we make use of Lemma 4.4 which states that our
synthesis function, Lϕ M=e, always produces well-formed enforcers, i.e., e∈Enfwf.
Lemma 4.4 (Enforcer Well-formedness).
∀ϕ∈sHMLnf · Lϕ M=e implies e∈Enfwf where
e∈Enfwf ::= id |x | recx.e |
∑
i∈Q
⁅oi, ci, o′i⁆.e
′
i where #
i∈Q
⁅oi, ci⁆
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Enforcer well-formedness is a syntactic restriction that requires that every
branch in a summation is prefixed by a disjoint symbolic transducer3.
Proving Theorem 4.2 also requires proving Single Step Determinism (Lemma 4.5),
which states that whenever a well-formed enforcer e is able to perform two different
reductions for the same input event α, i.e., Lϕ M tIt′−−−→ e′ and Lϕ M tIt′′−−−→ e′′, then
both reductions should process and modify α in the same way such that the output
actions, µ′ and µ′′, and the resultant continuation enforcers, e′ and e′′, are both
well-formed and syntactically equal.
Lemma 4.5 (Single Step Determinism). For every well-formed enforcer, e∈Enfwf,
e
αIµ′−−−→ e′ and e αIµ′′−−−−→ e′′ implies e′=e′′ and µ′=µ′′
The proofs for Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5 are provided in Appendix Section C.1.
To Prove Theorem 4.2
∀ϕ ∈ sHMLnf · Lϕ M tIt′==⇒ e′ and Lϕ M tIt′′===⇒ e′′ implies e′=e′′ and t′=t′′
By Lemma 4.4 we can instead prove
=⇒ ∀e ∈ Enfwf · e tIt
′
==⇒ e′ and e tIt′′===⇒ e′′ implies e′=e′′ and t′=t′′
Proofby induction on the structure of the input trace t.
Case t=ε : We know
e ∈ Enfwf (4.1)
e
ε . t′
===⇒ e′ (4.2)
e
ε . t′′
===⇒ e′′ (4.3)
Since t=ε, we know that no transitions can be made by enforcer e in (4.2) and
(4.3) since the input trace is empty, and so no output trace can be produced in
3One can notice the similarities between normalized formulae ϕ∈sHMLnf, which requires all
conjunctions to be prefixed by disjoint necessities, and well-formed enforcers e∈Enfwf.
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both cases. Hence, we conclude
e′ = e = e′′ (4.4)
t′ = ε = t′′ (4.5)
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case t=α;u : We know
e ∈ Enfwf (4.1)
e
α;u . t′
====⇒ e′ (4.2)
e
α;u . t′′
====⇒ e′′ (4.3)
By (4.2) and the definition of
α;u . t′
====⇒, we know
e
αIµ′−−−→ e′′′ (4.4)
e′′′ u .u
′
===⇒ e′ (4.5)
t′ = µ′;u′ (4.6)
Similarly, by (4.3) and the definition of
α;u . t′
====⇒, we know
e
αIµ′′−−−−→ e′′′′ (4.7)
e′′′′ u .u
′′
===⇒ e′ (4.8)
t′′ = µ′′;u′′ (4.9)
By (4.1), (4.4), (4.7) and Single Step Determinism (Lemma 4.5), we know
µ′ = µ′′ (4.10)
e′′′′ = e′′′ (4.11)
e′′′, e′′′′ ∈ Enfwf (4.12)
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By (4.5), (4.8), (4.11), (4.12) and IH we know
e′ = e′′ (4.13)
t′ = t′′ (4.14)
Hence, from (4.6), (4.9), (4.10) and (4.14) we conclude
t′ = (µ′;u′) = (µ′′;u′′) = t′′ (4.15)
∴ Case holds by (4.13) and (4.15).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
4.2.1.2 Proving Strong Enforceability by the Synthesized Enforcers
In order to prove that our synthesised deterministic enforcers are capable of strongly
enforcing the formula they were derived from, we prove Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3 (Strong Enforcement). For every satisfiable formula, ϕ∈Sat, that
is also in normal form, i.e., ϕ∈sHMLnf,
Lϕ M strongly enforces ϕ
In order to prove Theorem 4.3, by the definition of Strong Enforcement (Defini-
tion 3.5) we must prove the following lemmas:
Lemma 4.6 (Enforcement Soundness).
∀p∈Proc · Lϕ M[p]∈ JϕK
Lemma 4.7 (Enforcement Transparency).
∀p∈Proc · p∈ JϕK implies Lϕ M[p] ∼ p
Proving these two lemmas requires making use of Lemma 4.8, thus allowing us to
work up to optimized formulae, i.e., ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf .
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Lemma 4.8. For every normalized formula ϕ∈sHMLnf
opt(ϕ) = ψ implies ψ≡ϕ and ψ∈sHMLoptnf where
ϕ, ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf ::= X | ff | tt |
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ϕi where #
i∈Q
ηi |maxX.ϕ where X∈fv(ϕ)
Lemma 4.8 states that semantics are preserved when a normalized formula ϕ∈sHMLnf
is optimized into ψ∈sHMLoptnf , where ψ is said to be optimized when every fixpoint
variable X, that is bound to a maximal fixpoint maxX.ϕ, is used at least once in
the continuation formula ϕ. We prove this lemma by structural induction on ϕ in
Appendix Section C.2.3.
Moreover, in order to facilitate our proofs we use an alternative satisfaction
semantics for sHML as explained below.
Alternative sHML Semantics An alternative semantics for sHML was pre-
sented by Aceto et. al in [4, 5] in terms of a satisfaction relation, s. When
restricted to sHML, s is the largest relation satisfying the implications defined in
Figure 4.14.
p s tt always
p s ff never
p s
∧
i∈Qϕi whenever p s ϕi for all i∈Q
p s [η]ϕ whenever (∀q · p α−→ q and η(α) = σ) implies q s ϕ
p s maxX.ϕ whenever p s ϕ{maxX.ϕ/X}
Figure 4.14: A Satisfaction Relation for sHML formulae
The satisfaction relation states that truth, tt, is always satisfied, while falsehood,
ff, can never be satisfied. Conjunctions,
∧
i∈Q
ϕi are satisfied when all branches are
satisfied (i.e., ∀i∈Q such that p s ϕi), while necessities, [η]ϕ, are satisfied by a
process p when all derivatives q that are reachable over an action α where η(α)=
σ (possibly none), also satisfy ϕσ, i.e., q s ϕσ. Finally, a process p satisfies a
maximal fixpoint maxX.ϕ when it is also able to satisfy an unfolded version of ϕ,
i.e., p s ϕ{maxX.ϕ/X}.
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The authors proved that these satisfaction semantics, p s ϕ, correspond to the
denotational semantics of the sHML subset of µHML, JϕK, presented in Figure 2.4,
such that p s ϕ can be used in lieu of p ∈ JϕK (see [4, 5] for more detail).
Proving Enforcement Soundness In order to prove that our synthesised en-
forcers are sound we must show that Lemma 4.6 holds, i.e., that
∀p∈Proc, ϕ ∈ sHMLnf when ϕ∈Sat · Lϕ M[p]∈ JϕK
Since p∈ JϕK ≡ ps ϕ, and by the definition of L− M, we get
∀p∈Proc, ϕ ∈ sHMLnf when ϕ∈Sat · L opt(ϕ) M⊥[p]s ϕ
Since by Lemma 4.8 we know that opt(ϕ) implies ϕ≡ψ and ψ∈sHMLoptnf , we can
thus prove
∀p∈Proc, ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf when ψ∈Sat · Lψ M⊥[p]s ψ
Since L ff M⊥ does not yield a result, by definition of L− M⊥ we know that ⊥ cannot be
added to the resultant enforcer and hence substitution {e/⊥} is negligible, meaning
that Lϕ M⊥{e/⊥} is equivalent to Lϕ M⊥. Hence, we can instead prove
∀, p∈Proc, e∈Enfwf, ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf when ψ∈Sat · Lψ M⊥{e/⊥}[p]s ψ
This, however, allows us to prove a stronger result ranging over all possible ρ (i.e.,
where ρ=⊥ is a specific instance), as follows
∀ρ, p∈Proc, e∈Enfwf, ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf when ψ∈Sat · Lψ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ implies e′[p]s ψ
We prove this result coinductively by showing that there exists a satisfaction rela-
tion R (i.e., a relation that conforms to the rules given in Figure 4.14) such that
for every optimized formula ϕ∈ sHMLoptnf we cab show that the enforced process
e′[p] and formula ψ are related by R (defined below), meaning that process e′[p]
satisfies ψ.
R def=
{
(e′[p], ψ)
∣∣∣ ψ∈Sat and ∀e ∈ Enfwf · Lψ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′}
105
4. Enforcing Safety Properties via Suppressions
The proof for this Soundness result is provided in Appendix Section C.2.1.
Proving Enforcement Transparency To prove that the synthesised enforcers
are also transparent we must prove that Lemma 4.7 holds, i.e., that
∀p∈Proc, ϕ∈ sHMLnf · p∈ JϕK implies Lϕ M[p] ∼ p
Since p∈ JϕK ≡ ps ϕ, and by the definition of L− M, we get
∀p∈Proc, ϕ∈ sHMLnf · ps ϕ implies L opt(ϕ) M⊥[p] ∼ p
Since by Lemma 4.8 we know that opt(ϕ) implies ϕ≡ψ and ψ∈sHMLoptnf , we can
instead prove
∀p∈Proc, ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf · ps ψ implies Lψ M⊥[p] ∼ p
For all e∈Enfwf we know that Lϕ M⊥{e/⊥} ≡ Lϕ M⊥, since by definition of L− M⊥
we know that ⊥ cannot be added to the resultant enforcer since L ff M⊥ does not
yield a result, and hence substitution {e/⊥} is negligible, such that, we can instead
prove
∀p∈Proc, e∈Enfwf, ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf · ps ψ implies Lψ M⊥{e/⊥}[p] ∼ p
This, however, allows us to prove a stronger result ranging over all possible ρ (i.e.,
where ρ=⊥ is a specific instance), as follows
∀ρ, p∈Proc, e∈Enfwf, ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf ·ps ψ and Lψ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ implies e′[p] ∼ p
We prove this result in a coinductive manner by showing that there exists a
bisimulation relation R (defined below), such that for every optimized formula
ϕ∈sHMLoptnf , we can show that processes e′[p] and p are related by relation R, and
are thus bisimilar.
R def=
{
(e′[p], p)
∣∣∣ ps ψ and ∀e ∈ Enfwf · Lψ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′}
The proof for this Transparency result is provided in Appendix Section C.2.2.
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4.3 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have investigated the enforceability of safety properties via sup-
pressions. Since the sHML subset was proven to be maximally expressive wrt.
safety properties [49], we have focussed on defining a novel mapping between the
sHML subset and suppression enforcers in the form of a synthesis function. To re-
duce the complexity of synthesising deterministic enforcers, we assume a syntactic
restriction that limits the domain of our synthesis function to normalized formu-
lae. Despite this restriction, we have also produced a novel algorithm (based on
[3]) capable of converting any formula ϕ ∈ sHML into a semantically equivalent
formula ψ which is also in normal form, i.e., ψ ∈ sHMLnf. This result advocates
that our restricted syntax, sHMLnf, is still as expressive as the full (unrestricted)
syntax of sHML.
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In this section we review the state-of-the-art related to runtime enforcement and
enforceability and compare it to our work.
5.1 Enforceability
In general, the term enforceability refers to the relationship between the meaning of
a property and its ability to be forcibly imposed upon a system at runtime. In our
work, we investigate this relationship wrt. properties that are expressed as µHML
formulae, and as a result we identify a syntactic subset of the logic that allows
for defining properties that can be enforced at runtime. Through our synthesis
function, we also maintain a clear separation between the declarative specification,
i.e., the µHML logic, and the operational enforcement model, i.e., our enforcers.
Various works [81, 54, 44, 67] have presented a wide variety of definitions for
enforceability. However, unlike our work, most of these definitions do not distin-
guish between the specification and the enforcer, thereby requiring the property to
be expressed in terms of the enforcement mechanism itself.
For instance, when Schneider first explored enforceability in [81], he stated that
a property is enforceable if its violation can be detected by a truncation automaton
which in turn prevents it by terminating the system. In this setting, properties thus
require to be specified in terms of the enforcement model itself, i.e., as a truncation
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automaton. Furthermore, since this enforcement model can only prevent the oc-
currence of misbehaviour via system termination, the set of enforceable properties
is thus limited to just safety properties.
As a continuation of Schneider’s work, Ligatti et. al in [54, 65, 63], sought
to widen the set of enforceable properties by introducing edit automata i.e., an
enforcement mechanism capable of suppressing and inserting system actions. Based
on this enforcement model, Ligatti et. al introduced a new notion of enforceability
stating that a property is enforceable if it can be expressed as an edit automaton
that is able to transform an invalid system execution into a valid one.
Edit automata were shown to be capable of enforcing instances of safety and
liveness properties, along with other properties such as infinite renewal properties,
i.e., properties that are satisfied by infinite executions that have an infinite number
of valid prefixes, and violated when an infinite execution has only a finite number
of valid prefixes.
Based on these enforcement mechanisms, the authors define different notions of
enforceability based on the criteria of
(i) enforcement soundness, i.e., an enforcer is sound when it always converts
invalid executions into valid ones, and
(ii) transparency, i.e., a strongly transparent enforcer does not modify valid ex-
ecutions at all, while a weakly transparent one can only modify valid traces
into semantically equivalent ones (for some notion of equivalence).
Similar to Schneider [81], in this setting, their exists no clear separation between
the specification and the enforcement mechanism, such that the properties are
required to be expressed in terms of the enforcement model itself, i.e., as edit
automata. The authors thus state that a property is strongly enforceable if it can
be expressed as an edit-automaton which enforces the said property in a sound and
strongly transparent manner; a weaker notion for enforceability is similarly defined
in terms of soundness and weak transparency.
The fundamental difference between these definitions for enforceability and ours
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is that, we investigate enforceability wrt. a logic, i.e., we identify which subsets of
our logic, i.e., µHML, can be enforced soundly and transparently. Furthermore,
since we define enforceability wrt. the entire process, and not wrt. just a single ex-
ecution trace, we are able to prove stronger results for soundness and transparency.
For instance, in the case of transparency, we can prove that in certain cases, when
a process p already satisfies formula ϕ, then the enforcer e that is synthesised from
ϕ, does not change the behaviour of p in any way. We prove this result by showing
that the enforced process e[p] is strongly bisimilar to the original process p. This
result is thus stricter than trace equivalence constraint imposed by Ligatti et. al ’s
strong transparency criteria.
Other researchers such as Fong [46] and Talhi et. al [84], investigated the en-
forceability of properties wrt. enforcement automata with limited resources such as
a bounded history of system events. This research shows that although some prop-
erties are enforceable in theory via unbounded enforcement automata, in practice it
would require an infeasible amount of memory. They thus showed that, in practice,
the level of enforceability of an enforcement automaton is relative to the bounds
imposed by the available resources. This implies that although some properties
may be theoretically enforceable, they might not be so when limited by practical
constraints.
In their work, Bielova et. al [18, 20, 21] remarked that the transparency con-
straint, previously introduced by Ligatti et. al , only dictates how the monitor
should react when analysing a valid execution prefix, i.e., the meaning of valid
executions should remain intact. However, neither soundness nor transparency
specify the extent of the modifications that an enforcer should be able to apply
over an invalid prefix.
The authors thus propose a notion of predictability that restricts the enforcers
from transforming the invalid executions in an arbitrary way. More precisely, an
enforcer is predictable if one can predict the number of transformations that the
enforcer will apply in order to transform an invalid execution into a valid one.
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Predictability thus prevents enforcers from applying unnecessary transforma-
tions upon an invalid execution. Based on this notion they thus devise a more
stringent notion of enforceability that states that a property is enforceable if there
exists a sound, transparent and predictable enforcer.
By synthesising enforcers from a logic, we always produce enforcers that are,
in some sense, predictable since the synthesised enforcers are designed to enforce
properties of the same type, in the same way. For example, our syntheses converts
safety property [α][β]ff into a deterministic enforcer which enforces the property
by continuously suppressing events that directly lead to a violation, i.e., in this
case every occurrence of event β that occurs after event α is thus suppressed. A
similar approach is applied to other properties of the same type (i.e., safety) such
as maxX.[α]([β]X ∧ [γ]ff), where only the events preceding the violation, i.e., γ,
are required to be suppressed when preceded by an α action and zero or more β
actions.
5.2 Separating the Property from the Enforcer
As remarked by Bielova in [18], most of the definitions for enforceability do not
make a clear separation between the logic behind the property and the resp. en-
forcement mechanisms. In fact, the enforcement definitions we have seen so far in
Section 5.1, do not make a distinction between the enforcement mechanism and the
logic for specifying correctness properties, as they assume that properties are spec-
ified in terms of the resp. enforcement mechanism, e.g., as truncation automata,
edit automata etc..
Various research [18, 44, 74, 67] has been conducted to introduce a synthesis
phase which allows for expressing properties in terms of a more abstract model
from which the required enforcer is then derived. This allows the specifier to focus
on defining what should be enforced and not on how this should be done.
Most of this research, however, was conducted wrt. automata based specifi-
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cations, such as Policy automata [18] and Streett automata [44], unlike in our
case where we study the enforceability of branching time logic formulae. Mapping
automata-based specifications to enforcement automata is arguably easier to attain
compared to mapping a logic to an enforcer, mainly since both the specification
and the enforcement models are defined as variants of automata.
Bielova in [18] thus proposes an algorithm for automatically constructing en-
forcement automata from policy automata, i.e., an automata based representation
that combines the acceptance states of B uchi Automata and Finite State Au-
tomata. This therefore contrasts with our synthesis function which derives the
required enforcers directly from branching-time logic formulae.
Similarly, Falcone et. al in [42, 45, 44], propose a way how a variety of prop-
erties, defined in terms of Streett automata, can be mapped onto an enforcement
automaton that enforces the resp. property. More precisely, Falcone et. al showed
that most of the property classes defined within the Safety-Progress hierarchy [79]
are enforceable, as they can be encoded as Streett automata and subsequently
converted into enforcement automata.
Hence, as opposed to Ligatti et. al , Bielova and Falcone et. al separate the
specification of the property from the enforcement mechanism. This was done by
providing construction rules that convert properties expressed as Policy and Streett
automata into the resp. enforcement automata.
In relation to the work by Falcone et. al , Pinisetty et. al [74, 73] studied the
enforceability of safety and co-safety Timed Properties expressed as a variant of
Timed Automata. Similar to our work, non-deterministic specifications must first
be converted into deterministic ones.
Despite this step being conceptually similar to our normalization phase, since
the properties considered are expressed as Timed Automata, the determinization
of such non-deterministic properties was thus attainable via the conventional deter-
minization construction rules that are standard in automata theory. Conversely,
the normalization of µHML specifications was only recently explored in [3] and
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required being heavily adapted to our setting.
Following the determinization step, the resultant deterministic timed automata
are then projected onto the resp. enforcement mechanisms accordingly. Their
work was also implemented as a prototype tool, using Python, which allowed for
assessing the feasibility of their proposed timed enforcement.
More similar to our work, in [67, 68, 69], Martinelli et. al performed an initial
study of the enforceability of a logic. Hence, they partially addressed this issue by
devising a synthesis algorithm that converts formulae expressed in modal µ-calculus
[57] (a reformulation of µHML), into either a truncation, suppression, insertion or
an edit automaton, as decided by the specifier.
This synthesis algorithm thus burdens the specifier with still having to manu-
ally deduce the appropriate enforcement automaton (if any) capable of enforcing
the said formula, and with having to manually define a function which specifies the
points where the synthesised automaton should perform the required enforcement.
By contrast, we identify the subsets of µHML properties that can be enforced wrt.
insertions and suppressions such that the specifier is completely relieved from addi-
tional manual work related to the enforcement mechanisms required for enforcing
the specified property.
The presented synthesis algorithm is defined in terms of two techniques, namely,
partial model checking [7] and satisfiability [83]. The former is used to simplify the
formula and modify it according to the function defined by the specifier, while
the latter is the main mechanism used for obtaining the required enforcer; this is
achieved by finding a process which satisfies the modified formula obtained from
partially model checking the original formula; this contrasts with the way we gen-
erate the required enforcers via a compositional analysis of the specified µHML
formula.
In a multi-pronged verification approach, our synthesis may, however, benefit
from their former technique, i.e., partial model checking, to statically verify the
non-enforceable parts of the given formula and reduce it into an enforceable one
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which can then be synthesised using our synthesis algorithm.
5.3 Monitorability
Monitorability amounts to the relationship between the meaning of a property and
its ability to be recognized at runtime [48, 50]. As both runtime monitoring and
enforcement are dynamic analysis techniques capable of observing the behaviour of
a system, the differences between these two techniques is sometimes blurred such
as in [35, 36, 30, 55].
However, in contrast to enforceability which requires imposing property com-
pliance, a property is said to be monitorable when there exists a detection monitor
that can issue a definitive verdict determining whether the system under scrutiny
satisfies or violates the property.
Along the years, several variants for monitorability have been defined wrt. var-
ious criteria. Viswanathan et. al in [87] defined monitorable properties as a strict
subset of safety properties defined over infinite execution traces. This restrictive
definition came as the result of limiting the monitor’s detection capabilities to only
detecting misbehaviour after observing a finite prefix of a potentially infinite exe-
cution trace. As a by-product, this monitoring limitation restricts the domain of
monitorable properties to just safety properties.
Pnueli et. al in [78] defined a wider notion of monitorability which states that
properties are monitorable only when a positive or a negative verdict can be issued
by the monitor after analysing a finite execution trace. Specifically, a monitor
should be able to issue a negative (resp. positive) verdict, for a safety (resp.
co-safety) property ϕ, only in cases when a finite prefix of an execution trace
provides enough information from which the monitor can deduce that any possible
continuation of the prefix still violates (resp. satisfies) property ϕ. The authors
also determined that once a verdict is issued by the monitor wrt. a finite prefix
of the complete execution trace, this implicitly applies to the complete execution,
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and hence, the monitoring becomes redundant and can therefore be halted.
Inspired by [78], Bauer et. al in [12, 15] formulated another definition for mon-
itorability in which they adopted the notion of good and bad prefix from the field
of model checking [58]. The authors conjecture that it is possible to detect a viola-
tion or satisfaction for properties describing infinite behaviour, by only observing a
finite prefix of a potentially infinite execution. More specifically, a finite execution
prefix is said to be a bad prefix (resp. good prefix) wrt. a property ϕ if it provides
enough information to conclude that property ϕ was violated (resp. satisfied). A fi-
nite execution prefix is, however, said to be ugly if it does not provide the necessary
information to draw either of these conclusions.
Based on these three types of prefixes, the authors define new semantics for
Linear Time Logic (LTL) which reasons about finite traces. This variant of the
logic was called LTL3, for its ability of producing three verdicts, namely, true
(>), false (⊥) resp. indicating property satisfaction and violation, along with an
inconclusive verdict (?). In this way, an LTL3 property ϕ is monitorable wrt. an
execution trace t, if there exists a bad (or good) prefix of t that violates (or satisfies)
ϕ.
Bauer et. al further extend their work in [13, 14] by extending the monitoring
semantics of LTL3 in order to refine the inconclusive verdict (i.e., ?), into a more
informative verdict. Hence, the authors proposed new LTL semantics defining a
4-valued truth-domain which allows for producing two concrete verdicts, namely
true and false, along with approximation results denoting presumably true and resp.
presumably false. Despite still being inconclusive, the latter two approximation ver-
dicts provide more information compared to the single inconclusive verdict defined
in LTL3. This is therefore ideal for providing approximate positive (resp. negative)
verdicts for properties that are satisfied (resp. violated) by infinite executions.
For instance, a monitor can easily deduce the violation of a safety property after
observing bad prefix of an infinite execution trace, however, determining satisfac-
tion of the same property requires analysing the entire infinite sequence. Using the
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new truth domain, monitors are thus able to issue a presumably true verdict for
execution prefixes that do not violate a safety property, and conversely, a presum-
ably false for finite execution prefixes that do not satisfy a co-safety property; in
LTL3 the same inconclusive verdict (i.e., ?) is issued in both cases.
Falcone et. al in [44] generalized the definition by Bauer et. al by parameterizing
it with various truth-domains. Using this definition they are able to identify cases
when a truth domain is not expressive or fine-grained enough to monitor for some
specific classes of properties pertaining to the safety-progress hierarchy [79, 28, 43].
Their new definition of monitorability is therefore based on the distinguishability
of good and bad execution sequences. This alternative definition is able to better
distinguish between inconclusive situations that a monitor might encounter while
analysing a finite trace.
The definitions we have seen so far have always been explored wrt. linear-time
logics or automata-based specifications, and execution traces. Francalanza et. al in
[49, 50], studied the monitorability of branching-time properties expressed in terms
of Hennessy-Milner Logic with recursion (µHML) wrt. the entire computational
structure of the process (i.e., not just traces).
Francalanza et. al thus defined their own definition of monitorability which
states that a µHML property is monitorable, if for every process capable of exe-
cuting a particular trace, there exists a monitor that can issue a positive or negative
verdict by only analysing the executed trace. Similar to previous work by Pnueli
et. al [78], once a verdict is issued by a monitor, this becomes irrevocable and hence
the monitor must consistently provide the same verdict.
In relation to this notion of monitorability, the authors identify the maximally
expressive of µHML that syntactically characterises the monitorable µHML formu-
lae, i.e., they identify a syntactic restriction for µHML that allows for defining all
the possible µHML formulae that are monitorable according to their notion of mon-
itorability. The identified subset was thus termed as Monitorable HML (mHML)
and consists in the union of Safe-HML (sHML) and Co-Safe-HML (cHML). As
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the name implies, Safe-HML can only be used for specifying safety properties, while
Co-Safe-HML only allows for specifying co-safety (liveness) properties.
In this approach, the authors thus preserve the original semantics of the cho-
sen logic, i.e., µHML, and instead identify the monitorable subset of this logic
thus keeping the meaning of the logic independent from the employed verification
technique. This is therefore different from the body of work proposed by Bauer
et. al [12, 13, 14, 15] where they redefined the semantics of their chosen logic, i.e.,
LTL, wrt. finite traces in order to appease the selected verification technique, i.e.,
runtime monitoring.
The authors also prove the existence of a relationship between the logic and the
monitor’s verdicts. More precisely, the authors prove that for any process p which
satisfies (resp. violates) an arbitrary mHML property ϕ, there exists a detection
monitor m that is able to detect the property satisfaction (resp. violation) by
analysing a witness trace executed by p, and thus issue an irrevocable positive (resp.
negative) verdict as a result. In addition, the authors prove that the converse also
holds, i.e., that for any process p which can be monitored by a monitor m capable
of issuing a positive or a negative verdict, there exists a mHML formula that can
be either satisfied or violated by process p.
On top of this, the authors also provide a synthesis function capable of analysing
and monitorable mHML formula and deriving a monitor that is able to detect
the violation or satisfaction of the property it was derived from, by issuing the
appropriate verdict. Their theory is also supported by a runtime verification tool
for monitoring Erlang programs called detectEr [51, 9, 27, 24, 8]. This tool is able
to synthesise Erlang detection monitors from the monitorable subset of µHML
identified in [49].
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5.4 Supervisory-Control
Supervisory-Control [80, 86] is a static analysis technique that ensures that a sys-
tem always adheres to a specific correctness property by modifying its behaviour
in a pre-deployment phase. More precisely, a synthesis function in the sense of
supervisory-control, has the task of taking an existing program and reconstructing
it in a way which conforms to the given correctness property [86]. In general, the
modifications made to the system’s internal behaviour ensure that the system al-
ways conforms to the property by completely removing invalid execution sequences
from the resultant modified system.
This differs from runtime enforcement since, instead of modifying the inter-
nal system behaviour pre-deployment, enforcers ensure that the system conforms
to the property by performing on-the-fly modifications (i.e., event suppression or
insertion) while the system executes, and not during synthesis. Hence, the en-
forcer ensures that the system behaves as specified by the property by wrapping
around the system and acting as a proxy for its inputs and outputs. In fact, unlike
supervisory-control, in enforcement the system under scrutiny is barely modified
during synthesis and is generally treated as being a black box ; this makes en-
forcement ideal in cases where the internal behaviour of the system is unknown
pre-deployment.
Van Hulst et. al in [86] studied a variant of µHML wrt. supervisory-control
by establishing a synthesis algorithm that produces a controlled system that com-
plies to the specified property. Their synthesis is therefore designed to produce
the controlled system by statically analysing a given system and reformulating its
behaviour to keep it in line with some correctness property expressed as a formula
of the logic variant. As an evaluation of their work, the authors prove that their
synthesis always terminates, and that it adheres to a number of constraints, such
as validity, maximality and controllability.
Validity can be seen as the equivalent of soundness in RE, as this constraint
serves to ensure that the synthesised controlled system must always satisfy the
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resp. property. On the other hand, maximality is, in some sense, equivalent to
transparency, since this criterion dictates that the synthesis should remove the
least possible behaviour from the original system, such that any valid behaviour is
left intact. In addition, controllability is used to ensure that the synthesis affect
other behaviour that was not specified by the property.
Similar work on supervisory-control was also conducted in relation to other
logics such as the modal µ-Calculus [11, 72], LTL [88] and CTL* [37] amongst
others.
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In this report we outlined preliminary results towards developing theoretical foun-
dations for understanding the enforceability of properties that are expressed in
terms of a highly expressive logic. As stated in Section 1.1, in order to achieve this
aim, we intend to address the following objectives:
O1. Developing an abstract model for runtime enforcers and define enforceability
wrt. µHML.
O2. Assess the correctness of our abstract enforcers.
O3. Assessing the implementability of our enforcers by redefining them into a more
implementable version.
O4. Developing a prototype implementation for our enforcers and evaluating their
feasibility.
Until now, we have conducted an initial investigation of our first two objectives
by studying the ability to enforce µHML properties via event suppression; this
allowed us to identify sHML as being the subset of µHML which is enforceable
via sound and transparent suppression enforcers. We summarize our main novel
contributions as follows:
• In Chapter 3 we have mainly addressed our first objective by defining:
– Symbolic Transformations, that formally define a mapping mechanism
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for transforming a concrete system event into a (possibly) different one
as specified by the transformation pattern;
– An LTS semantics for Enforcers, which formalise the structure and dy-
namic behaviour of enforcers, along with the interaction between the
enforcer, e and the process under scrutiny, p, in the form of the instru-
mented LTS, e[p]; and
– A Formal Definition for Enforceability, defining the relationship between
the meaning of a µHML property and its ability to be adequately en-
forced at runtime by an enforcer. With this definition we establish that
an enforcer e strongly enforces a formula ϕ whenever it is able to do it
in a sound and transparent manner. By defining the enforced system
as an LTS, e[p], we were able to provide novel definitions Soundness
and Transparency which are stronger than the classic definitions (see
Section 3.4).
• In Chapter 4 we continued addressing objective O1 by:
– Identifying sHML as being Suppression Enforceable thus denoting that
every safety property expressible in µHML can be enforced via action
suppression.
– Defining a Normalization algorithm for reducing a symbolic sHML for-
mula into a semantically equivalent formula that is in normal form, from
which we can then synthesise deterministic enforcers; this algorithm was
heavily inspired from the work in [3]; and by
– Developing a Synthesis algorithm for converting normalized symbolic
sHML formulae into suppression enforcers.
• In Chapter 4 we also contributed towards objective O2 by:
– Guaranteeing semantic preservation for our normalization algorithm by
proving that each normalization step preserves the original semantics of
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the given formula (or system of equations); in Appendix Chapter B we
provide the proofs of the lemmas used when proving semantic equiva-
lence; and by
– Proving that the synthesised enforcers always behave deterministically
and can always strongly enforce the formula they were synthesised from;
in Appendix Chapter C we provide the proofs for the supporting lemmas
used when proving the aforementioned results.
6.1 Future Work
We plan to extend this work along two different avenues, namely, (i) by expanding
the work on objectives O1 and O2 by investigating a wider notion of enforceability,
and (ii) by addressing objectives O3 and O4 by exploring the implementability and
feasibility of our enforcers. To tackle (i) would require enlarging the subset of en-
forceable specifications by investigating the enforceability of µHML formulae wrt.
action insertions. This will potentially require extending the formal model, proofs
and other results obtained so far according to the new notion of enforceability.
Meanwhile, in (ii), we envision the development of another synthesis function
that converts the subset of enforceable µHML specifications into enforcers that
are defined in terms of a more implementable model. However, to ensure that
these implementable enforcers are also well-behaved (i.e., deterministic, sound and
transparent), it would require proving correspondence to the enforcers defined by
the abstract enforcement model we have so far. Based on this new synthesis we aim
to develop a runtime enforcement tool implementation that checks whether a given
specification is enforceable or not, when possible, converts it into an equivalent
enforceable property, and finally generates the required enforcer automatically. At
the time of writing we are unaware of the existence of such a tool.
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A. Supporting Material
This Appendix Chapter contains extra supporting information and examples that
may help in better understanding our contributions. Within this section we refer
to the following processes which are also pictorially represented in Figure 2.3.
p1 =recx.
(
i?req..i!ansx+ i?cls.nil
)
q1 =recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?req.x+ i?cls.nil
)
r1 = recx.
(
i?req.i!ans.
(
i?req.i!ans.x+ i?cls.nil
)
+ i?cls.nil
)
s1 = recx.
(
τ.i?req.i!ans.x+ i?cls.nil
)
A.1 Bisimulation Game Characterisation
A Strong ( resp. Weak) bisimulation game for LTS processes p and q, is a turn-
based game between two players, namely an attacker which aims to disprove the
Strong (resp. Weak) bisimulation, and a defender which aims to prove the Strong
(resp. Weak) bisimulation. The game is played in rounds, each of which considers
a pair (a.k.a. configuration) of LTS processes (pn, qn). The game starts its first
round with the initial pair being (p, q), and in each round the players change the
current pair according to the following rules:
1. Given a pair (p, q), the attacker chooses either the first or second element,
i.e., p or q, along with a suitable action µ. Based on the choice, the attacker
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must perform a transition over the selected action µ, i.e., p
µ−→ p′ if p is
chosen, and q
µ−→ q′ when q is chosen.
2. To counter the attack, the defender must reply by making a transition over the
same action µ, by using the process which was not selected by the attacker,
i.e., if the attacker chose p and attacks with p
µ−→ p′, the defender must reply
with a strong µ-reduction q
µ−→ q′, when proving a Strong Bisimulation, and
with a weak µ-reduction q
µˆ
=⇒ q′, when proving a Weak one.
3. After successfully defending an attack p
µ−→ p′, with a defensive Strong (resp.
Weak) transition, the new pair becomes (p′, q′). The game continues for
another round using the same rules.
A play of the game consists in a maximal sequence of pairs constructed by the
players according to the given rules, meaning that during a play an attacker must
try every possible attack with the attempt to disprove the bisimulation, while the
defender must defend for these attacks to prevent this. Hence, an attacker wins
a finite play whenever it is able to issue an attack, e.g., p
µ−→ p′, for which the
defender is unable to find a countering defensive move, i.e., p 6µ−→ in a Strong
Bisimulation Game, and p 6 µˆ=⇒ in a Weak Game; otherwise the defender wins. In
an infinite play (i.e., when comparing infinite LTSs), the defender wins if the play
is infinite, i.e., the attacker is bound to keep attacking infinitely with attacks that
can be countered by the defender.
Whenever, one of the players, either the attacker or the defender, is able to
provide a strategy that can always win the game, regardless of how the opposing
player chooses its moves, then we say that the player has a universal winning
strategy. Hence, two LTS processes p and q are said to be Strong (resp. Weak)
bisimilar iff the defender has a universal winning strategy in the Strong (resp.
Weak) bisimulation game which starts with the initial pair (p, q), otherwise the
processes are not bisimilar iff the attacker has a universal winning strategy.
The bisimulation games thus allow us to prove whether two processes are Strong
(resp. Weak) bisimilar to each other or not. Using a strong bisimulation game we
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are able to find a strong bisimulation relation R proving that processes p1 and r1
produce the same runtime behaviour, i.e., they both provide an answer for every
request with the possibility of closing while waiting for requests.
Example A.1. Recall example Example 2.7, in this example we give an alternative
way how to show that processes p1 and r1 from Figure 2.3 are Strongly Bisimilar via
the strong bisimulation game characterization. With this game we must therefore
obtain a Strong bisimulation relationR that proves that these two processes exhibit
the same behaviour.
Proof for p1∼r1. To prove that p1 ∼ r1 we use the Strong bisimulation
game, starting with the initial pair being (p1, r1), to find a relation R that observes
Definition 2.8. We denote an attacker’s and defender’s move as A : and D : resp.
Round 1: We show (p1, r1) ∈ R as,
A: p1
i?req−−−→ p2 D: r1 i?req−−−→ r2
A: p1
i?cls−−−−−−→ p3 D: r2 i?cls−−−−−−→ r5
A: r1
i?req−−−→ r2 D: p1 i?req−−−→ p2
A: r1
i?cls−−−−−−→ r5 D: p1 i?cls−−−−−−→ p3
In the next round we must show (p2, r2) ∈ R and (p3, r5) ∈ R.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Round 2: We show (p2, r2) ∈ R as,
A: p2
i!ans−−−→ p1 D: r2 i!ans−−−→ r3
A: r2
i!ans−−−→ r3 D: p2 i!ans−−−→ p1
The case for (p3, r5) ∈ R holds immediately as neither p3, nor r5 can perform any
further reductions. In the next round we must show (p1, r3) ∈ R.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
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Round 3: We show (p1, r3) ∈ R as,
A: p1
i?req−−−→ p2 D: r3 i?req−−−→ r4
A: p1
i?cls−−−→ p3 D: r3 i?cls−−−→ r5
A: r3
i?req−−−→ r4 D: p1 i?req−−−→ p2
A: r3
i?cls−−−→ r4 D: p1 i?cls−−−→ p3
In the next round we must show that (p2, r4) ∈ R.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Round 4: We show (p2, r4) ∈ R as,
A: p2
i!ans−−−→ p1 D: r4 i!ans===⇒ r1
A: r4
i!ans−−−→ r1 D: p2 i!ans===⇒ p1
No further rounds are required for this game since we already know (p1, r1) ∈ R
from Round 1.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Hence, given that the defender was always able to defend with a strong tran-
sition for every possible attack, we can conclude that there exists the following
strong bisimulation relation R, such that by the definition of strong bisimilarity
we can conclude that p1 ∼ r1, where:
R def= {(p1, r1), (p2, r2), (p1, r3), (p2, r4), (p3, r5)}
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
Example A.2. In Section 2.4 we had argued that showing p1 6∼q1 is in general very
hard to deduce since we need to prove that all binary relations R that can relate
p1 and q1, are not a Strong Bisimulation relation. A more practical alternative is
to resort to the bisimulation games. In the following proof we will use the Weak
Bisimulation Games to show that p1 6≈q1, which inherently implies that p1 6∼q1.
Proof that p1 6≈q16 6 . To prove that 6∼ we use the Weak Bisimulation Game,
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starting with the initial pair being (p1, q1).
Round 1: We show (p1, q1) ∈ R as,
A: p1
i?req−−−→ p2 D: q1 i?req===⇒ q2
A: p1
i?cls−−−→ p3 D: q1 i?cls===⇒ q3
A: q1
i?req−−−→ q2 D: p1 i?req===⇒ p2
A: q1
i?req−−−→ q1 D: p1 i?req===⇒ p2
A: q1
i?cls−−−→ q3 D: p1 i?cls===⇒ p3
In the next round we must show (p2, q2) ∈ R, (p2, q1) ∈ R and (p3, q3) ∈ R.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Round 2: We show (p3, q3) ∈ R holds immediately as neither p3 nor q3 can
perform any further reductions. We also show (p2, q2) ∈ R as,
A: p2
i!ans−−−→ p1 D: q2 i!ans===⇒ q1
A: q2
i!ans−−−→ q1 D: p2 i!ans===⇒ p1
However, the defender fails to counter the attacker’s attack when showing that
(p2, q1) ∈ R, since
A: p2
i!ans−−−→ p1 D: q1 6i!ans===⇒66
− − −−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Hence, given that the defender was unable to defend for one of the attacks, by
Definition 2.9 we can conclude that p1 6≈p2, which inherently implies that p1 6∼p2.
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
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A.2 An Iterative Fixpoint Derivation Example
Recall formula ϕ1 from Example 2.8 (restated below),
ϕ1 = maxX.ϕ
′
1 ϕ
′
1 = [d?req]ϕ
′′
1
ϕ′′1 = ϕ
′′′
1 ∧ ϕ′′′′1 ϕ′′′1 = [d!ans]X
ϕ′′′′1 = [d?req]ff
We can thus prove that p1 ∈ Jϕ1K as follows:
Jϕ1K = JmaxX.ϕ′1,∅K
= S ⊆ Jϕ′1, [X 7→S]K
To establish the maximal set S of processes which satisfy ϕ′1, we must iteratively
evaluate Jϕ′1, [X 7→ S]K starting with S = Proc = {p1, p2, p3, q1, q2, q3} until the
resultant set S stops changing with each iteration, therefore denoting that the
maximal fixpoint has been reached.
First Iteration (S = Proc)
Jϕ′1, [X 7→S]K=
{
p
(
∀v ∈ Val · p v?req===⇒ p′ and
⁅d?req, d6=j⁆(v?req)={v/d}
)
implies p′ ∈ Jϕ′′1{v/d}, [X 7→S]K
}
Jϕ′′1{v/d}, [X 7→S]K = Jϕ′′′1 {v/d}, [X 7→S]K ∩ Jϕ′′′′1 {v/d}, [X 7→S]K
Jϕ′′′1 {v/d}, [X 7→S]K = J[d!ans]X{v/d}, [X 7→S]K = J[v!ans]X, [X 7→S]K
=
{
p
(
p
v!ans
===⇒ p′ and
⁅v!ans, t⁆(v!ans)=∅
)
implies p′ ∈ JX∅, [X 7→S]K}
=
{
p
(
p
v!ans
===⇒ p′ and
⁅v!ans, t⁆(v!ans)=∅
)
implies p′ ∈ S
}
= S = Proc
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Jϕ′′′′1 {v/d}, [X 7→S]K = J[d?req]ff{v/d}, [X 7→S]K = J[d?req]ff, [X 7→S]K
=
{
p
(
∀u ∈ Val · p v?req===⇒ p′ and
⁅d?req, t⁆(v?req)={u/f}
)
implies p′ ∈ Jff{u/f}, [X 7→S]K}
=
{
p
(
∀u ∈ Val · p v?req===⇒ p′ and
⁅d?req, t⁆(v?req)={u/f}
)
implies p′ ∈ ∅
}
= {p2, p3, q2, q3}Jϕ′′1{v/d}, [X 7→S]K = Proc ∩ {p3, p4, q3, q4}
= {p3, p4, q3, q4}
Jϕ′1, [X 7→S]K=
{
p
(
∀v ∈ Val · p v?req===⇒ p′ and
⁅d?req, d6=j⁆(v?req)={v/d}
)
implies p′ ∈ {p3, p4, q3, q4}
}
S={p1, p2, p3, q2, q3}
Second Iteration (S = {p1, p2, p3, q2, q3})
Jϕ′1, [X 7→S]K=
{
p
(
∀v ∈ Val · p v?req===⇒ p′ and
⁅d?req, d6=j⁆(v?req)={v/d}
)
implies p′ ∈ Jϕ′′1{v/d}, [X 7→S]K
}
Jϕ′′1{v/d}, [X 7→S]K = Jϕ′′′1 {v/d}, [X 7→S]K ∩ Jϕ′′′′1 {v/d}, [X 7→S]K
Jϕ′′′1 {v/d}, [X 7→S]K = J[d!ans]X{v/d}, [X 7→S]K = J[v!ans]X, [X 7→S]K
=
{
p
(
p
v!ans
===⇒ p′ and
⁅v!ans, t⁆(v!ans)=∅
)
implies p′ ∈ JX∅, [X 7→S]K}
=
{
p
(
p
v!ans
===⇒ p′ and
⁅v!ans, t⁆(v!ans)=∅
)
implies p′ ∈ S
}
= S = {p1, p2, p3, q2, q3}
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Jϕ′′′′1 {v/d}, [X 7→S]K = J[d?req]ff{v/d}, [X 7→S]K = J[d?req]ff, [X 7→S]K
=
{
p
(
∀u ∈ Val · p v?req===⇒ p′ and
⁅d?req, t⁆(v?req)={u/f}
)
implies p′ ∈ Jff{u/f}, [X 7→S]K}
=
{
p
(
∀u ∈ Val · p v?req===⇒ p′ and
⁅d?req, t⁆(v?req)={u/f}
)
implies p′ ∈ ∅
}
= {p2, p3, q2, q3}Jϕ′′1{v/d}, [X 7→S]K = {p1, p2, p3, q2, q3} ∩ {p3, p4, q3, q4}
= {p3, p4, q3, q4}
Jϕ′1, [X 7→S]K=
{
p
(
∀v ∈ Val · p v?req===⇒ p′ and
⁅d?req, d6=j⁆(v?req)={v/d}
)
implies p′ ∈ {p3, p4, q3, q4}
}
S={p1, p2, p3, q2, q3}
Notice how so far in our derivation, the set of processes S has changed from Proc
to Proc\{q1} after the first iteration, but has remained the same (i.e., Proc\{q1})
after the second one. Hence, by the definition of JmaxX.ϕ,∅K, we can conclude:
Jϕ1K def= JmaxX.[i?req]([i?req]ff ∧ [i!ans]X),∅K
= {p1, p2, p3, q2, q3}
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for Normalization
As explained in Section 4.1.2, the algorithm for normalizing any sHML formula
(i.e., defining any type of symbolic event and not just singleton events) amounts
to the sequential application of the following 6 steps:
Step 1. For each sHML formula ϕ a semantically equivalent formula ϕsf that is in
Standard Form can be obtained using 〈〈ϕ〉〉1.
• This construction was reviewed and explained wrt. symbolic events in
Section 4.1.2.1 along with a proof advocating for its semantic preser-
vation.
Step 2. For each sHML formula ϕ that is in Standard Form, an equivalent System
of Equations SYSsfthat is in Standard Form can be obtained using 〈〈ϕsf〉〉2.
• We have discussed this construction wrt. symbolic events in Sec-
tion 4.1.2.2 accompanied by a proof denoting that the resultant sys-
tem of equations SYSsfis semantically equivalent to the input formula
ϕsf.
Step 3. For each System of Equations SYSsfthat is in Standard Form, an equiva-
lent System of Equations SYS uni that is Uniform can be obtained using
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〈〈SYSsf〉〉(i).
• This construction was introduced and explained in Section 4.1.3.2,
for which we proved that the obtained uniform system of equations
SYS uni is semantically equivalent to the given standard form system
of equations.
• The proof provided makes use of two lemmas, namely, Lemma 4.1
and Lemma 4.2; we prove these lemmas in Section B.1.
Step 4. For each System of Equations SYS uni that is Uniform, an equivalent Sys-
tem of Equations SYScomb that is Equi-Disjoint, can be obtained using
〈〈SYS uni〉〉(ii).
• An introduction and explanation of this construction was given in Sec-
tion 4.1.3.3. In the same section we also prove that our construction
is guaranteed to preserve the semantics of the given Uniform system
of equations.
• The proof guaranteeing Semantic Preservation for this construction
step makes use of Lemma 4.3 which we now prove in Section B.2.
Step 5. For each System of Equations SYS that is Equi-Disjoint and also in Stan-
dard Form, an equivalent System of Equations SYSnf that is in Normal
Form, can be obtained using 〈〈SYScomb〉〉3.
• This construction step was presented and explained wrt. symbolic
events in Section 4.1.2.3 accompanied by a proof sketch showing that
the semantics of the original system of equations are preserved by the
construction.
Step 6. For each System of Equations SYS that is Normal Form, an equivalent
formula ϕnf that is also in Normal Form, can be obtained using 〈〈SYSnf〉〉4.
• This construction step was explained in relation to symbolic events in
Section 4.1.2.4, and a proof guaranteeing semantic preservation was
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also provided.
B.1 Auxiliary Lemmas for Proving Semantic Preser-
vation of Construction 〈〈−〉〉(i)
In this section we prove the following lemmas that are required for guaranteeing
the semantic preservation of construction 〈〈−〉〉(i).
Lemma 4.1. traverse(Eq, {0}, partition,∅)=ζ implies
ζ is a well-formed map for Eq.
Lemma 4.2. ∀(Xj=ϕj)∈Eq· equation Xj=ϕj is in Standard form, and ζ is a well-
formed map for Eq implies uni(Eq, ζ)≡Eq and ∀(Xk=ψk)∈ uni(Eq, ζ)·
equation (Xk=ψk) is Uniform.
B.1.1 Proving Lemma 4.1.
In order to prove Lemma 4.1, we use Lemma B.1. This new lemma states that a
well-formed ζ ′ map for Eq is obtained upon performing a partition traversal on a
subset, Eq′, of the given equation set Eq, using an arbitrary ζ map that is well-
formed wrt. a subset of Eq that is restricted to the indices defined by the domain
of ζ, i.e., Eq//dom(ζ).
Lemma B.1. ∀Q, ζ ·Eq′ ⊆ Eq and traverse(Eq′, Q, partition, ζ)=ζ ′ and ζ is a well-
formed map for Eq//dom(ζ) implies ζ
′ is a well-formed map for Eq.
The proof for this lemma is provided at the end of this section.
To Prove Lemma 4.1.
traverse(Eq, {0}, partition,∅)=ζ implies ζ is a well-formed map for Eq.
Proof. Initially we know
traverse(Eq, {0}, partition,∅)=ζ (B.1)
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By the definition of Eq//Q we know
Eq//dom(∅) = ∅ (B.2)
By (B.2) and the definition of a well-formed map we know
∅ is a Well-formed map for Eq//dom(∅) (B.3)
By (B.1), (B.3) and Lemma B.1 we know
ζ is a well-formed map for Eq
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
To Prove Lemma B.1.
∀Q, ζ · Eq′ ⊆ Eq and traverse(Eq′, Q, partition, ζ)=ζ ′ and ζ is a well-formed map
for Eq//dom(ζ) implies ζ
′ is a well-formed map for Eq.
Proof. By induction on the structure of Eq′.
Case Eq′ = ∅ : Initially we know
traverse(∅, Q, partition, ζ)=ζ ′ (B.1)
ζ is a well-formed map for Eq//dom(ζ) (B.2)
∅ ⊆ Eq (B.3)
Since Eq′=∅, by (B.1) and the definition of traverse we know
ζ = ζ ′ (B.4)
By (B.2) and (B.4) we know
ζ ′ is a well-formed map for Eq//dom(ζ′) (B.5)
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By (B.1) and the definition of traverse, we know that the traversal starts from
the full equation set, i.e., Eq′= Eq, using an empty ζ map. With every recursive
application of traverse, the equation set Eq′ becomes smaller since when traverse
recurses it does so wrt. Eq′′, i.e., a smaller version of the current Eq′ which is
computed via Eq′′=Eq′ \ Eq′//Q. By contrast, with every recursive application of
traverse, the ζ accumulator becomes larger as it is updated with new mappings for
each index specified by the set of indices Q i.e., with the indices of the equations
that are removed from Eq′ when creating Eq′′. Hence, when the traverse function is
recursively applied wrt. some Eq′′′=∅, it means that all the equations specified in
Eq have been analysed by the traversal and their indices were thus added as maps
in the resultant ζ ′. Hence, we can deduce
Eq//dom(ζ′) = Eq (B.6)
Finally, by (B.5) and (B.6) we conclude
ζ ′ is a well-formed map for Eq. (B.7)
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case Eq′ 6= ∅ :6 6 Initially we know
traverse(Eq′, Q, partition, ζ)=ζ ′ (B.8)
ζ is a well-formed map for Eq//dom(ζ) (B.9)
Eq′ ⊆ Eq (B.10)
We consider two subcases:
– Q = ∅ : Since Q=∅, by (B.8) and the definition of traverse we know
ζ = ζ ′ (B.11)
145
B. Proving Semantic Preservation for Normalization
By (B.9) and (B.11) we know
ζ ′ is a well-formed map for Eq//dom(ζ′) (B.12)
Since Q=∅, this means that the traversal has reached a point where no more
children can be computed, which means that all the relevant equations (i.e.,
those reachable from the principle variable) have been analysed. This means
that any other equation in Eq (that is not in Eq//dom(ζ′), if any) is redundant
and irrelevant. Hence, since from (B.12) we know that ζ ′′ is a well-formed
map for the relevant subset of equations in Eq, i.e., Eq//dom(ζ′), then it is
also well-formed for the full blown subset of equations Eq (i.e., including any
unreachable, redundant equations). Therefore, we can conclude
ζ ′ is a well-formed map for Eq.
– Q6=∅ :6 6 By (B.8) and the definition of traverse we know
ζ ′′ = partition(Eq′, Q, ζ) (B.13)
Eq′′ = Eq′ \ Eq′//Q (B.14)
Q′ =
⋃
j∈Q
child(Eq′, j) (B.15)
traverse(Eq′′, Q′, partition, ζ ′′)=ζ ′ (B.16)
From (B.14) and (B.10) we can deduce
Eq′′ ⊆ Eq (B.17)
By (B.9) and the definition of a well-formed map we know that ζ provides a
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set of mappings which allow for:
• renaming the data variables of each pattern equivalent sibling necessity,
defined in Eq//dom(ζ), to the same set of fresh variables.
(B.18)
• renaming any reference to a data variable that is bound by a renamed
parent necessity defined in Eq//dom(ζ).
(B.19)
By (B.13) and the definition of partition we know
ζ ′′ = ζ
+∪

j 7→ ζ(i) +∪ {gn/dn}
k 7→ ζ(l) +∪ {gn/fn}
∀i, l ∈ Q · Eq′(i)= ∧
j∈Q′′
[ηj(d
n)]Xj ∧ϕ
and Eq′(l)=
∧
k∈Q′′′
[ηk(f
n)]Xk ∧ϕ s.t.
if ηj(d
n) is pattern equivalent to
ηk(f
n), then we assign the same
set of fresh variables gn.

(B.20)
From (B.20) we know that ζ ′′ includes a mapping for each sibling branch
that defines a pattern equivalent necessity. The added mappings map the
child indices (i.e., j, k∈Q′ since by (B.15) we know that Q′′ and Q′′′ are
subsets of Q′) of the conjunction branches, defined by equations identified by
the parent indices (i.e., i∈Q) specified in Q, to a substitution environment
which renames the resp. variable names of these conjunct pattern equivalent
sibling necessities, to the same fresh set of variable names, thereby making
the equivalent sibling patterns, syntactically equal. Hence, by (B.18) we can
deduce that ζ ′′ provides a set of mappings which allow for
• renaming the data variables of each pattern equivalent sibling necessity,
defined in Eq//dom(ζ)∪Q′ , to the same set of fresh variables. (B.21)
Similarly, from (B.20) we also know that the mappings in ζ ′′ include the
substitutions performed upon the parent necessities, i.e., in each mapping
j 7→σj, the mapped substitution environment σj also includes ζ(i) where
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i ∈ Q is the parent index of j ∈Q′. Hence, by (B.19) we can deduce that the
mappings provided by ζ ′′ also allow for
• renaming any reference to a data variable that is bound by a renamed
parent necessity defined in Eq//dom(ζ)∪Q′ . (B.22)
Hence, by (B.21), (B.22) and the definition of a well-formed map we know
ζ ′′ is a well-formed map for Eq//dom(ζ)∪Q′ . (B.23)
From (B.20) we know that ζ ′′ includes a mapping for each child branch,
identified by j ∈ Q′′ and k ∈ Q′′′ (where Q′′ and Q′′′ are both subsets of Q′),
that is defined in the equation identified by index i ∈ Q and which defines
a pattern equivalent necessity. Hence, we know that the domain of ζ ′′ is an
extension of the domain of ζ which additionally contains the child indices
defined in Q′, such that we can deduce
dom(ζ ′′) = dom(ζ) ∪Q′ (B.24)
Therefore, from (B.23) and (B.24) we can infer
ζ ′′ is a well-formed map for Eq//dom(ζ′′). (B.25)
Finally, by (B.16), (B.17), (B.25) and IH we can conclude
ζ ′ is a well-formed map for Eq.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
B.1.2 Proving Lemma 4.2.
∀(Xj=ϕj)∈Eq· equation Xj=ϕj is in Standard form, and ζ is a well-formed map
for Eq implies ∀(Xk=ψk)∈uni(Eq, ζ)· equation (Xk=ψk) is Uniform and
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uni(Eq, ζ)≡Eq.
Proof. By induction on the structure of Eq.
Case Eq = ∅ : This case holds trivially since Eq = ∅ = uni(∅, ζ).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case Eq =
{
Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ
} +∪ Eq′ : Initially we know
∀(Xk=ϕk) ∈
{
Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ
} +∪ Eq′·
equation Xk=ϕk is in Standard Form.
(B.1)
ζ is a well-formed map for Eq (B.2)
Since Eq′ ⊂ Eq from (B.1) we know
Equation Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(f
m
<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ is in Standard Form. (B.3)
∀(Xk=ϕk) ∈ Eq′ · equation Xk=ϕk is in Standard Form. (B.4)
Since Eq′ ⊂ Eq from (B.2) we know
ζ is a well-formed map for Eq′ (B.5)
Hence by (B.4), (B.5) and IH we know
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ uni(Eq′, ζ) · equation (Xk=ψk) is Uniform. (B.6)
uni(Eq′, ζ)≡Eq′ (B.7)
By applying the uni function on Eq and ζ we obtain
uni(
{
Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ
} +∪ Eq′, ζ)
=
{
Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆ ζ(j) ]ϕj ∧ ϕ
} +∪ uni(Eq′, ζ) (B.8)
By (B.2) and the definition of a well-formed map we know that ζ provides a set of
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mappings which allow for
• renaming the data variables of each pattern equivalent sibling necessity,
defined in Eq, to the same set of fresh variables. (B.9)
• renaming any reference to a data variable that is bound by a renamed
parent necessity defined in Eq. (B.10)
Hence, (B.9) and (B.10) allow us to deduce that mapping ζ(j) in (B.8) produces a
substitution environment which renames the data variables dnj (defined by pattern
o(dnj )) to some set of fresh variables g
n
j , which is the same for all the other conjunct
sibling necessities that are pattern equivalent to [⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆]. Hence, by the
definition of a Uniform Equation, we can deduce
Equation Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(f
m
<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ is Uniform. (B.11)
By (B.6), (B.8) and (B.11) we can thus conclude
∀(Xk=ϕk) ∈ uni(Eq, ζ) · equation Xk=ϕk is Uniform. (B.12)
By (B.9) and (B.10) we can deduce that equation Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ is
semantically equivalent to the equation reconstructed by the uni function in (B.8),
i.e., Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆ζ(j)]ϕj ∧ ϕ. This holds since when the substitution
environment, returned by ζ(j), is applied on the equated formula, it substitutes
symbolic event ⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆ by ⁅oj(gnj ), cj(gm<i)⁆. Notice that pattern oj(gnj ) is
equivalent to the original pattern oj(d
n
j ) since it only varies by the name of the
data variables it defines, while condition cj(g
m
<i) is also equivalent to cj(f
m
<i) since
by (B.10) we know that ζ(j) (where ζ(j) also contains ζ(i) where i is the parent
of j) substitutes accordingly the references to variables defined by renamed parent
necessities that are being made by the filtering condition cj(f
m
<i), i.e., ζ(j) renames
fm<i to the variable names, g
m
<i, assigned to the renamed parent necessities; this
preserves the semantics of the equation by keeping it closed wrt. data variables.
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Hence, we can deduce
Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ
≡ Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(gnj ), cj(gm<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ
≡ Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆ζ(j)]ϕj ∧ ϕ
(B.13)
Finally, by (B.7), (B.8) and (B.13) we can conclude{
Xi=
∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆]ϕj ∧ ϕ
} +∪ Eq′
≡ {Xi=∧
j∈Q
[⁅oj(dnj ), cj(fm<i)⁆ ζ(j) ]ϕj ∧ ϕ
} +∪ uni(Eq′, ζ)
i.e., Eq ≡ uni(Eq, ζ)
(B.14)
∴ This case holds by (B.12) and (B.14).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
B.2 Auxiliary Lemmas for Proving Semantic Preser-
vation of Construction 〈〈−〉〉(ii)
In this section we provide the proof for Lemma 4.3 (restated below) which is are
required for ensuring the semantic preservation of construction 〈〈−〉〉(ii).
Lemma 4.3 ∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq· equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform implies
Eq≡ traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅) and
∀(Xk=ψk)∈ traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅)· equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint.
B.2.1 Proving Lemma 4.3.
In order to prove Lemma 4.3, we use Lemma B.2. This new lemma states that one
can obtain an Equi-disjoint equation set, ω′, that is semantically equivalent to the
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original equation set Eq, by conducting a traversal upon a Uniform subset of Eq
(i.e., Eq′), using an Equi-disjoint accumulator equation set ω, where ω must be
semantically equivalent to a subset of Eq that is restricted to the indices associated
to the logical variables specified by the domain of ω, i.e., ω ≡ Eq//domind(ω), where
domind(ω)
def
=
{
i
∣∣∣ Xi ∈ dom(ω)}
Lemma B.2. ∀Q,ω · Eq′ ⊆ Eq and traverse(Eq′, Q, cond comb, ω)=ω′ and
Eq//domind(ω)≡ω and ∀(Xj=ϕj)∈Eq′· equationXj=ϕj is Uniform and ∀(Xk=ψk)∈ω·
equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint implies ∀(Xk=ψk)∈ω′· equation (Xk=ψk)
is Equi-Disjoint and Eq≡ω′
The proof for this lemma is provided at the end of this section.
To Prove Lemma 4.3.
∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq· equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform implies
Eq≡ traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅) and
∀(Xk=ψk)∈ traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb,∅)· equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint.
Proof. Initially we know
∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq · equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform (B.1)
By applying the traverse function on Eq starting from Q={0} and ω=∅ we know
traverse(Eq, {0}, cond comb, ω) = ω′ (B.2)
ω = ∅ (B.3)
By (B.3) and the definition of a Eq//Q we know
Eq//dom(∅) = ∅ = ω (B.4)
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From (B.3) we can also deduce
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω · equation Xk=ψk is Equi-Disjoint (B.5)
By (B.1), (B.2), (B.4), (B.5) and Lemma B.2 we know
Eq ≡ ω′ (B.6)
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω′ · equation Xk=ψk is Equi-Disjoint (B.7)
∴ This Lemma holds by (B.6) and (B.7).
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
To Prove Lemma B.2.
∀Q,ω · Eq′ ⊆ Eq and traverse(Eq′, Q, cond comb, ω)=ω′ and Eq//domind(ω)≡ω
and ∀(Xj=ϕj)∈Eq′· equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform and ∀(Xk=ψk)∈ω· equation
(Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint implies ∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω′· equation (Xk=ψk) is
Equi-Disjoint and Eq≡ω′
Proof. By induction on the structure of Q.
Case Q=∅ : Initially we know
Eq′ ⊆ Eq (B.1)
traverse(Eq′,∅, cond comb, ω)=ω′ (B.2)
Eq//domind(ω)≡ω (B.3)
∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq′ · equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform (B.4)
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω · equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint (B.5)
By (B.2) and the definition of traverse we know
ω = ω′ (B.6)
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From (B.5) and (B.6) we can deduce
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω′ · equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint (B.7)
From (B.3) and (B.6) we also know
Eq//domind(ω′)≡ω′ (B.8)
Since Q=∅, by (B.2) and the definition of traverse we know the traversal has
reached a point where no more children can be computed, which means that all
the relevant equations (i.e., those reachable from the principle variable) have been
analysed. This implies that any other equation in Eq (if any) is redundant and
irrelevant. Hence, since from (B.8) we know that the equations in ω′ are equivalent
to the relevant subset of equations in Eq, i.e., Eq//domind(ω′), and hence we can
conclude
ω′ ≡ Eq (B.9)
∴ This subcase holds by (B.7) and (B.9).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case Q 6=∅ :6 6 Initially we know
Eq′ ⊆ Eq (B.1)
traverse(Eq′, Q, cond comb, ω)=ω′ (B.2)
Eq//domind(ω)≡ω (B.3)
∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq′ · equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform (B.4)
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω · equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint (B.5)
We consider two subcases:
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– Eq′ = ∅ : Since Eq′ = ∅, by (B.2) and the definition of traverse we know
ω = ω′ (B.6)
By (B.3), (B.5) and (B.6) we know
Eq//domind(ω′)≡ω′ (B.7)
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω′ · equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint (B.8)
By (B.2) and the definition of traverse we know that the traversal starts from
the full equation set, i.e., Eq′ = Eq, using an empty accumulator, i.e., ω=∅,
that would eventually contain the resultant Equi-Disjoint equation set. Every
recursive application of the traverse function is then performed wrt.: a smaller
version Eq, i.e., Eq′=Eq\Eq//Q, and a larger accumulator ω′ containing the
reformulated, Equi-Disjoint equations whose indices are defined in Q (and
which where removed from Eq′). Hence, when Eq′ becomes ∅ it means that
domind(ω
′) = domind(Eq) (B.9)
Hence, from (B.9) and by the definition of Eq//Q we can deduce
Eq//domind(ω) = Eq//domind(Eq) = Eq (B.10)
Therefore by (B.7) and (B.10) we conclude
Eq ≡ ω′ (B.11)
∴ This subcase holds by (B.8) and (B.11).
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– Eq′ 6= ∅ :6 6 By (B.2) and the definition of traverse we know
cond comb(Eq′, Q, ω)=ω′′ (B.12)
Eq′′ = Eq′ \ Eq′//Q (B.13)
Q′ =
⋃
l∈Q
child(Eq, l) (B.14)
traverse(Eq′′, Q′, cond comb, ω′′) = ω′ (B.15)
From (B.1) and (B.13) we know
Eq′′ ⊆ Eq (B.16)
By (B.12) and the definition of cond comb we know
ω′′ = ω
+∪
Xi=
∧
ck∈C(j,Q′)
[⁅o, ck⁆]Xj ∧ϕ(= ψi)
(Xi=
∧
j∈Q′′
[⁅o, cj⁆]Xj ∧ϕ)∈Eq//Q
and Q′=
⋃
l∈Q
child(Eq, l)
such that Q′′ ⊆ Q′

(B.17)
By (B.17) and the definition of C(j,Q′), we know that the conjunctions in the
reformulated equations (i.e., in every ψi) now include an additional branch
for each condition ck ∈ C(j,Q′) where ck is a compound condition e.g., c0 ∧
c1 ∧ . . . ∧ cn or c0 ∧ ¬c1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬cn. These compound conditions consist in
a truth combination of the filtering conditions of the sibling symbolic events
which specify syntactically equal patterns ; this is guaranteed since by (B.4) we
know that the equations in Eq′ are uniform, meaning that all sibling pattern
equivalent events are guaranteed to be syntactically equal as well.
Hence, the reconstructed symbolic events in these additional guarded
branches are unable to match the same concrete event α unless they are
syntactically equal (i.e., define the same pattern and condition), since de-
spite their pattern being syntactically equal, only one compound filtering
condition can at most be satisfied by the matching concrete event α; a
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case in point is when equation X0=[⁅o, c1⁆]X1∧[⁅o, c2⁆]X2 is reconstructed
into X0=[⁅o, c1∧c2⁆]X1 ∧ [⁅o, c1∧¬c2⁆]X2 ∧ [⁅o, c2⁆]X2 ∧ [⁅o, c2⁆]X2. Therefore,
by (B.17) and the definition of Equi-Disjoint, we can deduce that
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈
Xi=
∧
ck∈C(j,Q′)
[⁅o, ck⁆]Xj ∧ϕ(= ψi)
(Xi=
∧
j∈Q′′
[⁅o, cj⁆]Xj ∧ϕ)∈Eq//Q
and Q′=
⋃
l∈Q
child(Eq, l)
such that Q′′ ⊆ Q′
 ·
equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint
(B.18)
Hence, by (B.6), (B.17) and (B.18) we can conclude
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω′′ · equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint (B.19)
Finally, we argue that the reconstructed equations in (B.17) (i.e., Xi=ψi) se-
mantically equivalent to the original ones (i.e., (Xi=ϕi)∈Eq//Q) since when-
ever a guarded branch, [⁅o, ci⁆]Xi, is reconstructed into (possibly) multiple
branches, [⁅o, ci∧cj. . .ck⁆]Xi ∧ [⁅o, ci∧¬cj. . .ck⁆]Xi ∧ . . . ∧ [⁅o, ci∧¬cj. . .¬ck⁆]Xi,
via the truth combination function C(i, Q′), the condition, ci, of the original
branch is never negated. This guarantees that continuation Xi can only be
reached when the original condition ci is true, and thus preserves the original
semantics of the branch. Therefore, we concludeXi=
∧
ck∈C(j,Q′)
[⁅o, ck⁆]Xj ∧ϕ(= ψi)
(Xi=
∧
j∈Q′′
[⁅o, cj⁆]Xj ∧ϕ)∈Eq//Q
and Q′=
⋃
l∈Q
child(Eq, l)
such that Q′′ ⊆ Q′
 ≡ Eq//Q
(B.20)
By (B.3), (B.17) and (B.20) we know
Eq//domind(ω′′) ≡ ω′′ (B.21)
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By (B.4) and (B.16) we know
∀(Xj=ϕj) ∈ Eq′′ · equation Xj=ϕj is Uniform (B.22)
Finally, by (B.15), (B.16), (B.19), (B.21), (B.22) and IH we know
Eq ≡ ω′ (B.23)
∀(Xk=ψk) ∈ ω′ · equation (Xk=ψk) is Equi-Disjoint (B.24)
∴ This case holds by (B.23) and (B.24).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
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C. Proving Enforcement
Correctness
In this section we present proofs ascertaining the correctness of our enforcers. Par-
ticularly, in Section C.1 we prove auxiliary lemmas required for proving Theo-
rem 4.2, i.e., the synthesised enforcers are Deterministic, while in Section C.2, we
show that these enforcers can also Strongly enforce the sHML formula they were
synthesised from.
C.1 Proving Determinism for the Synthesised En-
forcers
To address the issue of determinism we prove Lemma 4.4 which states that the syn-
thesis function always produces well-formed enforcers from a normalized formula,
and Lemma 4.5, which states that an enforcer always processes an input action
and thus reduces in the same way, and thus behaves deterministically with every
reduction.
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C.1.1 Proving Enforcer Well-formedness (Lemma 4.4)
To Prove.
∀ϕ∈sHMLnf · Lϕ M=e implies e∈Enfwf
By the definition of L− M we can instead prove
∀ϕ∈sHMLnf · L opt(ϕ) M⊥=e implies e∈Enfwf
We therefore quantify over all possible ρ and prove a stronger result, i.e.,
∀ρ, ϕ∈sHMLnf · opt(ϕ)=ψ and Lψ Mρ=e implies e∈Enfwf
Proof by induction on the structure of ϕ.
Case ϕ = tt : This case holds trivially since opt(tt) = tt and L tt Mρ = id where
id∈Enfwf.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ = ff : We know
opt(ff) = ff (C.1)
L ff Mρ = e (C.2)
We must consider two subcases for ρ.
ρ = ⊥: Case does not apply since L ff M⊥ does not produce an enforcer e.
ρ = y: From (C.2) and since ρ = y we know
L ff My = y (C.3)
∴ Case holds by (C.3) since y ∈ Enfwf.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
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Case ϕ =
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi : We know
opt(
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi) =
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]opt(ϕi) (C.1)
L∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]opt(ϕi) M
ρ
= rec y.
∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.ei (if L ffi My = ei)
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.ei (otherwise)
(C.2)
because by the definition of L− My we know
∀i ∈ Q · L opt(ϕi) My=ei (C.3)
By applying the IH on (C.3) we know
∀i ∈ Q · ei ∈ Enfwf (C.4)
Hence, from (C.2), (C.3), (C.4) and the definition of Enfwf we can conclude(
rec y.
∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.ei (if L ffi My = ei)
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.ei (otherwise)
)
∈ Enfwf (C.5)
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case maxX.ϕ and X ∈ fv(ϕ) :
opt(maxX.ϕ) = maxX.opt(ϕ) (C.1)
L maxX.opt(ϕ) Mρ = recx.e (C.2)
because by the definition of L− My we know
L opt(ϕ) Mρ=e (C.3)
By applying the IH on (C.3) we know
e ∈ Enfwf (C.4)
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Hence, from (C.2), (C.4) and the definition of Enfwf we can conclude
recx.e ∈ Enfwf (C.5)
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case maxX.ϕ and X /∈ fv(ϕ) :
opt(maxX.ϕ) = opt(ϕ) (C.1)
L opt(ϕ) Mρ = e (C.2)
By applying the IH on (C.2) we know
e ∈ Enfwf (C.3)
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
C.1.2 Proving Single Step Determinism (Lemma 4.5)
To Prove.
∀e∈Enfwf · e αIµ
′−−−→ e′ and e αIµ′′−−−−→ e′′ implies e′=e′′ and µ′=µ′′
Proof by rule induction on e
αIµ′−−−→ e′.
Case eId : Initially we know
e
αIµ′−−−→ e′ (C.1)
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where
e = id (C.2)
e′ = id (C.3)
µ′ = α (C.4)
e ∈ Enfwf (C.5)
and
e
αIµ′′−−−−→ e′′ (C.6)
By (C.2), (C.6) and eId we know
e′′ = id (C.7)
µ′′ = α (C.8)
Hence, from (C.3), (C.7) and (C.4) and (C.8) we conclude
e′ = e′′ = id (C.9)
µ′ = µ′′ (C.10)
From (C.2), (C.5) and (C.9) we also know
e′, e′′ ∈ Enfwf (C.11)
∴ Case holds by (C.9), (C.10) and (C.11).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case eRec : Initially we know
recx.e
αIµ′−−−→ e′ (C.1)
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because
e{recx.e/x} αIµ′−−−→ e′ (C.2)
and
recx.e
αIµ′′−−−−→ e′′ (C.3)
recx.e ∈ Enfwf (C.4)
By (C.3) and eRec we know
e{recx.e/x} αIµ′′−−−−→ e′′ (C.5)
Since e{recx.e/x} is the unfolded equivalent of recx.e, from (C.4) we can deduce
e{recx.e/x} ∈ Enfwf (C.6)
Hence, by (C.2), (C.5), (C.6) and IH we know
e′ = e′′ (C.7)
µ′ = µ′′ (C.8)
e′, e′′ ∈ Enfwf (C.9)
∴ Case holds by (C.7), (C.8) and (C.9).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case eSel : Initially we know
∑
i∈Q
ei
αIµ′−−−→ e′j (C.1)
because
∃j ∈ Q · ej αIµ
′−−−→ e′j (C.2)
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and
∑
i∈Q
ei
αIµ′′−−−−→ e′k (C.3)
∑
i∈Q
ei ∈ Enfwf (C.4)
By (C.3) and eSel we know
∃k ∈ Q · ek αIµ
′′−−−−→ e′k (C.5)
By (C.4) and the definition of Enfwf we know that every branch ei is prefixed by
disjoint symbolic transformations, such that we know
∀i ∈ Q · ei = ⁅oi, ci, o′i⁆.e′i (C.6)
#
i∈Q
⁅oi, ci⁆ (C.7)
By (C.6) and (C.7) we know that only one of the branches in (C.4) can match the
concrete system event α, and hence no matter how many times e is executed wrt.
α, the same branch is always chosen. Therefore, the same branch is chosen in both
reductions (C.2) and (C.5), such that we can conclude
j = k (C.8)
Hence, by (C.2), (C.5) and (C.8) we know
ej
αIµ′−−−→ e′j (C.9)
ej
αIµ′′−−−−→ e′k (C.10)
Since j ∈ Q, from (C.4) we know
ej ∈ Enfwf (C.11)
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Hence, by (C.9), (C.10), (C.11) and IH we know
e′j = e
′
k (C.12)
µ′ = µ′′ (C.13)
e′j, e
′
k ∈ Enfwf (C.14)
∴ Case holds by (C.12), (C.13) and (C.14).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case eTrns : Initially we know
⁅o, c, o′⁆.e αIµ
′−−−→ eσ (C.1)
because
⁅o, c, o′⁆(α) = (µ′, σ) (C.2)
and
⁅o, c, o′⁆.e αIµ
′′−−−−→ e′′ (C.3)
⁅o, c, o′⁆.e ∈ Enfwf (C.4)
By (C.2), (C.3) and eTrns we know
e′′ = eσ (C.5)
µ′′ = µ′ (C.6)
By (C.4) and the definition of Enfwf, we know that ⁅o, c, o′⁆.e is a special case for∑
i∈Q
⁅oi, ci, o′i⁆.ei, i.e., where Q contains only one index, and hence we know
e ∈ Enfwf (C.7)
Moreover, when σ is applied on an enforcer e, this does not modify the structure
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of e, but just binds data variables defined in a prefixing symbolic event to the data
defined in the matching concrete system event. Hence, from (C.7) we deduce
eσ ∈ Enfwf (C.8)
∴ Case holds by (C.5), (C.6) and (C.8).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
C.2 Proving Strong Enforceability for the Syn-
thesised Enforcers
We prove Theorem 4.3 (restated below), by proving that the enforcers synthesised
by our synthesis function are sound and transparent. We prove these two criteria in
Sections C.2.1 and C.2.2 resp. Finally, we prove the supporting lemma, Lemma 4.8,
in Section C.2.3.
C.2.1 Proving Soundness
∀ρ, p∈Proc, e∈Enfwf, ϕ ∈ sHMLoptnf when ϕ∈Sat · Lϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ implies e′[p]s ϕ
To prove this theorem we must show that relation R (below) is a satisfaction
relation (s) as defined by the rules in Figure 4.14.
R def=
{
(e′[p], ϕ)
∣∣∣ ϕ∈Sat and ∀e ∈ Enfwf · Lϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′}
Proof. By coinduction on the structure of ϕ.
Case ϕ = X : Does not apply since X is an open formula and thus X /∈ Sat
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
167
C. Proving Enforcement Correctness
Case ϕ = ff : Does not apply since ff /∈ Sat
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ = tt : Holds trivially since any process satisfies tt, which confirms that
(id[p], tt) ∈ R, since L tt Mρ{e/ρ} = L tt Mρ = id.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ = maxX.ϕ and X∈fv(ϕ) : We know
(e′[p],maxX.ϕ) ∈ R (C.1)
because
maxX.ϕ ∈ Sat (C.2)
L maxX.ϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ (C.3)
By (C.3) and the definition of L− Mρ, we know
L maxX.ϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = recx.e′′ = e′ (C.4)Lϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′′ (C.5)
Remark: To prove that R is a satisfaction relation, we must prove that whenLϕ {maxX.ϕ/X} Mρ{e/ρ} = e′′′ the following holds:
(e′′′[p], ϕ {maxX.ϕ/X}) ∈ R
By (C.2) and the definition of Sat we can deduce
∃q · q s maxX.ϕ (C.6)
By (C.6) and the definition of s we can know
∃q · q s ϕ {maxX.ϕ/X} (C.7)
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By (C.7) and the definition of Sat we know
ϕ {maxX.ϕ/X} ∈ Sat (C.8)
Since ϕ {maxX.ϕ/X} is the unfolded equivalent of maxX.ϕ, by (C.4), (C.5) and
the definition of L− Mρ, we know
Lϕ {maxX.ϕ/X} Mρ{e/ρ} = e′′{recx.e′′/x} (C.9)
Hence, by (C.8), (C.9) and the definition of R we know
(e′′{recx.e′′/x}[p], ϕ {maxX.ϕ/X}) ∈ R (C.10)
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ =
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi where #i∈Q ⁅oi, ci⁆ : We know
(e′[p],
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi) ∈ R (C.1)
because
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi ∈ Sat (C.2)
#
i∈Q
⁅oi, ci⁆ (C.3)
L∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ (C.4)
By (C.4) and the definition of L− Mρ, we know
L∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi Mρ{e/ρ} = (rec y.∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′i (if L ffi My = e′′i )
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′i (otherwise)
)
= e′ (C.5)
∀i ∈ Q · e′′i = Lϕ My{e/ρ} = Lϕ My (C.6)
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Remark: To prove thatR is a satisfaction relation, we must prove that wheneverL [⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi Mρ{e/ρ} = ei the following condition holds:
∀i∈Q · (ei[p], [⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi) ∈ R
But for R to be a satisfaction relation, by definition of s we must prove
∀i∈Q · (∀q′ · ei[p] α−→ q′ and ⁅oi, ci⁆(α) = σ) implies (q′, ϕiσ) ∈ R
Also, since by (C.3) we know that guarded conjunctions in sHMLnf are disjoint,
we know that the same event α can match and satisfy the condition of at most one
necessity guarding a specific branch. Since the case where none of the branches
match is satisfied trivially, we can simply prove the case where only one branch
matches α, i.e., we must show that whenever L∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ then
∃j∈Q · (e′[p] α−→ q′ and ⁅oj, cj⁆(α) = σ) implies (q′, ϕjσ) ∈ R
Hence we start by assuming the knowledge of
e′[p] α−→ q′ (C.7)
∃j∈Q · ⁅oj, cj⁆(α) = σ (C.8)
By (C.5) and (C.7) we know(
rec y.
∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′i (if L ffi My = e′′i )
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′i (otherwise)
)
[p]
α−→ q′ (C.9)
By (C.9) and iEnf we know
q′ = e′′′[p′] (C.10)(
rec y.
∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′i (if L ffi My = e′′i )
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′i (otherwise)
)
αIα−−−→ e′′′ (C.11)
p
α−→ p′ (C.12)
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By (C.11) and eRec we know(∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′i {e′/y} (if L ffi My = e′′i )
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′i {e′/y} (otherwise)
)
αIα−−−→ e′′′ (C.13)
Since by (C.3) we know that the summands in (C.13) are prefixed by a disjoint
transducer, we thus know that only one branch may be satisfied by action α. Hence,
by applying rule eSel on (C.13) we know
∃j ∈ Q · ⁅oj, cj, γ⁆.e′′j{e′/y} αIα−−−→ e′′′ where γ ∈ {τ, oj} (C.14)
Since the output action of the αIα -reduction in (C.14) is α ≡ ojσ, we know that
the selected branch cannot be a suppression operation (otherwise the output would
have been τ), hence we know
∃j ∈ Q · ⁅oj, cj, oj⁆.Lϕi My{e/y} αIα−−−→ e′′′ (C.15)
By (C.8) and the definition of J⁅o, c, o′⁆K, we know
∃j ∈ Q · ⁅oj, cj, oj⁆(α) = (α, σ) (C.16)
By (C.15), (C.16) and eTrns we know
e′′′ = e′′jσ{e′/y} (C.17)
Since j ∈ Q, from (C.6) we can deduce
e′′j = Lϕj My (C.18)
Hence, by (C.17), (C.18) and the definition of L− Mρ, we can conclude
Lϕjσ My{e′/y} = e′′jσ{e′/y} = e′′′ (C.19)
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Now, by (C.2) and the definition of Sat, we know
∃q · q s
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi (C.20)
By (C.20) and definition of s we know
∃q,∀q′, i ∈ Q · (q α−→ q′ and ⁅oi, ci⁆(α) = σ) implies q′ s ϕjσ (C.21)
Since by (C.3) we know that all branches are disjoint from each other, we can
deduce that (C.21) can be satisfied if there is one branch that matches α (or none
at all), such that we know
∀q′,∃q, j ∈ Q · (q α−→ q′ and ⁅oj, cj⁆(α) = σ) implies q′ s ϕjσ (C.22)
Therefore, by (C.8), (C.12) and (C.22) we know
∃q′ · q′ s ϕjσ (C.23)
Hence, by (C.23), the definition of Sat we know
ϕjσ ∈ Sat (C.24)
Finally, by (C.19), (C.24) and the definition of R we know
∃j ∈ Q · (e′′′[p′], ϕjσ) ∈ R (C.25)
Hence by assumptions (C.7), (C.8), (C.10) and deduction (C.25) we conclude
∃j ∈ Q · (e′[p] α−→ e′′jσ{e′/y}[p′] and ⁅oi, ci⁆(α) = σ)
implies (e′′jσ{e′/y}[p′], ϕjσ) ∈ R
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
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C.2.2 Proving Transparency
To Prove.
∀ρ, p∈Proc, e∈Enfwf, ϕ∈ sHMLoptnf ·ps ϕ and Lϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ implies e′[p] ∼ p
To Prove this lemma we must show that relation R (below) is a strong bisimulation
relation.
R def=
{
(e′[p], p)
∣∣∣ ps ϕ and ∀e ∈ Enfwf · Lϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′}
Hence we must show that R satisfies the following conditions:
(a) if p
µ−→ p′ then e′[p] µ−→ S ′ and (p′, S ′) ∈ R
(b) if e′[p]
µ−→ S ′ then p µ−→ p′ and (p′, S ′) ∈ R
Proof. By coinduction on the structure of ϕ.
Case ϕ = ff : Case does not apply since @p · p s ff.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ = X : Case does not apply since X is an open-formula and @p ·p s X.
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ = tt : Initially we know
(p, e′[p]) ∈ R (C.1)
because
p s tt (C.2)
L tt Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ (C.3)
By (C.3) and the definition of L− Mρ we know that function L− Mρ replaces every
occurrence of ff with ρ, in this case we have no falsehood declarations, and hence
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we know
∀e · L tt Mρ{e/ρ} = L tt Mρ = id = e′ (C.4)
By the definition of s also we know that tt is satisfied by any process, hence we
deduce
p′ s tt (C.5)
Hence by (C.3), (C.5) and the definition of R we know.
(p′, e′[p′]) ∈ R (C.6)
– To Prove (a): Since µ ∈ {α, τ}, we must consider the following two sub-
cases.
– µ =τ : We start by assuming
p
τ−→ p′ (C.7)
By (C.7) and iAsyP we know
e′[p] τ−→ e′[p′] (C.8)
Hence by assumption (C.7) and deductions (C.6) and (C.8) we know
p
τ−→ p′ implies e′[p] τ−→ e′[p′] and (p′, e′[p′]) ∈ R
– µ =α: We start by assuming
p
α−→ p′ (C.9)
By eId we know
id
αIα−−→ id (C.10)
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By (C.9), (C.10) and iEnf we know
id[p]
α−→ id[p′] (C.11)
By (C.4) and (C.11) we can thus deduce
e′[p] α−→ e′[p′] (C.12)
Hence by assumption (C.9) and deductions (C.6) and (C.12) we know
p
α−→ p′ implies e′[p] α−→ e′[p′] and (p′, e′[p′]) ∈ R
– To Prove (b): Since µ ∈ {α, τ}, we must consider the following two sub-
cases.
– µ =τ : We start by assuming
e′[p] τ−→ q (C.13)
By (C.13) and iEnf we know
q = e′′[p′] (C.14)
e′ αIτ−−→ e′′ (C.15)
p
α−→ p′ (C.16)
From (C.4) and (C.15) we can deduce
id
αIτ−−→ e′′ (C.17)
Since there does not exist a rule in our model that allows a monitor of
the form id to reduce using a αIτ -transition, this means that assumption
(C.17) can never occur, which implies that this case does not apply.
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– µ =α: We start by assuming
e′[p] α−→ q (C.18)
By (C.4) and (C.18) we know
id[p]
α−→ q (C.19)
By (C.19) iEnf and eId we know
p
α−→ p′ (C.20)
q = id[p′] (C.21)
By (C.4) and (C.21) we know
q = e′[p′] (C.22)
Hence by assumptions (C.18), (C.22) and deductions (C.6) and (C.20)
we know
e′[p] α−→ e′[p′] implies p α−→ p′ and (p′, e′[p′]) ∈ R
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ = maxX.ϕ where X∈fv(ϕ) : Initially we know
(p, e′[p]) ∈ R (C.1)
because
p s maxX.ϕ (C.2)
L maxX.ϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′ (C.3)
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By (C.3) and the definition of L− Mρ we know
L maxX.ϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = recx.e′′ = e′ (C.4)Lϕ Mρ{e/ρ} = e′′ (C.5)
Since X∈fv(ϕ), we know that the fixpoint variable X is defined in the continuation
formula ϕ, hence if we apply the synthesis function on the unfolded version of
maxX.ϕ, i.e., ϕ {maxX.ϕ/X}, from (C.4) we know that the synthesis produces
an unfolded version of e′, such that we can deduce
Lϕ{maxX.ϕ/X} Mρ{e/ρ} = e′′{recx.e′′/x} (C.6)
By (C.2) and the definition of s we know
p s ϕ{maxX.ϕ/X} (C.7)
Hence, by (C.6), (C.7) and the definition of R we know
(p, e′′{recx.e′′/x}[p]) ∈ R (C.8)
– To Prove (a): We start by assuming
p
µ−→ p′ (C.9)
From (C.8) and IH we know
p
µ−→ p′ implies e′′{recx.e′′/x}[p] µ−→ q′ and (p′, q′) ∈ R (C.10)
By (C.9) and (C.10) we deduce
e′′{recx.e′′/x}[p] µ−→ q′ (C.11)
(p′, q′) ∈ R (C.12)
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By (C.9), (C.11) and iEnf we know
e′′{recx.e′′/x} αIµ−−−→ e′′′ (C.13)
q′ = e′′′[p′] (C.14)
By applying rule eRec on (C.13) we know
recx.e′′
αIµ−−→ e′′′ (C.15)
By (C.9), (C.14), (C.15) and iEnf we know
recx.e′′[p]
µ−→ q′ (C.16)
By (C.4) and (C.16) we deduce
e′[p]
µ−→ q′ (C.17)
Hence by assumption (C.9) and deductions (C.12) and (C.17) we conclude
p
µ−→ p′ implies e′[p] µ−→ q′ and (p′, q′) ∈ R
– To Prove (b): Since µ ∈ {α, τ}, we must consider the following two sub-
cases.
– µ =α: We start by assuming
e′[p]
µ−→ q′ (C.18)
By (C.18) and iEnf we know
q′ = e′′′[p′] (C.19)
e′
αIµ−−−→ e′′′ (C.20)
p
α−→ p′ (C.21)
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By (C.4) and (C.20) we know
recx.e′′
αIµ−−−→ e′′′ (C.22)
By applying rule eRec on (C.22) we know
e′′{recx.e′′/x} αIµ−−−→ e′′′ (C.23)
By (C.19), (C.21), (C.23) and iEnf we know
e′′{recx.e′′/x}[p] µ−→ q′ (C.24)
By (C.8) and IH we know
e′′{recx.e′′/x}[p] µ−→ q′ implies p µ−→ p′ and (p′, q′) ∈ R (C.25)
From (C.24) and (C.25) we thus deduce
p
µ−→ p′ (C.26)
(p′, q′) ∈ R (C.27)
Hence by assumptions (C.18) and deductions (C.26) and (C.27) we con-
clude
e′[p]
µ−→ q′ implies p µ−→ p′ and (p′, q′) ∈ R
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ =
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi : Initially we know
(p, e′[p]) ∈ R (C.1)
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because
p s
∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi (C.2)
#
i∈Q
⁅oi, ci⁆ (C.3)
e′ = L∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi Mρ{e/ρ} (C.4)
By (C.4) and the definition of L− Mρ we know
L∧
i∈Q
[⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi Mρ{e/ρ} = rec y.(∑i∈Q{ ⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′i (if L ffi My=e′′i )⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′i (otherwise)
)
= e′ (C.5)
∀i ∈ Q · e′′i = Lϕ My{e/ρ} = Lϕ My (C.6)
By (C.2) and the definition of s we know
∀i ∈ Q · p s [⁅oi, ci⁆]ϕi (C.7)
By (C.7) and the definition of s we know
∀i∈Q · (∀p′ · p α−→ p′ and ⁅oj, cj⁆(α) = σ) implies p′ s ϕiσ (C.8)
Since by (C.3) we know that a concrete event α can match at most one symbolic
event defined in the guarding necessities, then we know that at most one branch
can be selected at runtime, hence from (C.8) we can deduce
∃j ∈ Q · (∀p′ · p α−→ p′ and ⁅oi, ci⁆(α) = σ) implies p′ s ϕjσ (C.9)
– To Prove (a): Since µ∈{α, τ}, we must consider the following two subcases.
– µ =τ : To prove this subcase we assume
p
τ−→ p′ (C.10)
This case holds trivially since (C.10) contradicts the assumption of
(C.9), thus trivially satisfying the implication in (C.9).
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– µ =α: We start by assuming
p
α−→ p′ (C.11)
We further investigate the following cases:
– ∀j∈Q ·mtch(oj, α) = undef (i.e., no matching branches) :
This case is trivially satisfied by (C.9) since @j ∈ Q · ⁅oi, ci⁆(α) = σ.
– ∃j∈Q · ⁅oj, cj⁆(α) = σ (i.e., 1 matching branch) : We know
∃j∈Q · ⁅oj, cj⁆(α) = σ (C.12)
By (C.9), (C.11) and (C.12) we know
∃j∈Q · p′ s ϕjσ (C.13)
By (C.10) and the definition of J⁅o, c, o′⁆K we know
∃j∈Q · ⁅o, c, o′⁆(α) = (o′σ, σ) (C.14)
By (C.14) and rule eTrns we know
∃j∈Q · ⁅oj, cj, o′⁆.e′′j{e′/y} αIo
′σ−−−−→ e′′jσ{e′/y} (C.15)
By (C.11), (C.15) and rule eSel we know
∃j∈Q ·
∑i∈Q\{j}{ ⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′j{e′/y} (if L ff My=e′′)⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′j{e′/y} (otherwise)
+ ⁅oj, cj, o′⁆.e′′{e′/y}

αIo′σ−−−−−→ e′′jσ{e′/y}
(C.16)
By (C.11), (C.16) and rules eRec + iEnf we know
∃j∈Q · rec y.
(∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′i (if L ffi My=e′′i )
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′i (otherwise)
)
[p]
o′σ−−−→ e′′jσ{e′/y}[p′]
(C.17)
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Since j ∈Q, from (C.6) we can deduce
Lϕj My{e′/y} = e′′j{e′/y} (C.18)
As we consider optimized formulae, we cannot have a case where ff
is embedded within a maximal fixpoint, e.g., maxX.ff would have
been optimized into ff. Hence, since @p · ps ff, from (C.12) we can
deduce
ϕjσ 6= ff (C.19)
By (C.19) we know that actions satisfying [⁅oj, cj⁆]ϕj in (C.17) will
not be suppressed since ϕjσ 6= ff, which means that o′ = oj 6= τ .
Hence, by the definition of L− Mρ, we know
∃j ∈ Q · e′[p] ojσ−−→ e′′jσ{e′/y}[p′] (C.20)
o′ = oj such that ojσ = α (C.21)
Hence, by (C.20) and (C.21) we know
∃j ∈ Q · e′[p] α−→ e′′jσ{e′/y}[p′] (C.22)
Since ϕjσ is the closed equivalent of ϕi (wrt. data variables), from
(C.18) we can deduce
Lϕjσ My{e′/y} = e′′jσ{e′/y} (C.23)
By (C.13), (C.23) and the definition of R we know
∃j ∈ Q · (p′, e′′jσ{e′/y}[p′])∈R (C.24)
Hence, by assumption (C.11) and deductions (C.22) and (C.24) we
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can conclude
∃j ∈ Q · p α−→ p′ implies e′[p] α−→ e′′jσ{e′/y}[p′]
and (p′, e′′jσ{e′/y}[p′])∈R
– To Prove (b): Since µ ∈ {α, τ}, we must consider the following two
subcases.
– µ =τ : We start by assuming
e′[p] τ−→ q (C.25)
By (C.5) and (C.25) we know
rec y.
(∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′i (if L ffi My=e′′i )
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′i (otherwise)
)
[p]
τ−→ q (C.26)
By (C.26) and iEnf + eRec we know
∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′{e′/y} (if L ff My=e′′)
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′{e′/y} (otherwise)
αIτ−−−→ e′′′ (C.27)
p
α−→ p′ (C.28)
q = e′′′[p′] (C.29)
By (C.27) and eSel we know
∃j ∈ Q · ⁅oi, ci, o′⁆.e′′j{e′/y} αIτ−−−→ e′′′ (C.30)
Hence, by (C.30) and eTrns we know
⁅oj, cj, o′⁆(α) = (o′σ, σ) (C.31)
By (C.31) and the definition of J⁅o, c, o′⁆K we know
⁅oj, cj⁆(α) = σ (C.32)
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Hence, by (C.9), (C.28) and (C.32) we know
∃j ∈ Q · p′ s ϕjσ (C.33)
However, as the reduction in (C.30) is performed over action αIτ ,
this can only be achieved when the matched branch is prefixed by
a suppression transducer, i.e., where o′=τ , hence from (C.27) we
know that e′′j{e′/y} performs a suppression operation when L ff My =
e′′j{e′/y}, such that we know
ϕj = ff (C.34)
Hence, this case does not apply (and is thus satisfied trivially) since
by definition of s we know that @p · ps ff, which contradicts with
(C.33) and (C.34).
– µ =α: We start by assuming
e′[p] α−→ q (C.35)
By (C.5) and (C.35) we know
rec y.
(∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′i (if L ffi My=e′′i )
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′i (otherwise)
)
[p]
α−→ q (C.36)
By (C.36) and iEnf + eRec we know
∑
i∈Q
{
⁅oi, ci, τ ⁆.e′′{e′/y} (if L ff My=e′′)
⁅oi, ci, oi⁆.e′′{e′/y} (otherwise)
αIα−−−→ e′′′ (C.37)
p
α−→ p′ (C.38)
q = e′′′[p′] (C.39)
By (C.3), (C.37) and eSel we know
∃j ∈ Q · ⁅oi, ci, o′⁆.e′′j{e/y} αIα−−−→ e′′′ (C.40)
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Since the reduction in (C.40) is performed over an αIα action, this
can only be achieved when the matched branch is guarded by an
identity transducer, such that o′ = oj. Hence, we can infer
∃j ∈ Q · ⁅oj, cj, oj⁆.e′′j{e/y} αIα−−−→ e′′′ (C.41)
By (C.41) and eTrns we know
e′′′ = e′′jσ{e/y} (C.42)
⁅oj, cj, oj⁆(α) = (ojσ, σ) (C.43)
From (C.43) and the definition of J⁅o, c, o′⁆K we know
⁅oj, cj⁆(α) = σ (C.44)
By (C.9), (C.38) and (C.44) we can deduce
p′ s ϕjσ (C.45)
Since j ∈Q from (C.6) we know
Lϕj My = e′′j (C.46)
Hence, from (C.42), (C.46) and the definition of L− Mρ we can deduce
Lϕjσ My{e/y} = e′′jσ{e/y} = e′′′ (C.47)
Therefore, by (C.45), (C.47) and the definition of R, we know
(p′, e′′′[p′]) ∈ R (C.48)
Hence by assumptions (C.35), (C.39) and deductions (C.38) and
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(C.48) we can finally conclude
e′[p] α−→ e′′′[p′] implies p α−→ p′ and (p′, e′′′[p′]) ∈ R
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
C.2.3 Proving Lemma 4.8
To Prove. opt(ϕ) =ψ implies ϕ≡ψ and ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf
Proof. By structural induction on ϕ.
Cases ϕ = ψ where ψ ∈{tt,ff, X} :
Holds trivially since opt(ψ)=ψ and ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf .
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ = maxX.ϕ′ : We know
opt(maxX.ψ′) = ψ (C.1)
By definition of opt, we must consider two subcases
– X ∈ fv(ϕ′) : We know
ψ = maxX.ψ′ (C.2)
ψ′ = opt(ϕ′) (C.3)
By (C.3) and IH we know
ψ′ ≡ ϕ′ (C.4)
ψ′ ∈ sHMLoptnf (C.5)
By (C.1), (C.2) and (C.4) we can deduce
maxX.ψ′ ≡ maxX.ϕ′ (C.6)
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By (C.5) and the definition of sHMLoptnf we know
maxX.ψ′ ∈ sHMLoptnf (C.7)
∴ This subcase holds by (C.6) and (C.7).
– X /∈ fv(ϕ′) : We know
ψ = opt(ϕ′) (C.8)
By (C.8) and IH we know
ψ ≡ ϕ′ (C.9)
ψ ∈ sHMLoptnf (C.10)
Since X /∈ fv(ϕ′), we know that X is never referenced in ϕ′, thus making the
maximal fixpoint declaration maxX. redundant, hence from (C.9) we can
deduce
maxX.ψ′ ≡ ϕ′ ≡ ψ (C.11)
∴ This subcase holds by (C.10) and (C.11).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
Case ϕ =
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ϕi : We know
opt(
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ϕi) =
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ψi (C.1)
because
∀i∈Q · opt(ϕi) = ψi (C.2)
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C. Proving Enforcement Correctness
By (C.2) and IH we know
∀i∈Q · ψi ≡ ϕi (C.3)
∀i∈Q · ψi ∈ sHMLoptnf (C.4)
From (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3) we can deduce
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ϕi ≡
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ψi (C.5)
From (C.1), (C.2), (C.4) and the definition of sHMLoptnf we know
∧
i∈Q
[ηi]ψi ∈ sHMLoptnf (C.6)
∴ This subcase holds by (C.5) and (C.6).
−−−−−−− ◦ −−−−−−−
−−− End of Proof. −−− 
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